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Yet what a noble role the 'relation 
between the name and the object named' has 
played in the eyes of certain 
philosophers! As if there were an 
invisible magical connection between the 
name and the object. There comes a point 
when a philosopher stares at the object, 
saying its name over to himself, and 
trying to elucidate the secret link which 
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Reference is of fundamental importance in natural 
languaqe semantics. In Formal Semantics, reference is 
regarded as an absolute relation between expressions and 
referents. Thus construed. reference is independent of 
the cognitive states of processors. 
Various Formal theories of reference are examined. 
We review the solutions which these theories offer to the 
referential problems associated with 'Opaque Contexts'. 
Such problems must be resolved if the Formal concept of 
reference is to be maintained. 
Formal explanations of other referential phenomena 
are also examined, viz. 'specificity', 'expressive 
responsibility'. and 'referentiality'. The thesis 
demonstrates that certain paradoxes arise as a result of 
using the same logical apparatus to describe all of these 
separate phenomena. 
It is argued that reference is not an absolute and 
invariant relation in language. Despite this claim. it is 
argued that a theory of the effectiveness of referential 
acts is still possible. 
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A system of referential description is presented 
that represents crucial aspects of the process of 
performing and understanding referential acts. It is 
proposed that generating and interpreting natural 
language is best explained as a process of constructing 
cognitive models. The elements involved in constructing 
such models indicate that the state of a language 
processor is the most important determinant of the 
mechanics of the referential act. 
The apparatus embodied in the system is used to 
explain 'specificity', 'expressive responsibility'. etc., 
without recourse to the logical apparatus of scope. The 
system is also deployed in the analysis of discourse 
data. This data is derived from a task in which the 
participants, initially, do not have equal knowledge 
about the likely objects of discourse reference. The 
analysis reveals that referential expressions are 
constructed, used and interpreted. modulo the intentional 
states of the processors. These states include; the 
kinds of high-level 'resource allocation' strategies that 
are in force at any point in the discourse, the beliefs 
processor's have about the domain of discourse, and the 
beliefs they have about the beliefs of their fellow 
interlocutors. 
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LIB~ OE ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
The representation of certain logical symbols is as 
detailed in the translation table below. The right hand 
column is a description of the logical symbol; the left 
hand column gives the corresponding rpresentation used 
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A philosophical problem has the form: 'I 
don't know my way about' L.Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Investigations 123 
INTRODUCTION 
By Wittgenstein's criterion this thesis starts with a 
philosophical puzzle. When I looked at the phenomenon of 
reference in language I became very unsure of 'my way 
about'. Reference has been approached from many 
directions; formal semantics, linguistics, psychology 
and artificial intelligence. This has produced different 
terminologies, different starting premises and different 
ideas about which paradigm really captures the essential 
elements of referential machinery. 
Of course, one can make the point that no approach 
can monopolise the phenomenon, but this is too easy to 
say and much harder to translate into a productive, 
eclectic effort. Nevertheless the ultimate account must 
be interdisciplinary, and it is the job of the 'cognitive 
scientist' to attempt to regiment and integrate data and 
insights from different contributing fields. 
However, it became clear, early on, that there are 
two basic views of reference currently in circulation. 
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They have their roots in fundamentally different views of 
what meaning in natural language is. 
One of these positions, the position occupied by 
formal semantics, has it that structural rules of syntax 
and semantics determine the meaning of sentences in a 
language by determining their truth conditions. Moreover, 
to have mastery of how these rules determine truth 
conditions is in a significant sense to understand the 
language. 
Against this is the view I have characterised as 
Intentionalist. The Intentionalists argue that it is 
impossible to give an adequate account of the concept of 
meaning without appeal to the possession by speakers of 
audience directed intentions of various sorts. Language 
is an audience directed communicative activity. Scholars 
such as Austin. Grice and Searle claim that meaning can 
only be understood in terms of speakers' beliefs and 
intentions, because it is intentions that inform and 
direct acts of communication in specific contexts of 
social interaction involving discourse (Footnote 1). 
Footnote 1. This is not to say, that a truth theory is 
absent from Intentionalist accounts of semantics. 
Although, the role it plays, the nature of the 'truth' 
predicate invoked, varies across Intentionalist theories. 
We shall be discussing the nature and place of 'truth' in 
an Intentionalist theory in later chapters. 
The Formalists argue that the Intentionalists are 
over-impressed by the concept of intended communication. 
Whilst there may be regularities between what intentions 
lie behind a speaker's use of a sentence and what the 
sentence conventionally means, the underlying system of 
syntactic and semantic rules is not a system for 
communicating at all, although it may be incidentally 
used for this purpose. 
Such a fundamental difference in opinion has, as I 
indicated, resulted in two very different views of 
reference in language • 
.Tii.Q VIEWS .QE REFERENCE 
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Reference is, logicians argue, a relation between 
expressions in a language and elements in a world or 
model. Accordingly, when a world is constructed model-
theoretically, the reference or extension of a singular 
term is an object, that of an n-place predicate a set of 
n-tuples of objects and that of a sentence a truth value. 
I will ref er to this as the Principle of Extensional 
Reference. 
To provide a coherent semantics, logicians require 
that the fundamental relations of reference between 
expressions in a language and the set theoretic objects 
in the model are fixed and independent of language users. 
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I will call this the Principle of Invariance of 
Reference. 
Together the principles of extensionality and 
invariance form the core of an 'absolute theory of 
reference'. 
The view of reference I want to contrast with the 
absolute one outlined above can be seen as related to an 
Intentionalist view of meaning. It derives most of its 
content from the claim that the fundamental principle 
behind a theory of reference for natural language ought 
to be a Principle of Context. The Principle would require 
the following as essential considerations in any account 
of reference in natural language: 
language understanding and generation 
takes place in linguistic processors 
linguistic processors are in complex 
internal and external states 
external processor states include at least 
the following; time, place, audience etc. 
internal processor states include at 
least; desires, goals, needs, memory 
states, beliefs etc. 
internal processor states sometimes 
represent the internal states of other 
processors Ceg we have beliefs about the 
beliefs and internal states of others) 
linguistic processors perform audience 
directed linguistic and communicative acts 
The 'intentional' view of reference construes all 
issues involving reference as involving language 
processors. Linguistic expressions in themselves are not 
held to refer. A definite description like 'the 
Departmental noticeboard' lacks reference unless it is 
invested with reference through a particular speaker's 
use of it. 
ref erring is not something an expression 
does; it is something that someone can 
use an expression to do. (P.F.Strawson 
1950) 
reference is a speech act, and speech acts 
are performed by speakers in uttering 
words, not by words. (J.R.Searle 1969) 
This thesis is an attempt to support an 
Intentionalist Processor oriented view of reference in 
language. I am not seeking to 'take on' logic, logic 
always has the formal capacity to model coherent and 
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consistent theories. What I do want to claim is that the 
standard logical accounts of reference fail to highlight 
crucial aspects of the phenomenon as it occurs in natural 
language. 
EEF~RERT..I.AL QPACITY 
The mass of problems surrounding the nature of reference 
has a long history and has generated a huge literature. 
I realised that in 'beginning to find my way' it would be 
wise to concentrate on a particular issue in the 
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referential literature. I chose the area of 'referential 
opacity'. This is a problem of particular interest since 
it has largely preoccupied the Formalists, to whom it 
presents a serious threat, whilst Intentionalists have 
considered the issue to be largely a product of the 
Formalists making and not one they need be agitated by. 
My claim will be that , ironically, the phenomenon, 
properly understood, reveals cogent reasons for adopting 
an Intentional Process view of reference. 
As a preliminary introduction to the problem of 
referential opacity we can say that since, for the 
Formalist, reference is often construed as a relation 
between words and those things in the world that give 
them meaning, any situation in which language seems to 
loose its grip on these referents is bound to be 
worrisome. 
Referential opacity has been held to arise in 
contexts that are traditionally regarded as created by 
such explicit language terms as the adverbs 
'necessarily', 'possibly'; the verbs 'hope', 'seek', 
'want', 'believe', 'regret'; or tense-like modal 
operators such as 'will'. These contexts are known as 
intensional contexts (Footnote 2) • 
Footnote 2. In this thesis I will be dealing with that 
set of intensional-context-creating operators known as 
the verbs of propositional attitude, examples are 'be-
lieve', 'think', 'assert', 'deny' ,'heard' ,'said' etc. 
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To see exactly why these contexts are problematic 
for the Formalist we must briefly consider in more detail 
the Formalists' programme. In formal semantics the aim is 
to produce for a language: 
1. A characterization of the admissible sentences 
2. An interpretation for the well-formed formulas 
3. Laws of inference that determine the entailments 
of sentences 
In this enterprise the syntax of a language is involved 
in a crucial way. First a set of recursive syntactic 
rules are given, these define the set of well-formed 
formulas Cwffs), starting with the smallest, primitive 
elements and specifying how units of various 
categories can be combined to form larger units. 
In developing the semantic theory the Formalist 
usually adheres to a Principle of Compositionality 
(Footnote 3). The Compositionality Principle begins with 
the supposition that each basic expression of the syntax 
is associated with something in that world or model the 
language is being interpreted against, be it an 
individual object, a relation or whatever. This 
correspondence of basic syntactic expressions with things 
This restriction is to enable me to concentrate on the 
problems of reference in 'belief contexts' rather than 
being sidetracked by the additional problems that sur-
round medals, adverbs and various other types of inten-
sional operator. · 
Footnote 3. This is not to say that Intentional theorists 
do not subscribe to some form of Compositionality thesis. 
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in the world or model is the first stage in the 
construction of a semantics, and we can recognise in this 
the fixing of the absolute referential relations of the 
language. The elements of the world or model are 
effectively the referential semantic values of the basic 
syntactic expressions (Footnote 4) • 
The next stage in following Compositionality is to 
produce syntactic and semantic rules of combination that 
take as their inputs various smaller expressions and 
produce as outputs more complex expressions constituted 
out of the more basic expressions. The formalist can 
then arrange a situation such that each syntactic rule of 
combination R, taking as inputs various smaller 
expressions and producing as output more complex 
expressions, has a corresponding semantic rule R' which 
takes as the input the semantic values of the smaller 
syntactic expressions and gives as output something which 
is the semantic value of the more complex syntactic 
expression generated by R. If the syntax and semantics 
are made to operate in tandem like this each sentence and 
each well-formed constituent will have a semantic value. 
Footnote 4. This is true of certain systems of formal 
semantics, we shall see, however, that in others, for 
example, Possible world semantics, the story is more 
complex than this. 
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In simple extensional formal languages the semantic 
values, assigned by the reference fixing assignment, 
given to basic expressions of the language are; objects 
to constants and sets of objects to predicates. These are 
the referents or denotations of these language terms. 
Full sentences are given truth values as their semantic 
values and denotations. 
This adherence to the Principle of Compositionality 
means, in these languages, that the semantic value of the 
whole sentence is rigorously determined by the semantic 
value of its parts and the syntactic combination of these 
parts. But such a simple way of assigning an 
interpretation and ascertaining semantic value will not 
succeed for natural language. 
To illustrate this point imagine we did try a simple 
extensional interpretation for natural language. Now 
consider the sentence triple (1)-(3); 
(1) Cicero is Tully 
(2) Claudius believes that Cicero denounced 
Catiline 
(3) Claudius believes that Tully denounced 
Catiline 
In such a case the denotation of the singular terms would 
be just those objects they named. Thus we might say the 
denotation of the proper name 'Cicero' was the individual 
Cicero, as was the denotation of the proper name 'Tully' 
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(Footnote 5). 
There is a rule in ordinary formal extensional 
languages which states that two expressions of the 
language may be substituted for one another freely if 
they denote the same object. If this is accepted then for 
these languages the truth functional evaluation of the 
substitutans will not be different from the 
substitutandum (Footnote 6). 
We can lay down this rule formally as in (4). We are 
to understand (4) as asserting that if the expressions 
'a' and 'b' are identical (in the sense that they stand 
for the same object, set of objects etc.) then the 
formula of the language 'Fa\b' is equivalent in its 
semantic value to 'F' 
(4) a = b -> [ F <-> Fa\b ] 
where 'Fa\b' is understood as substituting 
in 'F', 'b' for all free occurrences of 
the expression 'a'. 
Footnote 5. Throughout this thesis I have adopted the 
convention of placing the referring expressions thern-
sel ves in single quotation marks, and the referents of 
these phrases are underscored. 
Footnote 6. This test of substitutibility is one of two 
generally used to detect for the presence of Intensional 
contexts. The other is the failure of existential gen-
eralisation, exemplified in sentence (i). Once again this 
is a violation of a canon of extensional languages; in 
extensional languages the introduction of an existential-
ly quantified noun-phrase implies the existence of an 
object satisfying the expression. 
(i) Claudius believes a dryad broke his mirror. 
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This rule does not hold for English, (2) might be 
true and (3) false. In other words Cladius might believe 
and be rational about identity criteria, but not know 
that the Cicero of the orations and the Tully of 'De 
Senectute' were the same person. This problem holds 
generally for singular terms. 
To summarise, the model of reference the Formalist, 
as characterised, advocates is that the referents of the 
singular terms in (1)-(3) are the objects named, thus the 
referents of the sentences (2)&(3) Ci.e the respective 
truth values) should be the same. This not being 
necessarily so, the Formalist is pressed to explain why 
referential compositionality has broken down in natural 
language. 
THESI~ QUTL.l.NE 
The outline of this thesis, then, is as follows. The 
first part describes the development of the most 
influential Formalist approach to the problem of 
Intensional contexts. I indicate how, throughout, the 
approach has always embodied, at its base, the kind of 
Formalist theory of reference I have characterised. In 
the next part of the thesis I discuss certain problems 
that beset the Formalist's account of reference in 
natural language. I discuss how a 'non-absolute' view of 
reference can still suffice to secure 'communicative 
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success' in our language. I then go on to introduce my 
proposals for a system that attempts to relieve some of 
the particular problems manifested by the Formalist 
theory I have been reviewing. My proposals require the 
introduction of processors and their intentional states. 
I make the point that analysing referential opacity in 
such a way reveals language to be in a certain sense 
'radically opaque'. The system predicts that using 
language, whether in referential or other communicative 
acts is a 'risky' business and that misinterpretation 
will occur more often than a formal theory would predict. 
Finally I present the results of some discourse analysis 
work that supports an Intentional view of reference. The 
analysis relies heavily on apparatus embodied in the 
system of referential description developed earlier in 
this thesis. 
CHAPTER QNE FORMAL PERSPECTIVES .QN REFERENCE bND OPACITY 
SECTION ONE FREGEAN .,SEMANTICS 
Gottlobb Frege (1848-1925) was the first philosopher 
to formally investigate intensional phenomena. It is his 
celebrated distinction between sense and reference that 
will be of most relevance to this thesis. 
For Frege the relation of reference secured the 
content of what we talk about. Frege held that the 
referents of proper names and complex descriptions are 
objects in the world. Frege makes the strong realist 
claim that in ordinary language what we talk about are 
objects in the real world. Frege also adhered in his 
semantic work to the Principle of Compositionality; the 
meaning of a sentence is rigorously determined by the 
meaning of its parts. 
I said in the introduction, that the verbs of 
propositional attitude threaten this elegant account of 
reference and semantic compositionality. 
Suppose we say, using example~ similar to (1)-(3), 
that in (1.1)-(1.4) the referent of the terms 'the 
Morning star' and 'the Evening Star' is the planet Venus. 
The semantic values of (1.3) and (1.4) now look 
identical- these sentences are composed out of elements 
that are about the same things. But we know that (1.4) 
may be false and (1.3) true. How is this possible? 
(1.1) The Morning Star is 7800 miles in diameter. 
Cl.2) The Morning Star is the Evening star. 
(1.3) Beverly believes the Morning Star is 
the Morning star. 
Cl.4) Beverly believes the Morning Star is 
the Evening Star. 
Frege's solution is simple, within opaque contexts 
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descriptions do not have their normal referents. Within 
opaque contexts descriptions have as their referents 
objects called senses. In cases such as (1.3) and (1.4), 
Frege would say that the senses of the descriptions 'the 
Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star' can be different. 
Compositionality is saved because the semantic values 
associated with Cl.4) and (1.3) need not be the same, to 
be the same the senses of the two descriptions would have 
had to have been identical. 
This solution applies quite generally, not just to 
proper names and descriptions. Consequently a whole 
sentence occurring within an opaque context must be 
construed as not having customary reference Cits truth 
value) but indirect reference (the sense it expresses 
(Footnote 1.1)). 
Footnote 1.1. Frege called the senses of sentences 
Cl.5) Barry Smith plays rugby. 
Cl.6) Barry Smith lives at 29 Restalrig Terrace. 
(1.7) Dr Gordon Baker believes that Barry Smith 
plays rugby. 
Cl.8) Dr Gordon Baker believes that Barry Smith 
lives at 29 Restalrig Terrace. 
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We can illustrate this using arguments analogous to 
those presented in examples Cl.1)-(1.4). Suppose (1.5) 
and (1.6) are true- that is they have the same referent, 
the truth value 'true'. Notwithstanding, we do not want 
to say that substituting one for another in a complex 
pair of sentences such as (1.7) and Cl.8) will preserve 
the truth values of these complex sentences. 
The Fregean solution is to assert that Dr Baker's 
beliefs are not about truth values but senses. The senses 
of (1.5) and Cl.6) are allowed to be different whilst 
there reference may be the same. Consequently, the 
complex sentences into which they are substituted need 
not have the same semantic values. There is 
compositionality of sense as well as reference. 
Frege, by considering what substitutes are possible 
without change of truth-value in opaque contexts, was 
forced to conclude that we need an additional level of 
semantic theory; we need a theory of sense. But what is 
'thoughts'. 
sense? 
We can think of the theory of 
[reference] (Footnote 1.2), very generally 
as concerned with the relations between 
expressions of the language and entities 
in the world. Now, Frege came to see the 
need for another level of description and 
theory which is concerned, we might with 
equal generality say, with relations 
between expressions of the language and 
the understanding competent speakers have 
of them. He found it necessary to 
recognise the possibility of an objective 
semantic difference between two 
expressions not distinguishable by the 
theory of reference [ ••• ] - this 
difference having to do with the different 
ways in which the expressions are to be 
understood by competent speakers, these 
different ways in turn ultimately resting 
upon the different thoughts and 
propositional attitudes that competent 
speakers will have on hearing and 
understanding sentences containing the two 
expressions. (Evans 1982:13) 
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The sense of an expression seems to be the .me.ans by 
which a referent of an appropriate kind is determined for 
the expression. Though reference has a vital role in a 
theory of meaning, our understanding of a word or complex 
expression can never consist merely in associating word 
and object. There must be a means by which this 
association is grasped, by which sense is grasped. Frege 
himself in talking of sense used the metaphor of a route 
from the word to a referent. In opaque contexts what we 
are talking about are senses- we are talking about the 
Footnote 1.2 • Evans actually uses the term 'Meaning' 
for reference, He is using the term 'Meaning' with this 
particular technical sense. 
17 
method by which a normal referent is identified. Sense 
is always present- within opaque contexts sense becomes 
the referent of language, it is what we are talking 
about. 
The concept of sense renders another semantic 
problem tractable. How is it that certain statements of 
identity, such as (1.9) and Cl.10), be informative? 
(1.9) The Morning Star is the Evening Star. 
(1.10) Cicero is Tully. 
There is no more pungent account of the problem and its 
perceived solution than the one Frege gives himself in a 
letter he wrote to Philip Jourdain. 
Let us suppose that an explorer travelling 
in an unexplored country sees a high snow-
capped mountain on the Northern horizon. 
By making inquiries among the natives he 
learns that its name is 'Aphla'. By 
sighting it from different points he 
determines its position as exactly as 
possible, enters it on his map, and writes 
in his diary: 'Aphla at least 5000 metres 
high'. Another explorer sees a snow-capped 
mountain on the southern horizon and 
learns that it is called Ateb. He enters 
it on his map under that name. Later 
comparison shows that both explorers saw 
the same mountain. Now the content of the 
proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is far from 
being a mere consequence of identity, but 
contains a valuable piece of geographical 
knowledge. What is stated in the 
proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is certainly 
not the same thing as the content of the 
proposition 'Ateb is Ateb'. Now if what 
corresponds to the name 'Aphla' as a part 
of the thought was the referent of the 
name and hence the mountain itself then 
this would be the same in both thoughts. 
The thought expressed in 'Ateb is Aphla' 
would have to correspond to the one 'Ateb 
is Ateb', which is far from being the 
case. What corresponds to the name 'Ateb' 
as part of the thought must therefore be 
different from what corresponds to the 
name 'Aphla' as part of the thought. This 
cannot therefore be the reference which is 
the same for both names, but must be 
something which is different in the two 
cases, and I say accordingly that the 
sense of the name 'Ateb' is different from 
the sense of the name 'Aphla'. 
Accordingly, the sense of the proposition, 
'Ateb is at least 5000 metres high' is 
also different from the sense of the 
proposition 'Aphla is at least 5000 metres 
high'. Someone who takes the later to be 
true need not therefore take the former to 
be true. An object can be determined in 
different ways, and every one of these 
ways of determining it can give rise to a 
special name and these different names 
then have different senses, for it is not 
self-evident that it is the same object 
which is being determined in different 
ways. We find this in astronomy in the 
case of the planetoids and cornets. Now if 
the sense of a name was something 
subjective, then the sense of the 
proposition in which the name occurs, and 
hence the thought, would also be something 
subjective, and the thought one connects 
with this proposition would be different 
from the thought another man connects with 
it; a common store of thoughts, a common 
science would be impossible. It would be 
impossible for something a man said to 
contradict what another man said, because 
the two would not express the same thought 
at all, but each his own. 
For these reasons I believe that the sense 
of a name is not something subjective 
[crossed out: in one's mental life], that 
it does not therefore belong to 
psychology, and that it is indispensable 
(Frege, in Gabriel et al 1980:80). 
Frege argues that the sense of a proper name such as 
'Ateb' cannot consist in its having the reference it 
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does. we need a second semantic element- the element of 
sense. In appealing to arguments about informational 
content Frege is explicitly linking the notion of sense 
and knowledge. 
Since sense seems to have to do with information we 
might suppose that Frege belongs to a cognitivist 
tradition. However, a moments reflection on the passage 
quoted reveals the anti-cognitivist nature of Fregean 
sense. He outlines his objections forcefully. Objective 
sense is forced on us since we require an objective 
science and an account of why we can recognise and agree 
on a certain class of assertions as true. This 
requirement is constantly reiterated in Frege's writings. 
Whenever anyone recognises something to be 
true, he makes a judgement. What he 
recogni3es to be true is a thought Cie 
sense of a sentence). It is impossible to 
recognise a thought as true before it has 
been grasped. A true thought was true 
before it was grasped by anyone. A thought 
does not have to be owned by anyone. The 
same thought can be grasped by several 
people. Making a judgement does not alter 
the thought that is recognised to be true. 
(Frege 1915, in Hermes et al 1979:251) 
Frege argues that what is recognizable in that class of 
sentences we agree to assent to, is the objective fact of 
sense. Moreover, in so far as sentential senses are 
functions of their constituent senses, then the 
constituent senses can no more be subjective than 
sentential ones. 
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In his letter to Jourdain Frege writes, 'An object 
can be determined in different ways, and every one of 
these ways of determining it can give rise to a special 
name and [ •• ] these names then have different senses'. 
Is this really commensurable with what he writes a few 
lines later. 'I believe that the sense of a name is not 
something subjective'? 
Surely people can come through different methods and 
contexts of presentations of objects to develop separate 
senses. These may be very particular and highly 
idiosyncratic. How can senses avoid the taint of 
subjectivity? How can there be any appropriate or correct 
way to characterise the sense of words? 
Frege seems perfectly aware of the variation in 
sense attached, by different individuals or at different 
times, to the same expression. He also is sensitive to 
the fact that the senses so attached are of ten vague and 
indeterminate. 
We might say that Frege's reaction was to see this 
haziness of sense in language as a defect. The lack of 
precision and ambiguity in language should be banished so 
as to achieve the logical clarity he sought. Dummett 
writes: 
The picture of language which Frege 
employs in discussing sense is that in 
which each logically simple expression of 
the language is introduced or explained, 
whether by means of definition or (since 
it is impossible that every expression be 
defined) by some other means, without room 
for variation, to each person when he 
first becomes familiar with its use. 
(Dummett 198la:l05) 
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Frege's response to the failure of natural language 
practice to meet this demand was to declare our practice 
defective. 
At the very least the picture presented so far of 
Frege's notion of sense with its radically anti-
psychologistic nature procures it a curious ontological 
status. There is nothing much that can be done with a 
sense except grasp it, subsequently to express it and so 
convey it to other in the linguistic community. 
However, it is one thing to feel uncomfortable with 
Frege's ideas but if we reject them we are obliged to 
account for those semantic facts which Frege's theory of 
meaning render tractable. 
Before leaving Frege I will outline his views on the 
classes of nominal expression with which I will be 
particularly concerned throughout this thesis. These are, 
proper names, definite descriptions and indefinite 
expressions. These three categories of expression are 
especially important in the reference literature because 
of the various claims made, and explanations given, of 
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whether and how such expressions might refer. 
Frege uses the term 'proper name' to talk both of 
ordinary names (such as 'Alexander', 'Berlin' etc.) and 
definite descriptions (such as 'the moon', 'the horse 
that carried Napoleon at Austerlitz' etc.). A proper name 
for Frege is any expression that refers to a definite 
object. 
It is clear from the context that by ••• 
name I have understood any designator 
figuring as a proper name, which has as 
its meaning a definite object ••• The 
designator of a single object can also 
consist of several words or other signs. 
For brevity let every such designator be 
called a proper name. (Frege 1892a, in 
Geach et al 1980:57) 
the singular definite article always 
indicates an object. (Frege 1892b, in 
Geach et al 1980:57) 
The senses of ordinary names and definite 
descriptions are placed in a close correspondence by 
Frege 
The sense of a proper name is grasped by 
anybody who is sufficiently familiar with 
the language or totality of designations 
to which it belongs; but this serves to 
illuminate only a single aspect of the 
thing meant, supposing it to have one. 
Comprehensive knowledge of the thing meant 
would require us to be able to say 
immediately whether any given sense 
attaches to it. To such knowledge we never 
attain. (Frege 1892a, in Geach et al 
19 80: 57) 
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Frege goes on, in a footnote to the article from 
which the above quote comes, to describe the case of 
ordinary names as we might use them. He allows a 
surprising tolerance in this passage given that one 
constant objection he brings to the identification of the 
sense of expressions with their associated ideas is that 
this would allow sense to vary from person to person. 
In the case of an actual proper name such 
as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense 
may differ. It might, for instance, be 
taken to be the following: the pupil of 
Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. 
Anybody who does this will attach another 
sense to the sentence 'Aristotle was born 
in Stagira' than will a man who takes as 
the sense of the name: the teacher of 
Alexander the Great who was born in 
Stagira. So long as the thing meant 
remains the same, such variations of sense 
may be tolerated, although they are to be 
avoided in the theoretical structure of a 
demonstrative science and ought not to 
occur in a perfect language. (Frege 
1892a, in Geach et al 1980:58) 
Frege held that objects are the referents of proper 
names. Moreover, only one object can be designated by 
each such name. However, more than one object can fall 
under a concept (the referent of a predicate). Thus a 
concept such as 'moon of Venus', or 'horse drawing the 
Queen's carriage' can have a number, the number of 
objects forming the extension of the concept. Concept 
signs, Frege maintained, can becom~ names of objects, by 
being conjoined with a deictic expression or the definite 
article (eg 'The horse that carried Napoleon at 
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Austerlitz', 'This horse ••• ' etc.) But in this case they 
are no longer functioning as concept signs. Moreover, a 
concept sign does not become a proper name merely because 
its extension happens to comprise of exactly one object. 
Thus 'moon of Earth' is a concept sign and not a proper 
name. 
Frege also held that concept signs do not form 
proper names when combined with the indefinite article 
'a'. Dummett (198la:59) formulates the kind of criteria 
that Frege would have adopted in distinguishing whether 
or not an expression is a proper name in a particular 
context. 
Dummett argues that it is a necessary condition for 
an expression, say 'h', to be a Fregean proper name 
(denote an object) that we should be able to infer from a 
sentence containing it the result of replacing in that 
sentence the expression 'h' by the word 'something'. To 
rule out the inference of (1.12) from (1.11) we add the 
requirement that we reframe the inference as (1.13) from 
(1.11) • 
Cl.11) If Thatcher wins, we shall be out of work. 
Cl.12) If something wins, we shall be out of work. 
(1.13) There is something such that if it wins, 
we shall be out of work. 
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The expression 'something' itself is taken not to 
refer for the very good reason that from Cl.14) and 
Cl.15) we cannot infer Cl.16). Thus a further requirement 
is attached to the rule to detect proper names- from two 
sentences containing the alleged proper name 'Sl(h)' and 
'S2(h)' it should be possible to infer 'There is 
something such that Sl(it) and S2Cit) '·This rules out, 
as it should on a Fregean account, any case of naming in 
the indefinite expressions occurring in (1.17) and 
(1.18). 
Cl.14) Something raced past the barn. 
Cl.15) Something raced past the cottage. 
Cl.16) There is something such that it raced 
passed the barn and the cottage. 
Cl.17) A horse raced past the barn. 
Cl.18) A horse raced past the cottage. 
It should be pointed out that a long tradition in 
formal semantics, which has also come to dominate 
linguistic attitudes, is to associate the indefinite 
article 'a' with the semantics of the existential 
quantifier 'Ex •• '. This quantifier can be informally 
glossed as 'There exists something such that •• '. Thus 
'Ex(Man(x))' is usually understood as being equivalent to 
a form of words such as 'There exists an x such that x 
has the property of being a man'. ~rege as the founder of 
quantification theory was also the first to identify the 
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logical existential operator with the indefinite article 
of natural language. 
'someone falling under the concept man' 
means the same as 'a man' (Frege 1892b, in 
Geach et al 1980:47). 
The correctness of such an identification will be 
the subject of further discussion in this thesis (cf 
Chapter 7) • 
One of the main accomplishments of Frege and his 
formal semantic heirs lies in the provision of a 
recursive definition of the truth definitions of 
sentences of certain languages. This requires a rigorous 
definition of the truth conditions of all the complex 
sentences in terms of the truth conditions of the simpler 
sentences of which they are composed, and ultimately in 
terms of a set of basic assignment of objects to 
expressions and sets of objects to predicates etc. The 
existence in natural languages of opaque contexts 
threatens the success of such a simple and elegant 
recursive programme. Frege pointed the way to a means of 
saving the compositionality principle for reference. 
For those Formalists sympathetic to Frege's semantic 
proposals two things had to be done: 
1. formalise the notion of sen~e (the 
formal notion of sense was termed 
intension by Carnap (1947)) 
2. establish formal criteria to 
distinguish when an expression normally 
denotes and when it denotes its sense. 
Before discussing how these two desiderata were 
realised I want to look at a logical alternative to the 
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Fregean proposals. It was advanced only a few years after 
Frege's and it claimed that a theory of reference 
exhausted the semantic content of language. 
SECTION .TN.Q .IDJSSELLIAN ~EMANTICS 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) took up many of the issues 
Frege had raised about the semantic analysis of natural 
language. 
Certainly with regard to the question 'What is 
referring?' Russell and Frege held similar views. 
Reference was the relation between an expression of the 
language and a designated object. The relation of 
reference thus underpinned for Russell and Frege the 
possibility of a theory of meaning. 
But contra Frege, Russell held that referring 
expressions can only 'mean' by virtue of the objects they 
designate. Russell's Theory of Meaning makes no 
provision for sense. 
In his 1905 article 'On denoting' Russell presented 
a new analysis of what he called 'denoting phrases'. Such 
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denoting phrases include, 'a man', 'some man', 'every 
man', 'all men', 'the present Queen of England', 'the 
present King of France', 'the mass of the solar system at 
the first instant of the twentieth century', 'the 
revolution of the Sun round the Earth' etc. These 
denoting phrases are characterised purely in virtue of 
their form. 
Russell distinguishes three cases within the class 
of denoting phrases. 
1 A phrase may be denoting but not denote anything, 
eg 'the present King of France'. 
2 A phrase may denote a definite object, 
eg 'the present Queen of England'. 
3 A phrase may denote ambiguously, eg 'a man'. 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions starts from the 
premise that denoting phrases do not reveal their actual 
logical form. In this respect denoting phrases such as 
'the present King of France' are misleading natural 
language 'shorthand'. A shorthand that induces a mistaken 
perception of denoting phrases as subject terms. Russell 
analyses sentences containing denoting phrases as complex 
existential statements. A sentence like (1.19) is 
equivalent to the conjunction of the following three 
sentences: 
(1.19) The present King of France is bald 
(l.19a) There is at least one present 
King of France. 
Cl.19b) At most one person is presently 
King of France. 
(l.19c) That person is bald. 
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We can symbolise the conjunction of these three sentences 
in the predicate calculus representation (1.19'). 
Cl .19') (Ex) ( F (x) & (y) ( F (y) -> x =y) & G ( x)) 
where 'F' is the predicate 'King of France' 
and 'G' the predicate 'is bald'. 
Notice that all of (l.19a), (l.19b), and (l.19c) 
except the last two words of (l.19c) are in effect the 
original denoting phrase 'the present King of France'. 
Notice also that since (l.19a) is false the entire 
conjunction which is the analysis of (1.19) is false, but 
certainly not meaningless. 
What struck Russell about his analysis was that the 
denoting phrase had expanded in such a way that the 
denoting phrase has disappeared upon logical analysis 
into quantified variables and predicates. Denoting 
phrases, on analysis, do not denote at all. Obviously, 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions depends upon a 
background theory of quantification. Russell defines 
'the x' by means of 
(a) the existential quantifier 'some x' 
(b) the idea of 'not more than one x', 
which he defines in terms of the 
universal quantifier and identity. 
Russell saw his theory of descriptions as 
demonstrating a radical difference between names and 
descriptions. This enables him to give an alternative 
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explanation of the informativeness of identity statements 
to that provided by Frege. Russell recast the identity 
problem in the following amusing way: 
George IV wished to know whether Scott was 
the author of Waverley ; and in fact Scott 
was the author of Waverley. Hence we may 
substitute Scott for .th_e .fill-.tho.I. of 
'Waverley', and thereby prove that George 
IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. 
Yet an interest in the Law of Identity can 
hardly be attributed to the first 
gentleman of Europe. (Ibid;47-48) 
Russell's solution to this absurdity was to assert 
that of course George IV did not wish to know whether 
Scott was Scott. What George IV did want to know was 
given that one and only one person authored Waverley was 
Scott that person. The point is that being the 'author of 
Waverley' does not, like 'Scott', get its meaning by 
naming, but in this indirect way by description. A name 
and a description that identify the same person cannot, 
therefore in general be substituted for each other. 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions makes it logically 
transparent why not. 
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But once embarked on this style of analysis what is 
Russell to say of identity statements such as {1.10) 
cited previously in this chapter. 
Cl.10) Cicero is Tully. 
His response must be that these are not really proper 
names but disguised denoting phrases. Russell says 
explicitly that really proper names cannot be informative 
in the way Cl .10) is. 
for the name itself is merely a means of 
pointing to the thing, and does not occur 
in what you are asserting, so that if one 
thing has two names, you make exactly the 
same assertion whichever of the names you 
use, provided they are really names _gng 
not truncated descriptions. {Russell: The 
philosophy of logical atomism, in Marsh 
1956:245) 
Russell was convinced that more often than not when 
proper names are used in ordinary language they are in 
fact truncated descriptions, these proper names are used 
as shorthand for more detailed meanings. Nevertheless, 
it is important to realise that for Russell the logical 
ideal underlying the distinction of descriptions and 
names is conceivable, even if it is not often 
approximated by.the ordinary proper names of 'persons, 
places and things'. He came eventually to speak of 
logically proper names- names, that is, which pick out 
their referent without any description whatever. 
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Russell believed that logically proper names really 
get us to reality. And whereas logically proper names get 
us to reality directly, descriptive phrases only purport 
to. So how do 'denoting phrases' engage reality? If we 
suppose, with Russell, that a primary way of engaging 
reality is by naming or some variant of it then we must, 
show how 'denoting phrases' engage the world without 
being names. 
To answer this problem Russell appeals to 
'surrogate' names. Consider a description as in (1.20), 
the Theory of Descriptions would analyse this as in 
(1.21). We can think of 'x' as a 'deputy' proper name 
(Footnote 1.3). The variable 'x' together with the 
existential quantifier makes contact with 'reality' in 
the same radically simple manner as a logically proper 
name. 
Cl.20) The Prime Minister of Britain is a woman. 
(1.21) (Ex) (P(x) & (y) (P(y) -> x=y) & W(x)) 
Footnote 1.3. This is similar to the logical device of 
Skolemisation. In the Predicate Calculus we are able to 
introduce new constant symbols, Skolem constants, in the 
place of the variables introduced by the existential 
quantifiers. Instead of saying that there exists an 
object with a certain set of properties, one can create a 
name for one such object and simply say that it has the 
properties. Skolemisation has the essential further pro-
perty of guaranteeing that there is an interpretation for 
the symbols of a formula that makes.the formula true if 
and only if there is an interpretation for the skolemised 
version of the formula. 
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The quantified variable, considered in isolation, is the 
logical device for making objective reference without any 
descriptive element (the descriptive elements are added 
by means of the logical symbols for the predicates). On 
this way of looking at the matter Cl.20) conveys the 
proposition that two predicates ' •• is Prime Minister of 
Britain', • •• is a woman', hang together in one term, call 
it 'x'. This we have distinguished the (deputy) naming 
and describing ingredients within the descriptive phrase. 
Unfortunately, for Russell, quantification is not, 
and cannot be, genuine naming. Russell connects logical 
questions about reference and meaning with questions 
about epistemology. 
We must attach some meaning to the words 
we use, if we are to speak significantly 
and not utter mere noise; and the meaning 
we attach to our words must be something 
with which we are acquainted. (Russell 
1912: 32) • 
He must therefore deny naming to quantification 
because we do not have acquaintance with the object in 
question. It is not genuine naming because 'something' 
does not ~ out an individual, it merely indicates that 
an individual or particular x, y, z ••• n is at issue. The 
quantified expression is not our route to .th~ individual. 
Grounding our descriptions in terms of acquaintance 
is a problem Russell never satisfactorily resolves. Even 
if he were to provide a compelling solution in the way 
outlined another problem immediately arises. The 
essential subjectivity of our immediate acquaintance of 
the world seems incompatible with objective meaning. 
When a person uses a word, he does not 
mean by it the same thing as another 
person means by it. I have often heard it 
said that this is a misfortune. That is a 
mistake. It would be absolutely fatal if 
people meant the same things by their 
words. It would make all intercourse 
impossible. and language the most hopeless 
and useless thing imaginable, because the 
meaning you attach to your words must 
depend on the nature of the objects you 
are acquainted with and since different 
people are acquainted with different 
objects, they would not be able to talk to 
each other unless they attached quite 
different meanings to their words (Russell 
1918, in Marsh 1956:195). 
This position seems directly contrary to the Fregean 
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thesis of objective sense outlined in the last section. 
How can language. logic or science be used to assert, 
affirm or verify a common stock of truths on such a 
Russellian analysis? How can we effect a transition from 
the privacy of experience and the presumed privacy of 
language which depends on that experience to successful, 
public, communication? 
Russell of course saw the problem. He was 
endeavouring to produce an heroic synthesis of language, 
logic, ontology and epistemology. In the end he was 
unable to reconcile the demands of a logical semantics 
with the subjective view of linguistic meaning which his 
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epistemology required. 
Frege legislated such a problem out of existence by 
de-psychologising meaning. He achieved his objective 
language semantics by placing 'meanings' or 'senses' out 
in the world quite apart from their referents. 
As we shall see in the next section a later 
generation of logicians helped themselves to what they 
saw as the best of Frege and Russell • 
.s.E_C.'.r.I.QN THREE INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS 
Whilst it had been Russell's ambition to dispense with 
sense, other logicians attempted to develop and more 
fully formalise Frege's semantic theory. 
I said at the end of Section One that any attempt to 
fully formalise Frege's programme, including his 
treatment of referential opacity, had to satisfy two 
desiderata: 
1. formalise the notion of sense 
2. establish criteria to distinguish when 
an expression directly refers and when it 
indirectly refers. 
These desiderata where first considered by Carnap 
(1947) who coined the term 'intension' for his formalised 
notion of sense. And were subsequently developed by 
Church (1951), Kripke(l963) and Kaplan (1964). Montague 
in a series of papers (196 8,1970a,1970b,1970c,1973) 
applied the resulting formal system to a substantial 
fragment of English. 
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An intension is a theoretical construct that does 
what a sense does; insofar as the sense of an expression 
is something that determines for any time, place and 
possible situation, the denotation of the expression in 
that time, place and situation (or in the case of a 
sentence, the truth value of the sentence in that time, 
place and situation). 
Montague adopted the basic idea of using possible 
world semantics to define the notion of intensions for a 
formal language. Appeal to the notion of possible states 
of affairs had provided the ideas necessary for the 
development of co-ordinate semantics by Kripke (1959, 
1963). He had suggested taking constructs he called 
'possible worlds' as indices for modal logic semantics. 
Modal logic had its own set of opaque contexts to worry 
about. The logical operator 'Necessarily' (symbolised as 
'NEC') is just such an opaque or intension creating 
operator. The truth of a sentence of the form 'NEC PHI' 
is not simply a function of the truth value of 'PHI' • 
Suppose it happens to be true in the actual world that 
the head of the linguistics department is the dean of the 
faculty of arts. Then (1.22) and (1.23) are both true, 
but (l.24) is true while Cl.25) is false. 
(1.22) The head of the linguistics department 
is the head of the linguistics department. 
(1.23) The head of the linguistics department 
is the dean of the faculty of arts. 
Cl.24) Necessarily the head of the linguistics 
department is the head of the linguistics 
department. 
(1.25) Necessarily the head of the linguistics 
department is the dean of the faculty of arts. 
Such problems have a familiar look. It was the 
analysis of the semantics of the modal operators 
'necessarily' and 'possibly' that provided, not only 
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another motivation for formally characterising intension, 
but also an idea of what the apparatus might look like to 
do this. 
The modal operators suggest very readily that we can 
think of the intension/sense of a sentence as a function 
from possible worlds to truth values. In each possible 
world the intension of a sentence assigns a truth value 
to that sentence. We can then define the intension of a 
sentence like (1.22) to be a function that assigns the 
value .:t.rJ;Le to that sentence in every possible world. The 
intension of a sentence like (1.23) will be a function 
that assigns .:t.rJ;Le to the sentence in some worlds, false 
in others. The difference in these two intensions can 
then be made the basis for the solution to the 
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substitutibility problem in Cl.25). The expression 'PHI' 
in 'NEC PHI', say Cl.24), has a different semantic value, 
different intension, than the expression 'PSI' in 'NEC 
PSI', say Cl.25). So substitution of 'PSI' for 'PHI' in 
the frame 'NEC~' will not result in the same semantic 
values. 
Along with possible worlds Montague added a further 
parameter relevant to the computation of formal 
intensions. He introduced point semantics that considered 
how denotations changed through time, effectively 
providing the capacity to handle certain tense phenomena 
in language. The truth value of a sentence containing a 
tensed verb depends not simply on the possible world in 
which the sentence is evaluated. The denotation of such a 
sentence also depends on the time instant that is chosen 
to designate the temporal present. Thus the truth value 
of Cl.26) depends not only on the fact that the sentence 
is evaluated with respect to the actual world but also on 
the fact that the narrative present would have to be 
taken as sometime between 1837-1901 to make the sentence 
true. 
Cl.26) Queen Victoria reigns over Great Britain. 
Cl.27) John has beaten Jimmy. 
Cl.28) John beats Jimmy. 





In just the same way that a treatment of the 
semantics of a modal operator such as 'necessary' 
requires the denotation of formulas to be evaluated 
relative to possible worlds other than the actual one, so 
tense operators require other times than that understood 
as the narrative present to be taken into account. 
Consider the three sentences Cl.27)-(1.29), Cl.27) is 
true at wl (world 1) and t3 (time 3) if and only if 
Cl.28) is true at the world wl at a time t2 earlier than 
t3. 
Similarly, Cl.29) is true at wl and tl if and only 
if Cl.28) is true at the world wl at some time later than 
tl. 
The consequence of adding the temporal parameter is 
that all denotations must now be evaluated with respect 
to a particular world and a particular time. Intensions 
are then understood as functions from ordered pairs of a 
world and time to denotations. 
Now the truth conditional semanticist can be 
characterised as defining for a language the recursive 
rules of syntax and the recursive rules of semantics that 
assign truth conditions to the syntactically well-formed 
formulas of the language. 
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If we look, first, at the requirements this places 
on the syntactic component we observe that two basic 
conditions must be met. Firstly, that a set of syntactic 
categories be provided. One of these categories, the 
'sentence' or whatever other label is chosen, is to be 
associated with truth or falsity. Secondly, there must be 
an assignment of expressions in the language to the 
syntactic categories. Since we normally consider grammars 
capable of generating an infinite number of well-formed 
formulas there must exist rules to assign each of these 
well-formed expressions to syntactic categories. 
Turning now to the semantic component, in the light 
of the syntactic requirements outlined above we can 
stipulate four conditions. Firstly, we require a set of 
things which can be assigned as semantic values to 
various expressions of the language. At a minimum this 
must be a set of individuals and a set of truth values, 
set theory then provides functions that construct more 
complex semantical objects out of these components to act 
as the semantic values for various other expressions 
besides individual constants and sentences. In addition, 
we need to specify for each syntactic category the type 
of semantic value that is to be assigned to expressions 
of that category (eg names are to have individuals 
assigned, sentences are to be assigned truth values 
etc.). Next we need a set of semantic rules to determine 
how the semantic value of any complex expression is a 
function of the semantic values of its components. And 
finally, we require an initial assignment of a semantic 
value of the appropriate type to each of the basic 
expressions of the language. 
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We can distinguish two classes of facts that go into 
determining the semantic values of sentences. One class 
of facts has to do with the formal structural properties 
which a sentence has (characterised in the formation 
rules of the semantics) • The other class depends on 
certain contingent states of affairs in the world or 
'model'. 
The first class of facts are theory-internal 
conditions, whilst the second set of facts has to do with 
the connection between language and the world or model 
which the language describes. 
Formally, we define a model to be an ordered pair 
<A,F> such that A is a set, the set of individuals in the 
model, and F is a function which assigns semantic values 
of the appropriate sort to the basic expressions. The 
individuals, and sets of individuals that comprise the 
semantic values of individual constants and predicate 
constants can now be anything one likes. Thus in one 
model the set of individuals might consist of the set of 
natural numbers, in another the same expressions of the 
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language might be assigned members from the set A which 
consists only of ex-Prime Ministers of Great Britain etc. 
The rest of the semantic apparatus, rules of 
semantic evaluation for the logical connectives etc., is 
taken as the fixed part of the semantics for a particular 
language. We can, therefore, examine the effect of 
allowing the model to vary in respect of the semantic 
values assigned to basic expressions of the language. 
With this concept we now have a way of saying that a 
sentence of the language is no longer true simpliciter ; 
rather we now say that a sentence s is true with respect 
to (a particular) model M. (Footnote 1.4) 
Montague's solution to the problem of intensional 
constructions was to increase the complexity of the model 
the language was interpreted over. The model structure 
he proposed contains more than a set of individuals and 
an assignment of individuals, sets of individuals etc. to 
various expressions of the language. The insight he 
exploited was, as outlined on page **, that sentences 
will have truth values relative to moments of time and 
possible worlds. 
Footnote 1.4 • I shall adopt the normal convention that 
for any expression alpha, I [alpha] I .:M:. denotes the 
semantic value of alpha with respect to the model M. 
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This means that to formally interpret a language 
containing both tense and modal operators we need a model 
with two other sets besides the set of individuals. Let 
us designate these sets as the set W (the set of possible 
worlds) and the set T (the set of times). In addition the 
model will contain an ordering function < on the set T, 
this function establishes the directionality and sequence 
of time. 
Our definition of denotations will now be relative 
to a choice of some index, <w,t> out of w X T. Thus 
semantic rules will now provide a definition of 
I [alpha] I .:M,w,t,g:. for each expression alpha (Footnote 
1. 5) • 
The innovation of the intensional logician is not 
merely to add extra parameters to the structure of the 
model but to allow the semantic value or denotations of 
expressions to be actual intensions. Expressions are to 
be allowed to have two sorts of reference/denotation or 
semantic value- namely, extensions and intensions. 
Intensions will be understood as functions from indices 
to other denotations (these denotations may be extensions 
Footnote 1.5. The notion of g, is an assignment of values 
to variables, for a full explanation of this mechanism 
and, indeed, the general apparatus ~f quantification see 
Dowty et al (1981). As an aid to what follows the rules 
of formation and interpretation for Li are included as an 
appendix in this thesis. 
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or once more intensions). However, ultimately the 
semantics grounds out in extensions. Here then we 
discharge the Fregean insight that expressions of a 
language may have two sorts of semantic value, sense or 
reference. Thus the referent of an expression, what the 
expression is about, may be direct reference to an 
extension or normal referent, or it may be indirect 
reference to an intension or sense. What Montague 
produces, however, is a way of doing this within an 
entirely extensional semantics. He saw a way of 
accounting for intensions in terms, ultimately, of 
extensions. To this extent adopts a Russellian position. 
In the next chapter I will present Montague's 
proposals for dealing with opaque constructions. In 
particular hls treatment of three classes of nominal 
expression - names, descriptions and indefinites - which 
occur within sentences containing verbs of propositional 
attitude. Throughout I will use the Dowty, Wall and 
Peters (1981) characterisation of Montague's (1973) 
Intensional Logic, I will refer to their version of this 
Intensional Logic as 'Li' (Footnote 1.6). 
Footnote 1.6. Readers unfamiliar with the standard 
characterisation of a formal language are referred to 
Dowty et al (1981) which serves as an excellent introduc-
tion to formal semantics in general and Montague Seman-
tics in particular. 
CHAPTER TNQ PUTTING LOGIC TO WORK 
SECTION ONE INTENSIONS AND REFERENT.I.AL OPACITY 
Section one of this chapter will consider the 
solutions which intensional logic has proposed for the 
problems of referential opacity. In section two we will 
consider claims made for extending the explanatory 
function of logical machinery- extensions which are 
directed towards some additional phenomena associated 
with reference in opaque contexts. 
1 Proper Names and Belief Contexts 
Let us first review how, in general, the formal 
characterisation of intensions is carried out in a 
language. I will define, for expository purposes, a model 
as an ordered quintuple 
M = < A,W,T,<,F > 
where: 
A is the set of objects/individuals in the model, 
in this case three individuals. 
A= { a,b,c } 
W is the number of possible worlds available to the 
model, in this case two worlds. 
W= { wl, w2 } 
T is the set of time intervals at which the model 
is sampled, in this case three. 
T= { tl, t2, t3 } 
< is a linear ordering of the set T, this establishes 
the directionality and sequence of time. In this case 
represented as a set of ordered pairs. 
<= {< tl, t2 >, < t2, t3 >, < tl, t3 >} 
F is a function that assigns semantic values of the 
appropriate sort to each non-logical constant of 
the language relative to each pair <w,t> where 
w-in-set-W and t-in-set-T. 
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Let us consider the following non-logical constants 
of the language Li (Footnote 2.1.); j, m, d, n, and K, B. 
The assignments F makes for this model are given below in 
Table 2.1. For the six indices of this model the 
denotations of the names and predicates are fully 
determined for each of the index pairs by the function F. 
Footnote 2.1. Li is a characterisation of an Intensional 
Logic based on Dowty et al (1981). The rules of formation 
and interpretation of this language are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
TABLE 2.1 
Assignment of denotations to some basic expressions 
of Li under F (Footnote 2.2) 










































where R and S are meta-variables ranging over 
the propositions associated with 
the formulas K(n) and K(m) respectively, 
ie R=I ["'K(n)] I .:M,g:., S=I ["'K(m)] I .:M,g: •• 
We have laid out the intensions of the basic 
expressions of our language using our "mini-model" by 
demonstrating all the varying extensions the terms can 
have in the model. The intensions are just functions 
which for any given argument pair (world, time index) 
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Footnote 2.2. Let us adopt the convention that for any 
expression alpha and for any model M and value assignment 
g, I ["'alpha] I .:M,g:. is the intension of alpha with 
respect to M and g. 
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return a value (the extension of the term). 
Suppose we translated the non-logical constants into 
expressions of English as indicated in Table 2.2. 
(Footnote 2.3) 
Table 2.2 
Translation of expressions of LI into English 
j=John d=Dick n=Nick m=Mr. Universe 
K=swims Bel=believes 
Syntactic types of these basic expressions are 
(Footnote 2.4) 
j, d, n, m, are of type e 
K 
Bel 






is of type <e,t> 
is of type <<s,t>,<e,t>> 
Ca relation between persons 
and propositions) 
translates as 'John' 
translates as 'Dick' 
translates as 'Nick' 
translates as 'Mr Universe' 
translates as 'swims' 
translates as 'is British' 
Footnote 2.3. I will assume at this stage that the rules 
of syntactic combination of the English fragment can be 
specified so as to 'unscramble' the unnatural surface 
order for English that the syntax of Li would produce. In 
Montague's PTQ fragment these formation rules of English 
and their relation to the syntax and semantics of the 
intensional logic are rigorously specified. 
Footnote 2.4. For an explanation of the conventions 
behind the categorial formulation of the syntactic 
classes of expression see Dowty et al (1981) 
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From the intension I [Ajl I .:M,g:. we can say that the 
non-logical constant 'j' is acting as a 'rigid-
designator', and as such names the same individual at all 
indices. However, the intension I [Arn] I • : M, g:. shows 
that 'rn' is acting as a non-rigid designator, that is the 
term holds of different individuals at different times 
(Footnote 2.5). 
Now a rule of syntactic combination will allow basic 
terms and predicates to combine. The equivalent rules of 
semantic interpretation will allow us to construct 
intensions for formulas such as 'K(rn)' and 'K(j)' (Table 
2. 3) • 
Table 2.3 
Constructed intensions for two formulas of Li 














The intensions of the two formulas 'K(rn)' and 'K(j)' 
were determined by calculating the denotation of the 
formulas at each index and then collating the results of 
this computation into a function returning a truth value 
for each index. 
Footnote 2.5. such expressions are not uncommon in 
English- examples are 'Miss England', 'Supergrass' etc. 
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Notice that intensions and extensions will be 
notions that are inter-definable relative to a completely 
specified model. Thus the intensions of an expression can 
be constructed from extensions laid out for each index, 
whilst an extension for the expression can be computed by 
applying the index as argument to the intension as 
function (Footnote 2.6). 
To accommodate the two-tier system of semantic 
values outlined we need to change the syntax and the way 
the semantic rules compute the semantic value/denotations 
of a complex phrase in terms of the denotation of its 
parts. To do this in accord with the Fregean programme we 
have our language include expressions which denote, have 
as their semantic value, the intensions of certain other 
expressions (this of course reflects Frege's own view of 
certain expression which occurred in oratio obligua 
having indirect referents) • We need to add a rule to the 
effect 
If alpha is any expression, then Aalpha 
is an expression which denotes I [Aalpha] I .:M,g: •• 
(Footnote 2.7) 
Footnote 2.6. The extension of a variable is given by g 
and does not differ from index to index. Effectively, the 
intension of a variable is a constant function on in-
dices. For any u then for all w and t 
I [ "'u] I • : M , g : • C< w , t >) =g C u ) • 
Footnote 2.7. These new intensional expressions will be 
characterised as of type <s,a>, where 'a' is the type of 
expression the intension is formed from. Thus <s,a> is 
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Since the notion of an intension is defined for 
every expression of the language, expressions such as 
'Aalpha' will themselves have an intension, namely-
'AAalpha'. However, these higher-order intensions are 
uninteresting since they represent constant functions 
returning the immediately embedded intensions as result. 
A second syntactic device present in Montague's 
intensional logic is the operator '@',when applied to 
any expression alpha which denotes an intension this 
operator gives a new well-formed expression '@alpha' 
denoting whatever the value of I [alpha] l.:M,g:. is at 
that index. Thus for any index <w,t> 
I [@alpha] I. :M,w,t,g: .=I [Aalphal I. :M,g:. C<w,t>) 
The semantic theory that is a consequence of the 
elements of Li provides for the construction of semantic 
objects corresponding to the kinds of intensional objects 
required in a two tier semantic system. 
Thus the intensions that this language generates 
will correspond to functions that for each index 
determine a unique object. These functions are precisely 
what is needed to provide a denotation for a singular 
term in each 'situation'. But, as we commented earlier, 
meant to suggest a function from indices to the denota-
tions of expressions of type 'a'. 
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there is no need for such functions to be constant. Thus 
two of them, say N and M can have the same value in some 
but not all world/time indices. Here is the reason, 
embedded rigorously in the formal semantic theory, of why 
assertions of identity can be contingent, for 
'alpha=beta' will be true in some but not all possible 
worlds and times if the intension of alpha is N and of 
beta is M. 
To this see this in more detail let us consider the 
sentence (2.1). Suppose there is a particular 
(2.1) John believes Mr Universe 
(2.2) Bel C j , " CK Cm) ) ) 
(2.3) "CK (m) ) 
( 2. 4) K (m) 
(2.5) John believes Nick swims 





course of events (possible world) and a particular time 
at which Nick is Mr. Universe. And let us further suppose 
that in this particular world and at this time John 
really believes that whoever is Mr Universe, can swim. 
Two more facts about this world/time construct are 
pertinent- John does not know that the individual known 
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to him as 'Nick' is 'Mr Universe', John also believes 
that the individual he knows as 'Nick' cannot swim. What 
I have described is a perfectly possible and consistent 
state of affairs. However, for a semantic theory which 
deals only in extensions, we have produced a very 
embarrassing state of affairs. Given the truth of a 
formula such as {2.9) {at the index <w2,tl> say) then at 
that same index, using an extensional semantics, it is 
possible to infer {2.5) from {2.1). Let us see in detail 
how the use of intensions as the semantic values of 
expressions blocks this kind of inference. 
Given our assignment of syntactic categories to 
expressions {Table 2.2) and the rules of formation of Li 
one way of generating {2.1) is {2-I) below. This 
generative tree is determined by the rules of syntactic 
composition of Li {English translations are given on the 





John believes Mr Universe swims 
Bel(j,A(K(m))) Relational Notation 
Bel C A ( K ( m) ) ) ( j ) B2 
<t> ~
believes Mr Universe swims 
Bel C AK Cm) ) B2 
~~ 
believes Mr Universe swims 
Bel Bl AK (m) Bl 5 
<<s,t>,<e,t>> <s,t> I 
Mr Universe swims 
K (m) B2 
~ 
Mr Universe swims 
m Bl K Bl 
<e> <e,t> 
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We can use this generative tree as a computational 
schema to evaluate the semantic value of its various 
nodes. The tree indicates which sub-parts each larger 
part depends on for its own semantic evaluation. Our 
syntactic structure is designed to reflect directly the 
semantic dependencies of the expressions. The various 
semantic values computed in the course of the generation 
of (2-I) with respect to a particular index, model and 
value assignment are shown in (2-II). We will see in 
working through an example how (2-II) is a graphical 
representation of the steps in computing the semantic 
value of its constituent nodes. 
2-II 
I [Bel(j,"(K(m)))] I .:M,w,t,g:. 
I [Bel C" CK Cm) ) ) C j) ] I • : M, w, t, g: • B2 
I [jJ I .:M,w,t,g:~~ 
~I [Bel ( ~K Cml l l I. :M,w,t,g:. B2 
I [Bel ] I • : M, w, t , g : • Bl 
I ["K (m)] I. :M,w,t,g:. Bl5 
I [K (m)] I. :M,w,t,g:. B2 
I !ml J.:M,w,t,g:. ~~ 
I [K] I. :M,w,t,g:. Bl 
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Suppose we evaluate the truth of sentences (2.1) and 
(2.5) with respect to M and an index, say <w2,tl>. The 
logical formula (2.2) represents one of the ways the 
'translated' sentence (2.1) can be generated- it 
corresponds to the top node of (2-II). Formula (2.2) 
asserts that the relation of believing holds between an 
individual g represented in the logical language by the 
rigid-designator 'j', and the proposition represented by 
the formula given as (2.3). Now consider how the semantic 
value of (2.3), the embedded proposition in (2.2), is 
computed in Li. 
To compute the value of proposition (2.3) we need to 
compute the denotation of 'm' (translated as 'Mr 
Universe') at each index in the model as well as the 
denotation of 'K' (translated as 'swim') at the same 
indices to determine whether (2.4) is true at each of 
these indices. Given F and the co-ordinates <w2,tl> we 
can calculate the following semantic value for (2.3) 






Given this way of breaking down sentence (2.1) and 
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computing the semantic value of its embedded proposition, 
see what happens when we try to substitute an expression 
which at <w2,tl> is co-extensive with the expression 'm'. 
The individual denoted by the term 'm' at <w2,tl> 
namely g, is in the set denoted by 'K' at <w2,tl>, as a 
consequence the complex formula (2.4) is also true at 
<w2,tl>. If we now substitute for 'm' in (2.4) the 
expression 'n', which also denotes g at this index 
<w2,tl>, then the resultant formula (2.8) remains true. 
Substituting one expression for another we preserve the 
truth value of the complex expression • This relies on 
the fact that 
I [K(m)] I .:M,w2,tl,g:.=I [K(n) I [.:M,w2,tl,g:., 
which is a logical consequence of the fact that the 
denotations of I [ml I. :M,w2 ,tl ,g:. and I [nl I. :M,w2 ,tl ,g:. 
are identical. 
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But it does not follow from the above facts that the 
proposition denoted by (2.3) is identical to the 
proposition denoted by (2.7). In fact these two 
propositions are not identical in M as can be seen when 
we inspect the intensions of the respective formulae. 
The intensions of (2.3) and (2.7) are different because 
there are some indices at which (2.4) is true and (2.8) 
is false (eg <wl ,tl>) (see Table 2 .4 below). 
Table 2.4 
Constructed intensions for (2.3) & (2.7) 












Regardless of the truth of (2.9), we are now in a 
position to give a perfectly consistent model, which we 
have done with the F assignment to 'Bel', such that (2.1) 
is true at <w2,tl>, whilst (2.5) is false at the same 
index. This analysis of one reading of (2.1) allows that 
John may perfectly well understand identity statements 
and what they entail and at the same time not be forced 
into inconsistency by asserting that (2.5) must be a 
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logical consequence of (2.1). What John believes on this 
analysis of (2.1) is a proposition whose semantic value 
when computed is found not to be the same as the semantic 
value of the proposition contained in (2.5). The problem 
of substitutibility is solved by placing John in a belief 
relation to an intensional rather than extensional 
object. 
We have shown in effect that the rule schema (2.10) 
(referred to on page 10) is not valid in intensional 
logic. 
(2.10) alpha=beta-->CPHI<-->PHialpha/beta) 
Where 'PHialpha/beta' is understood as 
substituting in 'PHI', 'beta' for all free 
occurrences of the expression 'alpha' 
However, there are occasions when substituting co-
extensive expressions in sentences such as (2.1) is 
allowed. An intensional system like Li offers an 
explanation of how and why this can be done. Using the 
rules of Li we can generate a tree exactly the same as 
the previous one except that the logical constant 'm' is 
not combined immediately with the predicate 'K'. Instead 
it is quantified into a variable of the appropriate sort, 
a variable which has been generated in the position the 
logical constant originally occupied. Effectively this 
means that the expression 'm' (translated as the singular 
term 'Mr Universe') stands outside the scope of the 
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intensional operator 'A'. The trees (2-I) and (2-III) 
capture the essential differences of the two derivations 
and their concomitant logical form. 
The derivation 2-III is meant to represent a reading 
of (2.1) which in the semantics literature is often 
referred to as the 'de re' reading. The sentence (2.1) 
could be understood as describing a belief John has about 
a certain individual, and his belief is directly about 
the individual and not about any particular way the 
individual is described. The 'de re' interpretation is 
one where the belief concerns the object directly and not 
its manner of description. 
Let us see how this 'de re' reading relates to the 
generative tree 2-III. The top node of 2-III is the 
formula (2.11)- this is the logical translation of a 'de 
re' reading of (2.1). 
2-III 
John believes Mr Universe swims 









j Bl Bel(AK(xS)) B2 
<e> <e,t> 
b 1 . --------~h . e ieves es swims 

















Let us consider how the semantic value of (2.11), is 
computed. Again take our model at index <w2,tl>, (2.11) 
is true at this index if and only if (2.12) is true at 
<w2,tl> where x takes on the value I [m] l.:M,w2,tl,g:. 
which in this case is the individual c (Footnote 2.8) In 
turn (2.12) depends on whether the individual denoted by 
' j ' at <w 2 , tl > ( i e I [ j ] I • : M , w 2 , tl , g : • ) - namely , _g stands 
Footnote 2.8. This is a consequence of the fact that we 
imagine g to have assigned the variable x to the indivi-
dual c. However the truth conditions hold quite generally 
since we eventually consider all value assignments of 
variables to individuals. 
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in a belief relation to the proposition denoted by 
(2.13). In computing (2.13) we check the the denotation 
of 'K' at each index but hold the value of x constant for 
all indices, so x's value remains for all indices at 
whatever 'm' denotes at <w2,tl>. 
(2.1) John believes Mr Universe swims. 
C 2 .11) ? x [Bel C j , "' [ K ( x) l ) l Cm) 
(2.12) Bel(j, "' [K(x)l) 
(2.13) "' [K(x)] 
(2.14) K(x) 
The computation is carried out in this way because in our 
language the denotation of a variable will not change 
from one index to the next, the denotation of a variable 
depends only on the value assignment g not on the F 
assignment. We can read (2.11) as asserting that the 
individual denoted by 'm' is such that John believes the 
proposition that that individual swims • 
Considering (2.11) as an alternative reading of 
(2.1) let us again try substituting the expression 'm' 
at index <w2,tl> for another coextensive with it at that 
index. Substituting 'n' at <w2,tl> for 'm' in (2.11) 
makes no difference to the evaluation of the proposition 
(2.13), since x remains for all indices at whatever 'n' 
denotes at <w2,tl>, the individual ~. 
The crucial difference between (2.2) and (2.11) is 
that the non-rigid designator 'm' stands within the 
scope of the opaque-context-creating operator "' in (2.2) 
but outside it in (2.11). 
(2.1) John believes Mr Universe swims 
(2.11) ?x5 [bel' [j,"' [swim' Cx5)]]] (m) 
( 2. 2) bel I [ j I,.. [SW im I ( m) ] ] 
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We have shown that a restricted version of (2.10) is 
valid in the intensional logic, namely (2.15). Moreover 
another restricted version of (2.10) is also valid in Li, 
(2.16). This states that substitution of expressions is 
permissible where alpha and beta not only have the same 
extension at some index but also have the same intension 
as well. Rule (2.16) preserves the Fregean thesis of the 
compositionality of sense which asserts that the sense of 
a complex expression is always a function of the senses 
of its parts. 
(2.10) alpha=beta-->CPHI<-->PHialpha/beta) 
Where 'PHialpha/beta' is understood as 
substituting in 'PHI', 'beta' for all free 
occurrences of the expression 'alpha' 
(2.15) alpha=beta-->CPHI<-->PHialpha/beta), where 
alpha does not stand within the scope 
of "',NEC,Past or Fut 
(2.16) "'alpha="'beta-->CPHI<-->PHialpha/beta) 
In the derivational tree 2-III at the top node the 
logical formula (2.11) contains a number of important 
elements that are not represented at all in the in the 
English surface structure (2.1). Montague was 
particularly concerned that logical syntactic form should 
mirror English syntactic form, what was to be done in 
this case? It might seem that the obvious move is to 
apply the operation of lambda conversion whereby (2.11) 
is converted to (2.2) (see Dowty et al (1981) for a 
detailed exposition of the apparatus of lambda 
abstraction). Lambda conversion would give a more 
faithful approximation of the syntactic elements in 
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(2.1). But this immediately destroys the basis for a 
solution to the substitutibility problems for this class 
of expressions by making (2.11) & (2.2) equivalent. 
Montague chose the uncompromising position of 
allowing such a conversion to occur with these types of 
expression, thus preserving the generality of lambda 
conversion. The cost was to decree that expressions in 
the category of proper names were to be assigned semantic 
values which did not vary from index to index. By 
assigning proper names unvarying extensions, Montague was 
in effect denying the possibility in his semantics of the 
kind of semantic anomaly that quite patently arises in 
natural language. The alternative is to state that in a 
language like Li containing non-rigid designators, lambda 
conversion dos not hold with full generality. A 
constraint on its application, such as that below, is 
required. 
(2.17) ?u(PHI)<-->PHiu/alpha, provided that u does 
not stand within the scope of A' NEC, 
Past, or Fut in PHI 
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As already mentioned Montague found this restriction 
so odious that in the (1973) PTQ system the semantics for 
proper names did not allow them to function as non-rigid 
designators. He thus ruled out of court the application 
of the necessary apparatus to deal with the class of 
substitution problems associated with proper names. 
2 Definite Descriptions and Belief Contexts 
We have reviewed how an intensional logic could be 
used to solve the substitution problems associated with 
Proper Names. In the next two parts of this chapter I 
will consider the analysis Montague provides for two 
other sorts of noun-phrase. 
First, let us consider the treatment of definite 
descriptions. Formula (2.19) would result from a Montague 
analysis of (2.18) (Footnote 2.9). It will be apparent 
that Montague is presenting a Russellian account of the 
semantics of the definite determiner. The translation of 
the definite determiner 'the' in combination with the 
Footnote 2.9. This is a 'boiled down' representation of 
Montague's analysis. There is, however, a strict 
equivalence between this representation and the rather 
fuller one presented in Dowty et al (1981). 
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rest of the formula (2.19) effectively asserts that there 
exists one and only one individual who is a butler and 
that individual limps. 
(2.18) The butler limps 
(2.19) Ey ( Vx [ butler' (x) <--> x=y ] & limps' (y)) 
Now consider a sentence triple of, by now, a familiar 
sort (2.20)-(2.22). At the home of Lady Devonshire a 
dastardly murder has been committed. Holmes and Watson 
have been called in to help. Let us suppose that Watson 
noted whilst talking to the staff that the butler suffers 
from a severe limp, a war wound perhaps. Now the vital 
piece of evidence which Watson has over looked, but which 
we can be assured Holmes will have noticed, is a trail of 
dragging foot prints through the conservatory where the 
crime was committed. In this case it would be perfectly 
truthful to assert (2.20). But what about (2.21) ? 
(2.20) Watson believes the butler limps 
(2.21) Watson believes the murderer limps 
(2.22) The butler is the murderer 
Montague's intensional analysis seeks to explain why 
(2.21) can be false whilst (2.20) and (2.22) are true. It 
goes further and suggests a reading of (2.21) in which it 
would be a true assertion. This would be a reading in 
which the way the individual of Watson's belief is 
described is irrelevant. So what could such an assertion 
about a belief of Watson's be about? From Watson's point 
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of view it is about, an individual and not about any way 
of describing the individual, it is a de re reading. 
On Montague's analysis the two readings of (2.21) 
revolve round the scope possibilities of the noun phrase 
'the murderer'. There are two possible Montague 
derivations of the surface sentence (2.21), represented 
as the compositional syntactic trees 2-IV & 2-V. Each 
generative possibility has a parallel logical tree that 
results in two formulas shown in (2.23) and (2.24) which 
are the logical translations of the two interpretations 
of (2.21). 
(2.23) bel' [n,""Ey[Vx[murderer' (x)<-->x=yl&limp' Cy)] l 
2-IV 
Watson believes the murderer limps 
Watson believes the murderer limps 
believes the murderer limps 
I 
the murderer limps 
~. 




(2.24) Ey[Vx[murderer' (x)<-->x=yl&bel' [n,"'Climp' Cy))]] 
2-V 
Watson believes the murderer limps 
.~
Watson believes hes limps the murderer 
/~ the ~~urderer 




he5 -------------- limps 
On the (2-IV) analysis the definite description is seen 
to fall within the scope of the intension creating 
context (the verb 'believe' induces this context). It is 
therefore the intensional semantic values of the elements 
in the embedded proposition that must be calculated. Now 
suppose that the intension given to the descriptive 
element ('murderer') in the definite description is as 
given below in Table 2.S (this describes a model M2 with 
an assignment F2 of intensions to basic expressions) • It 
is easy to see that the intensions of the descriptive 
elements 'butler' and 'murderer' are quite distinct. We 
will not be at liberty to substitute the intensions of 
expressions containing these elements. 
However, with this assignment there is a world/time 
index pair at which all the predicates, 'murderer', 
'butler', 'limps', are true of the same individual, this 
is the index <wl,tl>. So lets consider (2.21) having 
wide scope as in (2-V) and (2.24). Let us evaluate the 
sentence at index <wl,tl> with respect to a particular 
fixed assignment of values to variables. 
TABLE 2.5 



















Because the definite description is not generated within 
the scope of the opaque operator •"'•,the value of the 
embedded proposition is computed with respect to a 
variable (represented in the analysis tree as 'he5') and 
the intension of. the predicate 'limps'. Now, recall that 
in model theoretic systems variables are constant 
functions which have, modulo a g assignment, the same 
extension at every index. Thus the complex intension of 
the embedded proposition will turn out to depend on 
whatever the value the embedded variable is when it is 
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bound by the definite description. And this definite 
description since it has wide scope and is outside the 
scope of any intensional operator will have an 
extensional semantic value depending on the index at 
which it is being evaluated. Now if this index is <wl,tl> 
then we can construct a perfectly consistent model in 
which the extensional values of the predicates 'murderer' 
and 'butler' are the same, ie the individual g. We are 
also assured, by the semantic rules of evaluation for 
quantifiers, that there will be a g assignment of the 
form [ga/x]a/y (the value of x and y are both the 
individual,~). 
These facts ensure that in the embedded proposition 
the compound intension of the bound variable and 
predicate 'limps' will be the same Cin this evaluation 
context) regardless of the particular manner of 
description of the individual g in the wide scope 
definite noun-phrase. We might say, echoing our comments 
about proper names, that the way the individual is 
described is irrelevant to the evaluation of the embedded 
proposition in (2.21). 
3 Indefinite expressions and Belief Contexts 
An ambiguity exactly analogous to the singular term and 
definite description cases can be found in sentences like 
(2.25) 
(2.25) John believes a Cretan lies 
(2.26) bel' [j,"'Ex[Cretan' (x)&lies' (x)] l 
(2.27) Ex[Cretan' (x)&bel' (j,"'[lies' (x)] )] 
There are, in Montague's system, two analysis trees of 
this sentence (Footnote 2.10). 
C 2 • 2 6 ) be 1 ' [ j , "'Ex [ c re tan ' C x > & 1 i es ' C x ) l ] 
2-VI 
John believes a Cretan lies 
John ------------:~ Cretan lies 
----------~ believes a Cretan lies 
a Cretln lies 




Footnote 2.10 Montague did not consider the so-called 
'generic' interpretation of indefinites as represented in 
such sentences as Ci) 
Ci) A lion is fierce. 




John believes a Cretan lies 
believ~~ Cretan 
a Cretan 
believes hes lies 
/-------




Again the crucial between the analyses has to do with 
scope, where in the generative tree the quantifying 
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expression is inserted. If we look at the final, surface 
level, logical translations of these two trees we see 
that in the first, narrow scope, reading of (2.2S}, 
represented as (2.26}, the existential quantifier and 
associated common noun 'Cretan' occur inside the scope of 
•"•,whilst in the wide scope reading of (2.2S}, 
represented as (2.27}, the quantifier and CN occur 
outside the scope of the opaque operator I " I • 
The formula produced in (2.27}, as one reading of 
(2.2S}, seems to make the assertion that a particular 
Cretan exists. This is not a problem in this example, but 
consider (2.28} which is structurally exactly like 
(2.2S}. Here the commitment to existence, the canon of 
existential generalisation mentioned on page 10, seems 
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more of an embarrassment. 
(2.28) John believes a leprechuan lies 
Montague's way out of this dilemma is very simple. 
He treats existence as a simple predicate. Recall that 
the model structure, over which Montague's intensional 
logic is interpreted, has available to it a set of 
individuals, A. This set of individuals is, in fact, the 
set of all possible individuals. Montague states in a 
footnote in PTQ 
if there are individuals that are only 
possible but not actual, A is to contain 
them (Montague 1973: 257) 
The assignment of intensions to expressions can turn 
out to assign possible individuals to the extension of 
expressions at a particular index. Consequently we can 
read line (2.28) as saying that there is available from A 
a 'possible individual'. The question as to whether or 
not that possible individual has the additional property 
of 'existence' is determined by pragmatic world 
knowledge. Montague does not view this issue as something 
that need concern him 
this is an issue it would be unethical for 
me as a logician (or linguist or 
grammarian or semanticist for that matter) 
to take a stand on (Ibid: 257) 
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Let us take stock of Montague's position on the 
three classes of nominal expression examined; proper 
names, definite descriptions and indefinite expressions. 
Only the category of proper names 'denotes' or 'refers' 
in the sense that their use can make reference to 
individuals. Both definite and indefinite expressions do 
not denote in this sense. 
'The' turns out to play the role of a 
quantifier in complete analogy with 
'every' and 'a' and does not generate C in 
combination with common noun-phrases) 
denoting expressions. This does not mean 
that it would not be possible to assign 
complex and artificial denotations to such 
phrases as 'The alpha', 'every alpha', and 
'a alpha', but in no case would the 
denotation be an individual. (Montague 
1970b:216) 
All these categories can exhibit scopal variations 
depending where, in the analysis trees, they are 
'quantified in'. If one of these categories of nominal 
has wide scope with respect to an opaque operator in a 
sentence containing an embedded proposition Montague 
talks of the reading as referential or ~ .I.e· If it has 
narrow scope, he talks of the non-referential or ~ dicto 
reading of the sentence. 
Our fragment is very rich in structural 
ambiguities, all roughly describable as 
arising from the various possible orders 
in which the syntactic operations ••• may be 
applied ••• the ~ ..r..e and~ dicto 
interpretations correspond to two ways of 
generating the sentence in question. 
(Ibid:214) 
In a sentence such as (2.25) we have two different 
analyses represented by the two trees (2-VI) & (2-VII). 
the first of these two tress corresponds 
to the de dicto (or non-referential) 
reading of the sentence, and the second to 
the de re (or referential reading) 
(Montague 1973:255) 
Now the terms 'referential' and 'non-referential' 
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used in this way should be distinguished from the use of 
the word 'refer' used in contexts such as 'the expression 
alpha refers'. Montague's referential/non-referential 
distinction had to do with the type of semantic object an 
expression takes as its semantic value. 
In the wide scope readings of (2.21) or (2.25) the 
respective definite and indefinite expressions have 
referential readings. 
(2.21) Watson believes the murderer limps 
(2.25) John believes a Cretan lies 
(2.5) John believes Nick swims 
That is, they contain on analysis variables that denote 
extensional objects, these variables are about 
individuals. But this is not to say that the expressions 
'a Cretan', or '.the murderer' refer, they avowedly do not 
on Montague's say so. Contrast this situation with 
singular terms such as 'Nick'. A sentence such as (2.5) 
has a referential and non-referential reading. However, 
on the referential reading the expression 'Nick' can be 
said to refer or denote an individual directly. The 
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notion of 'refer' at work in the context 'the expression 
alpha refers' has to do, in such a model theoretic 
account, with whether an expression in a language can 
refer directly to an object by virtue of the F assignment 
alone. 
In the case of the non-referential readings of 
(2.21), (2.25) & (2.5) the semantic object that is the 
subject of the proposition is an intensional one. Thus 
the belief in both cases is about the characterisation of 
the meaning of the expression, hence the ~ dicto label. 
Moreover, the expressions 'the alpha', 'a alpha', 
'alpha', are not themselves referential or non-
referential. It is the semantic objects, the values of 
expressions, that are referential or non-referential. 
All of the scopal analyses involving belief contexts 
extend directly to multiply embedded sentences. This 
allows Montague to deal with iterated opaque contexts. 
SECTION .TIY.Q EXTENDING .'.r1iE SCOPE .Q£ SCOPE 
1 Scope and Responsibility 
The wide scope/narrow scope distinctions examined in the 
previous sections have been extensively used by logicians 
and linguists to account for a wide range of semantic 
phenomena. In doing so, they have gone beyond what 
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Montague himself claimed. However, many regard the use 
of scope in the analyses of different semantic phenomena 
as conclusive evidence of the explanatory power of the 
logical analysis of language. 
In discussing the wide scope reading of a sentence 
such as (2.1) Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981) describe this 
reading as 
(2.1) John believes Mr Universe swims 
the one in which the name [Mr Universe] is 
the 'speaker's description' of the person 
in question. The other reading ••• is 
sometimes described as the one in which 
[Mr Universe] is 'John's description' of 
the person in question. (Dowty et al. 
1981: 16 6) 
What is at issue here is where the expression 
originates; from the speaker Ceg the attributer of the 
belief) or John (the attributee). Determining who is 
responsible for the use of a 'form of words' is at the 
root of what I will call the attibuter/attributee 
distinction. This distinction is to be found in Hintikka 
(1969), Hasegawa (1972), Fodor (1970), Johanson (1976), 
Partee (1979) and Hellan (1981). In all of the cited work 
the phenomenon is analysed scopally. 
One phenomena presumably calling for a 
[scopal] analysis is the difference 
between what we may call a speaker's being 
responsible for the use of a certain 
expression and a participant's being so 
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responsible (Hellan 1980:48) 
This distinction appears to hold across many classes 
of nominal in 'belief' contexts as well as in other 
opaque contexts. Thus in sentence (2.29) the relative 
scope of constituents is used to explain the various 
interpretations this sentence ('said' is treated in this 
case as an opaque verb). 
(2.29) Jim said that he had seen my girlfriend. 
Sentence (2.29) can either report Jim's having said 
something such as "I saw your girlfriend" or report 
something like "I saw Jo Miles" where the speaker of 
(2.29) identifies Jo Miles as 'my girlfriend'. The 
ambiguity is clearly shown by the two ways of continuing 
(2.29). The difference of interpretation centres on 
whether the description is the responsibility of the 
attributer (the speaker) or the attributee. 
(2.30) She said she would ring me up tonight. 
(2.31) Luckily, he didn't know that or he would have said 
something embarrassing. 
Similar ambiguity is present in (2.32), where Jim 
might or might not realise that I live next door to his 
supposed spy. 
(2.32) Jim thinks my next door neighbour is a spy. 
such examples show how in certain kinds of embedded 
sentences the lexical material relating to noun-phrases 
in the embedded sentence may be semantically either a 
part of the embedded sentence or a part of a higher 
sentence. This very naturally translates into a scope 
difference of the noun-phrase relative to the opaque 
operator of the super-ordinate sentence(s). 
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A related ambiguity is found in (2.33). This may 
conceivably be interpreted as Karl's having uttered a 
contradictory sentence such as "I didn't kiss the girl I 
kissed". 
(2.33) Karl says that he didn't kiss the girl he kissed 
It is more likely to involve a sentence which Karl 
uttered such as "I didn't kiss Moira", reported by a 
person who is convinced that Karl really did kiss Moira. 
Clearly, exactly the same scope phenomenon can be 
appealed to for an explanation of these ambiguities. If 
the definite noun-phrase is inside the scope of 'says' we 
have the contradictory reading, if it is outside the 
scope we have the non-contradictory reading. Again the 
noun-phrase in question varies its scope relative to an 
opaque operator. 
Examples below show how the attributer/attributee 
ambiguity extends to all three classes of nominal we are 
interested in. Taking proper names first, in (2.34) the 
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description 'Samuel Clemens' may be one the attributee 
would not recognise, since we can imagine that the 
description originates from a speaker who is better 
informed about literary figures than John. Nevertheless, 
John may well believe that 'Mark Twain is a great 
writer'. 
(2.34) John believes Samuel Clemens is a great writer. 
Now consider the second class of nominals, definite 
descriptions, imagine that (2.35) was uttered by the 
Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1941. We might 
reasonably suppose that the 'responsibility' for the 
description 'the vilest man in Europe', lies with the 
individual Winston Churchill rather than one of Hitler's 
closest ministers. A wide scope interpretation of (2.35) 
would provide a means of representing this reading. 
(2.35) Goering believes the vilest man in Europe 
is infallible 
(2.36) Churchill believes the vilest man in Europe 
is dangerous 
In the case of (2.36) uttered by the Goering we 
might suppose there were good grounds for understanding 
the description as originating with the attributee ( ie 
Churchill) 
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Finally, (2.37) can be construed in such a way that 
the indefinite expression is understood as originating 
from the 'attributer' of 'attributee'. Imagine a context 
in which John has no idea that a certain individual is 
informing against him. The speaker of (2.37) might well 
use the expression 'an informer' which would in no way 
'line up' with what John believes about some particular 
individual. But now imagine a situation where John has 
arrived at the conclusion that certain unspecified 
persons, who are supplying him with confidential 
information, can be trusted. In this case we would say 
that the expression 'an informer' is legitimately one 
which John would assent to in describing these various 
people. 
(2.37) John believes an informer is trustworthy 
The scopal analysis of 'expressive responsibility' 
is summed up by Fodor 
linguists have assumed, and rightly I 
think, that the difference between the 
opaque and transparent reading of a 
sentence [narrow scope versus wide scope] 
is that the former expresses some 
relationship between the subject of the 
opaque verb and the descriptive content of 
the noun-phrase in question. They also 
seem to have assumed that although on the 
transparent [wide scope] reading the usual 
relationship between a speaker and a 
description he uses holds, this is not so 
for the opaque reading; on the opaque 
reading the speaker is merely taking over 
the description from the subject of the 
opaque verb, saying what would count, in 
his opinion, as a description of the 
object in question from the point of view 
of that subject ••• The assumption that the 
source of the description, or the 
responsibility for it, is always either 
the speaker Con the transparent reading) 
or the subject of the opaque verb Con the 
opaque reading) is embodied in the 
proposed representations [scopall that we 
have been considering. (Fodor 1976:248) 
2 Scope and the Specific Non-Specific distinction 
As well as the issue of responsibility for nominal 
expressions, a further 'semantic' distinction has been 
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'explained' in terms of scopal variation of nominals with 
respect to belief contexts. 
It has been alleged that indefinite noun-phrases 
occurring in opaque contexts exhibit a semantic property 
known as 'specificity'. The property of specificity 
seems at first straightforward. The ambiguity in (2.38) 
has been discussed in, among others, Baker (1966) , Bach 
(1968), Dahl (1970), Dean (1968), Kasher & Gabbay (1976), 
Kroch (1979), Ioup (1977), Jackendoff (1972) and Lyons 
(1977). The distinction centres on the two ways 
represented by (2.39) and (2.40) that (2.38) can be 
continued. 
(2.38) John wants to buy a car. 
(2.39) He will buy it tomorrow. 
(2.40) He will buy one tomorrow. 
(2.41) Which car does John want to buy? 
The continuation (2.39) corresponds to a reading in which 
82 
the indefinite noun-phrase in (2.38) is understood 
specifically ; whilst in (2.40) the reading of the 
indefinite noun-phrase in (2.38) is non-specific • 
Notice also that the question (2.41) is only appropriate 
in the case of the specific reading of the corresponding 
assertion. 
Associating specificity in indefinites with scope 
variations has been proposed repeatedly (cf for example 
Fodor 1970, Baker 1966, Bach 1968, Ioup 1977, Kroch 
1979). Thus in a sentence such as (2.25) the analysis 
tree (2-VII) and logical translation (2.27) would 
correspond to the specific, wide-scope reading. 
(2.25) John believes a Cretan lies. 
A reading which is paraphrased as 'there exists a 
particular individual Cretan such that John believes him 
to be a liar'. The narrow scope analysis of (2.25) (see 
analysis tree (2-VI) and logical translation (2.26)) is 
paraphrased as 'John believes that there is some Cretan 
or other who lies'. 
It is claimed that a scopal analysis of specificity 
must be employed when sentences such as (2.42) are 
considered. 
(2.42) Mary believed that John wanted to see a film. 
A feature analysis (noun-phrase [+specific] or [-
specific]) is inadequate to capture all the possible 
readings of (2.42). It is claimed (2.42) is three ways 
ambiguous, as can be seen by continuing the sentence in 
one of three ways. 
(2.43) Because John can relax watching one. 
(2.44) But Mary doesn't know which one it might be. 
(2.45) So they are going to see 'Cabaret' tonight. 
The scopal proposals agree that the ambiguities do 
not result from the ambiguity of the indefinite noun-
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phrase, nor from the context, but stem from the semantic 
relationship between the noun-phrase and the rest of the 
sentence. Fodor, for example, argues for a type of 
logical representation where the indefinite is 
represented by something akin to an existential 
quantifier manifesting scope interactions with other 
elements in the sentence. The scopal account is claimed 
to offer the most adequate formal analysis of 
specificity. The scope possibilities of indefinites are 
seen to explain why a sentence like (2.42) has three 
interpretations. These interpretations correspond to the 
ordering possibilities of the existentially quantified 
noun-phrase with respect to the two opaque operators 
'believes' and 'wants'. We can represent these 
possibilities in the quasi-logical frames (2.46)-(2.48). 
(2.46) Mary believes C John wants Ex ( John see x )) • 
(2.47) Mary believes Ex ( John wants ( John see x )) • 
(2.48) Ex (Mary believes C John wants ( John see x )) • 
It is claimed that it is not possible to explain such 
ambiguities except by means of the notion of scope, 
because we find a systematic relationship between the 
number of interpretations and the number of embedded 
opaque contexts. So (2.49) has four interpretations 
corresponding to the four orderings of the existential 
operator with the three opaque operators 'claims', 
'said', and 'wanted'. Continuations that support each 
84 
interpretation are given below together with the relevant 
operator orderings. 
(2.49) Atlee claims Churchill said Bevan wanted 
to support a Communist. 
(2.50) Because the Communists stood a better chance 
in the Clyde. 
(2.51) Atlee claims ( Churchill said ( Bevan wanted 
Ex (Bevan support x ))). 
(2.52) But Bevan wouldn't tell Churchill who. 
(2.53) Atlee claims ( Churchill said Ex C Bevan wanted 
(Bevan support x ))). 
(2.54) Churchill wouldn't tell him who Bevan 
favoured. 
(2.55) Atlee claims Ex C Churchill said ( Bevan wanted 
(Bevan support x ))). 
(2.56) It transpires that it is John Mclean. 
(2.57) Ex ( Atlee claims C Churchill said 
(Bevan wanted (Bevan support x ))). 
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3 Scope and the Referential Attributive distinction 
It is natural to ask whether definite descriptions 
exhibit a similar kind of scope ambiguity to the one 
detailed above. We might suppose that (2.58) does exhibit 
such an ambiguity. 
(2.58) John believes the soldier who ordered 
the attack is brave 
(2.59) Which soldier does John believe to be brave? 
(2.60) John believes a soldier to be brave 
This sentence can be taken to mean that John believes of 
some individual that that person is brave. Or it can 
describe a belief John has 'whoever the individual who 
ordered the attack, that individual must have been 
brave'. However the distinction is not exactly the same 
as in the case of indefinite expressions. The question 
(2.59) is both appropriate and answerable for either 
reading of (2.58) (contrast with question (2.41) applied 
to both readings of (2.38)). In fact both readings of 
(2.58) seem to entail the 'specific' reading of the 
corresponding indefinite (2.60). 
The distinction has therefore been articulated in 
terms of whether or not a particular individual is held 
by the attributee to have some property, and whether, in 
addition, the attributee has a means of knowing who the 
individual was. It is not at issue that one particular 
individual is supposed to be involved. 
According to one of the readings of 
sentence Ci), which I shall call the 
'attributive' reading, John does not have 
any particular boy in mind, but simply 
wants to talk to whoever failed the exam. 
Ci) John wants to talk to the boy who 
failed the exam 
(Fodor 1970:131) 
On the other reading, the 'referential' reading, John 
86 
does have a particular boy in mind as the boy he wants to 
talk to, and this boy he has in mind· is the boy who 
failed the exam. The difference between the referential 
and attributive readings of sentence Ci) is a matter of 
whether or not John has any particular boy in mind ~ ~ 
boy .lihQ failed the ~. The attributive reading of Ci) 
implies that there is only one boy who 
failed the exam, and there can therefore 
be no question of John's deciding which 
boy who failed the exam he wants to talk 
to, but only of John's knowing or not 
knowing which boy failed the exam. (Fodor 
1970:132) (Footnote 2.11). 
Fodor in using the terms referential and attributive 
is adopting the terminology originally coined by 
Donnellan (1966). Donellan's widely quoted distinction 
is made in a way that does not actually refer to definite 
descriptions containing definite articles. Also his 
examples do not contain explicit opaque operators. 
Footnote 2.11). Notice that the term 'referential' is 
being used differently to the way Montague employs it. 
87 
However, if we consider what Donnellan says it is easy to 
see that the distinction is essentially the same as the 
one we have drawn in the last few pages. 
Suppose first we came upon poor Smith 
foully murdered. From the brutal manner of 
the killing and the fact that Smith was 
the most lovable person in the world, we 
might exclaim 'Smith's murderer is 
insane'. I will assume, to make it a 
simple case, that in a quite ordinary 
sense we do not know who murdered Smith 
{though this is not essential to the 
case). This, I shall say, is an 
attributive use of the definite 
description. 
The contrast with such a use of the 
sentence is one of those situations in 
which we realise whom we have in mind when 
we speak of Smith's murderer and, most 
importantly, to know that it is this 
person about whom we are going to say 
something ••• This I shall say, is a 
referential use of the definite 
description. {Donnellan 1966:285) 
It is I think reasonable to suppose that the 
definite description 'Smith's murderer' is synonymous 
with the phrase 'the murderer of Smith'. The fact 
Donnellan's example is not tied to an explicit opaque 
context is more interesting. Donnellan regards the 
distinction he has drawn as a pragmatic and not a 
semantic one. In particular he does not regard it as 
scopal. Thus a sentence like (2.61), is not ambiguous in 
itself, but can be used in two different ways. 
(2.61) The murderer of Smith is insane. 
We might say following Levinson {1983:60) that it is an 
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utterance which is potentially ambiguous between these 
two usages. These remarks notwithstanding Fodor (1970) 
argues for an analysis of the referential/attributive 
distinction in scopal terms. 
the referential/attributive distinction is 
a matter of scope relationships, and ••• the 
readings should be distinguished formally 
in terms of the position of some operator 
which determines the scope of the noun-
phrase. (Fodor 1970:137) 
As evidence in support of Fodor's claim consider, in 
a sentence like (2.62), the relationship between the 
number of possible readings this sentence may have, and 
the number of embedded clauses with opaque operators 
which the quantified definite noun-phrase can interact 
with. Again we find a systematic relationship between the 
number of embedded sentences containing opaque operators 
and the number of possible readings. 
(2.62) Jill thinks John believes the murderer of 
Smith is insane 
(2.63) (iota x) Jill thinks John believes 
(the murderer of Smith):.x.: is insane 
(Footnote 2 .12) 
(2.64) Jill thinks (iota x) John believes 
(the murderer of Smith):.x.: is insane 
(2.65) Jill thinks John believes (iota x) 
(the murderer of Smith):.x.: is insane 
Thus (2.62) can be taken to mean three things depending, 
Footnote 2.12. I am using the 'iota' operator as 'short-
hand' for the fuller Russellian notation. It possesses 
exactly the same semantic truth conditions. 
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it is claimed, on the scope of the definite description. 
On one reading, which we might represent using the quasi-
logical formula (2.63), Jill has in mind the individual 
who murdered Smith and thinks that John believes him to 
be insane. On the reading represented by (2.64) Jill 
thinks that whoever murdered Smith is such that John 
believes him to be insane. And finally (2.65) represents 
the reading in which Jill simply believes that John 
believes whoever murdered Smith to have been insane. 
Of course, we may still need convincing that 
Donellan's distinction, as he himself drew it, can be 
carried over into opaque contexts. The necessary 
evidence is perhaps secured when we consider that a 
sentence such as (2.66) may have been actually uttered by 
someone (Footnote 2.13). Suppose John uttered (2.66), 
now on Donnellan's own admission (2.66) can be made to 
assert two things, so presumably John might have have 
been thinking either of two things in uttering the 
sentence. What appears to be a distinction between ~ 
of a phrase in a transparent, non-opaque context like 
(2.66) is actually a matter of whether the speaker has a 
particular person in mind or not. such a situation could 
Footnote 2.13. Some semanticists (cf for example Saar-
inen) would argue that issues to do with occasions and 
acts of utterance are of no concern to formal semanti-
cists. They are interested only in the truth conditions 
of sentences. This is an important and contentious point 
which I take up later in the thesis. 
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be captured by (2.67). However, (2.67) still contains an 
ambiguous expression, the definite description 'Smith's 
murderer'. This is hardly surprising since presumably 
(2.67) is uttered by someone as well. Suppose that I were 
that person, we can represent the position by insisting 
that a 'performative' surrounds the representation of 
(2.67). We then have a way of distinguishing our various 
possible readings in terms of something like (2.68). This 
is three ways ambiguous and seems to connect non-explicit 
opaque perf ormatives with explicit opaque verbs such as 
'believes', 'thinks', etc. 
(2.66) Smith's murderer is insane 
(2.67) John thinks Smith's murderer is insane 
(2.68) I say to you John thinks Smith's 
murderer is insane 
Partee (1972), as well as connecting the Donnellan 
examples with referential/attributive distinctions in 
opaque contexts, also remarks on the close equivalence of 
this distinction in def inites with specificity in 
indefinites. 
Finally it should be mentioned that 'proper names' 
can manifest referential/attributive ambiguities when 
considered in certain contexts. In (2.69), clearly the 
individual has been named but never found. Now imagine 
someone uttering (2.69), effectively giving (2.70). 
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Given the state of affairs that exist in the actual 
world, representation (2.71) best captures the 
attributive reading of (2.70). However, this is a 
matter of contingent fact, and we could imagine that the 
utterer of 2.69 did in fact know the identity of the 
killer. Such a situation would then best be captured by 
(2.72). 
(2.69) Jack the Ripper was insane 
(2.70) I say to you Jack the Ripper was insane 
(2. 71) I say to you (iota x) (Jack the Ripper): .x.: 
was insane 
(2.72) (iota x)I say to you (Jack the Ripper):.x.: 
was insane 
Taken together these last sections indicates a 
number of different ways scopal insights have been used 
to explain alleged semantic distinctions in belief-
contexts (see Table 2.6). This clutch of scopally based 
semantic insights seems very impressive. In addition 
there is Montague's own attempt to solve various 
substitution problems He attempts to effect this through 
his formalisation of the Fregean distinction of sense and 
reference, along with rules to determine when the one or 
other of these semantic values was in play. Together 
these achievements might convince us of the value and 
power of the Formalist programme. 
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One final point to note. The issue of who is 
responsible for a particular descriptive expression, what 
they might mean be it etc. could be seen as related to 
the problem of deciding when discourse is about an object 
and when it is about a meaning or description. 
Similarly, we can ask to what extent do the specific/non-
specific or attributive/referential dichotomies relate to 
claims that expressions can be about either their own 
senses/meanings or their simple extensions? There seems 
to be a considerable amount of overlap- perhaps it is 
little wonder that a common logical mechanism should be 
thought to underly these various phenomena. The issue of 
what is common to these referential phenomena and whether 
intensions and scope provides an adequate account is the 
topic of the next chapter. 
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Footnote 2.14. The terms 'Referential_M' and 'Non-
Referential_M' refer to Montague's use of the terms 
'referential' and 'non-referential'. The terms 
'Referential_D' and 'Attributive_D' are the terms Donnel-
lan uses for his ambiguity in def inites. 
.C.llA-..P_TER .THREE OVERWHELMING SCOPE AND DND_ERWHELMING 
CONTEXT 
SECTION ONE FARAD~ .QE SCOPE 
Can scope be made to carry all of the semantic 
distinctions cited in the last chapter? In this section I 
intend to show that it cannot. 
In the previous chapter I tried to draw the various 
semantic distinctions as clearly and as unambiguously as 
I could. This is, in a sense, to distort how things are. 
There has been. and remains, great confusion about the 
precise nature of distinctions such as 'specific' versus 
'non-specific', 'referential' versus 'attributive' etc. 
For example, apropos 'specificity'. it is common to 
find the following kinds of statements 
I am aware that what is precisely meant by 
specific and non-specific [ ••• ] is a 
little obscure. (Lyons 1977:191) 
The 'specific'/'non-specific' contrast 
[ ••• ] These expressions have a very 
confused history in the linguistic 
literature. They have been used in several 
overlapping ways. (Heny 198l:liv fn34) 
This lack of consensus arises because of different views 
about how distinctions in sentences such as (3.1) and 
(3.2) should be drawn. These views in turn are the 
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product of two very different sorts of emphasis. The 
first emphasizes the truth conditions of sentences. The 
second, highlights the states of knowledge and 
understanding of language which speakers and hearers 
possess. 
(3.1) John believes a policeman committed the crime 
(3.2) John believes the murderer is insane 
(3.3) John seeks a unicorn 
For those who claim that the kinds of ambiguity present 
in sentences like (3.1) & (3.2) are scopal in origin 
there is a commitment to explaining the phenomena in 
terms of the different truth conditions the sentences may 
have. These truth conditions are dependent on actual or 
possible states of affairs in the world. The 
relationship of expressions in a languaqe to states of 
affairs in the world determines the truth values of 
sentences in a language. In this account we do not make 
any mention of the mental states of the speakers and 
hearers of language. 
It is in this spirit that we find Dowty et al. 
explaining how Montague would have talked about 
'specificity' (they use sentence (3.3) to illustrate the 
'specificity' phenomenon). They point out two different 
ways one can think about a sentence like (3.3). 
1. what goes on in a person's mind when he 
decides to seek for something or other 
(and what beliefs may lead him to seek 
something) and 
2. what relation can be said to obtain 
among (non-linguistic and non-mental) 
objects, and in particular, what the 
second of the two objects in this relation 
is, when the sentence 'John seeks a 
unicorn' is true. 
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Model theoretic semantics is only 
concerned with the second of these two 
questions. Dowty et al 1981:249 fn 13 
This highlights one of Montague's chief concerns-
namely, the discovery of the appropriate ontoloqy for a 
theory of meaning, a commitment to the discovery and 
elucidation of 'non-linguistic' and 'non-mental' semantic 
objects. These objects are the values that expressions in 
a language can take on. In Montague's account they 
include various set theoretic objects, total functions of 
certain sorts and truth values. All of these objects are 
quite independent of the intentional belief states of 
language users. 
This treatment of sentences and their meanings as 
comprising a separate, objective ontological realm is 
very Fregean in spirit. There exists a similar motivation 
in the desire to decouple the language user from language 
itself. for example, distinguishing sentences as abstract 
objects from occasions of use. Saarinen writes in 
connection with sentences like (3.2) 
the referential attributive distinction is 
not a semantic ambiguity [ ••• ] a semantic 
ambiguity is a property of sentences 
(rather than utterances) (Saarinen 1980:2) 
Returning to Montague, the de re/de dicto 
distinction he makes. and which I described in the last 
chapter, is a distinction between the kinds of semantic 
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object that expressions in a languaqe can be about. This 
gboutness is no product of a languaqe user's intentions, 
the relation of aboutness is secured by our objective 
theory of meaning which relates expressions in the 
languaqe to objects in the world. Thus in (3.2) there are 
two sorts of object that the definite description could 
be about. On a wide scope reading it would be about an 
'extension', in this case an individual. Whilst on the 
narrow scope reading the definite description would be 
about an 'intension', this intension is not an 
individual, but is a set-theoretic entity that can be 
used for accessing individuals at particular indices. 
Here again we have made no use of cognitive notions 
such as what an individual thought he was referring to, 
or what he intended to convey by the use of particular 
expressions. Ontology and psychology have been kept quite 
separate. 
But we saw in the last chapter a number of examples 
where the formal apparatus of truth conditional semantics 
was being used to draw 'psychological' distinctions. 
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Distinctions having to do with the cognitive states of 
language users. 
1 Where does Responsibility lie? 
Take, for example, the question of 'responsibility' 
for the use of an expression. We saw on page 75 that 
scope has been used to explain the various possibilities 
which arise in determining 'expressive responsibility' in 
sentences like (3.4). It seems quite natural, in such 
cases, to enquire after peoples' intentions, states of 
knowledge etc. when using or reporting such sentences. 
(3.4) Goering thinks the bravest man in Germany 
planted the bomb 
We might ask who is responsible for the use of 
definite description in (3.4)? Is it the attributer 
(whoever reported (3-4)) or the attributee (Goering 
himself)? These two possibilities might be represented by 
the logical schemas (3.5) and (3.6). In (3.5) the 
definite description has narrow scope indicating that 
responsibility for its use was the attributee's, whilst 
in (3.6) the wide scope reading indicates that the use of 
this definite description was the responsibility of the 
attributer or utterer of (3.4). We would, using our 
knowledge of the actual world and its history, probably 
suppose that (3.6) is the most likely interpretation for 
(3.4). 
(3.4) Goering thinks the bravest man in Germany 
planted the bomb 
(3 .5) thinks Cg, "'iota x Cbravest __ man in Germany (x) 
& planted_bomb(x))) 
(3.6) iota x(bravest_man_in_Germany(x) 
& th inks (g, "'planted __ bomb (x)) ) 
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But (3.6) is also the 'de re' reading of (3.4). and 
as such is supposed to have nothing to do with modes of 
description of expressions themselves. The 'de re' 
interpretation relates the attributer to a certain sort 
of semantic object and nothing more. 
We might sugqest that since 'responsibility' has to 
do with the 'mode of description' an intension would 
serve as a more appropriate object for the attributer to 
be related to in the scenario sketched above. If the 
attributer could be related to an intensional object then 
we might be able to make more sense out of the proposal 
to use logical scope to explain the phenomenon of 
'expressive responsibility'. To this end we might 
consider. in line with our proposals on page 90, the 
introduction of a 'performative verb'. This seems 
reasonable, in the scenario above the attributer will 
utter (3-4). This idea could be generalised, so all 
sentences would be understood as embedded under opaque 
perf ormative operators. If we adopt this suggestion there 
are three schemas for utterances like (3.4). ie (3.7)-
( 3. 9) • 
(3.4) Goering thinks the bravest man in Germany 
planted the bomb 
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(3.7) SAYS (sp,Athinks(g,Aiota x(bravest man in Germany(x) 
& planted_bomb(x))) 
( 3. 8) SAYS Csp, A iota x (bravest man in Germany ( x) 
& thinks(g,Aplanted_bomb(x))) 
(3.9) iota x(bravest man in Germany(x) 
& SAYS Csp,Athinks(g,Aplanted_bomb(x))) 
In (3.7) the description is the attributee's 
responsibility, in (3.8) it is the attributer's 
responsibility and in (3.9) we have the genuinely 'de re' 
interpretation in which the responsibility for a mode of 
description is not at issue at all. 
The problem with this analysis is that it still 
tries to use one set of machinery to explain two very 
different sorts of phenomena. The 'de re/de dicto' 
distinction raises issues to do with semantic ontoloqy 
and 'absolute external truth conditions'. The idea of 
'expressive responsibility' raises questions about how 
speakers and hearers ~nderBtand the ways we identify and 
describe the objects of discourse, and how this 
understanding relates to the states of knowledge which 
processors have at any moment in time. 
This is demonstrated if we consider (3.4) a little 
more carefully. On its 'de dicto' analyses. (3.7) for the 
attributee and (3.8) for the attributer, the formal 
theory of truth demands that there is an unequivocal 
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answer to the question 'who is the bravest man in 
Germany?'. There has to be an objective answer to the 
question of whether the expression 'the bravest man in 
Germany' is true of a certain object at any index, 
otherwise the formal intension of the expression cannot 
be constructed. This answer will depend on the various 
independent, extensional characterisations of the basic 
expressions which constitute this complex description. 
These semantic values are not up for negotiation, they 
lay outside the conventions and interferences of 
individual cognitive processors. 
What we have said in the last paragraph is very 
different to what we want to say about the nature of 
'expressive responsibility'. We view expressive 
responsibility as a notion that goes beyond the mere 
detail of whether X or Y used an expression. Rather, 
expressive responsibility is the realisation that 
speakers use expressions which other members of the 
speech community recognise as originating from that 
speaker. One consequence of this is that members in the 
speech community need not assent to, or judge as 
appropriate, these expressions. Expressions such as 
'brave', 'traitor'. 'informer' etc. are particularly good 
examples of terms whose appropriateness can only be 
judged within the framework of a particular Belief 
System's intentions Cits goals, desires, needs, wishes 
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etc). 
In summary. assessing the truth conditions of (3.7) 
and (3.8) requires appeal to meanings which are 
objectively fixed, this runs counter to a full notion of 
'responsibility'. It is an example of the general problem 
that arises when objective truth conditional meanings 
confront our linguistic practice. A problem that is 
rooted in the contrast between an anti-psycholoqistic 
versus a psychologistic view of meaning. 
2 On being Specific 
The clash ref erred to above is at the bottom of the 
confusion over what is meant by 'specificity'. The only 
definite thing to emerge out of a careful reading of the 
literature is that sentence (3.10) may be carried on in 
two ways, represented by (3.11) and (3.12). 
(3.10) John wants to marry a Swede 
(3.11) He'll propose to her tomorrow 
(3.12) He's yet to find one who will have him 
The distinction has been drawn in a number of ways. A 
linguist who has related it to questions of discourse and 
what is in the speaker or hearer's mind is Lyons (1977). 
He talks about specificity only after having defined 
reference in cognitive terms. 
according to the view of reference adopted 
here, when we ask 'What does the 
expression x refer to?', we are asking 
the same question as 'What is the speaker 
referring to by means of x (in uttering 
such-and-such a sentence)?' (Lyons 
1977: 177) 
The point is that, once any information at 
all has been supplied about an indefinite 
referent, it can then be treated by the 
participants as an individual that is 
known to them both and is identifiable 
within the universe of discourse by means 
of a definite referring expression. It is 
not a necessary condition of successful 
reference that the speaker or hearer 
should be able to identify the individual 
being ref erred to in any sense of 
identification other than this (Lyons 
1977: 189) 
He illustrates the specific, non-specific 
distinction using sentence (3.13) 
(3-13) Every evening at six o clock a heron flies 
over the chalet. 
(3-14> It nests in the grounds of the chateau. 
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This sentence contains an indefinite noun-phrase, which 
under one interpretation, Lyons claims. can be 
understood to refer to a specific, though unidentifiable, 
individual • The continuation sentence (3.14) is seen to 
support such an interpretation. On this account it is no 
part of specificity that one should be able to go out 
into the world and identify the heron. The speaker 
probably couldn't do this any way. Indeed it doesn't 
matter on this account if the imagined state of affairs 
is false. There could be a number of herons flying over 
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the chalet and nesting in the grounds of the Chateau. 
What is important is that the speech act was intended 
specifically and could succeed as a speech act, as a 
referential act, regardless of what holds. 
A rather different view of specificity is held by 
those scholars who draw the distinction in terms of what 
holds true in the world, and how sentences relate to 
these states of affairs. 
Jackendoff (1972) talks of the distinction in terms 
of what the noun-phrase does or would identify in the 
world. He writes apropos of sentence (3.15) 
(3.15) John wants to catch a fish. 
On one reading there is a particular fish 
that John wants to catch (the specific 
reading). On the other reading (the non-
specific reading) •••• there will be a fish 
to point to just in case John succeeds in 
catching one (Jackendoff 1972:279) 
Often scholars seem to rely on both absolute truth 
conditions and cognitive states to explain the context of 
specificity. Kasher & Gabbay (1976) in an article 
entitled 'On the semantics and pragmatics of specific and 
non-specific indefinite expressions' claim that 
the difference between the specific and 
non-specific readings involves a 
difference of truth conditions. Consider 
[3.16] 
[3.16] John talked with a Swede 
Assume that I can describe some Swedes in 
a predicative identificatory way, and some 
Swedes I can't describe in this way. 
Assume one of the latter talked to John 
but none of the former [ •••• ] Now. on its 
non-specific reading [3.16] is true in a 
context of my uttering. if John talked to 
someone who is a native of Sweden. Hence 
[3.16] on that reading is true under the 
circumstances described above. On the 
other hand [3-16] on its specific reading 
is true, in my context of uttering it. if 
John talked with some Swede who I am able 
to describe in a predicative 
identificatory way. Under the above 
described circumstances John talked with 
none of the latter swedes and thus [3.16] 
on its specific reading. is false, under 
these circumstances. CKasher & Gabbay 
197 6: ) 
They also assert a little earlier in the article that 
they are using a cognitive notion of reference. 
we should like to stress that our 
criterion for specificity is the existence 
of a speech act of reference in the 
context of utterance (Ibid) 
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Taking these two quotes together we see that the authors 
regard 'specificity' as comprising, in part what the 
speaker intended. in part. what the speaker is able to do 
Chis state of informedness) and, lastly. what is the case 
in the world. 
What does seem incontrovertible is that if we once 
allow the full involvement of a processor's intentions. 
his state of informedness, his knowledge about the 
'belief states' of other processors etc., we open up an 
enormous range of possibilities for the actual 
interpretation of the expressions in our linguistic 
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practices. 
There are those who argue that such an involvement 
of individual cognitive states takes us beyond the realm 
of semantics and into pragmatic issues. However, I will 
endeavour to show that a theory of "truth" and 
"reference" cannot be isolated from a theory of the 
cognitive states of language users. 
For now let us "play" according to the formalist's 
rules. Firstly. we should note that the examples used by 
both Lyons and Kasher & Gabbay do not contain verbs that 
are traditionally regarded as inducing opaque contexts. 
As a consequence it is not immediately clear how the 
'specificity analysis' suggested on page 89 can be used 
at all in these cases. One move is to once again 
introduce an implicit perf ormative verb into such 
sentences. The perf ormative provides the operator with 
which the indefinite can interact, cf for example 3.17 
and 3 .18. 
(3-16) John talked with a Swede 
(3.17) SAYS Csp,""(Ex(swede(x) & talked(j.x)))) 
(3.18) Ex(swede(x) & SAYS Csp,""(talked(j,x)))) 
But notice that, using an intensional formal system, 
'specificity' is 'semantically' indistinguishable from 
the de dicto/de re distinction of Montague's. This 
"intensional" characterisation of 'specificity' implies 
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that on the 'specific' reading the speaker is related to 
an extensional object and in the 'non-specific' reading 
to an intensional object. Specificity so construed is not 
concerned with what speakers or hearers intend by means 
of their use of certain expressions. 
Nevertheless. let us construe 'specificity' in the 
way Jackendoff suggests. in terms of what the noun-phrase 
does or would identify in the world. Playing by the 
formalist's rules we can run into problems. 
Using truth conditional semantics and scope to 
articulate specificity, Ioup (1977) claims to have 
demonstrated certain 'paradoxes of scope'. She claims 
that a sentence like (3.19) is interpretable in four 
ways- supported, she claims. by continuation sentences 
such as (3.20)-(3.23). These four interpretations are 
the result of two different ambiguities. One is the 
ambiguity possible in the relative ordering of the 
quantifiers 'every' and 'a'. ie •v ••. E ••• ' versus 
'E ••• v ••. '- what I will refer to as the 'combinatoric 
ambiguity'. The other is the ambiguity inherent in our 
understanding of the indefinite noun phrase as specific 
or non-specific- I will term this the 'specificity 
ambiguity'. 
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The essential point in Ioup's argument is that a 
linear arrangement of quantifiers, indicating the 
relative scopes of the quantified expressions, can only 
capture three out of the four interpretations. To 
understand her claims we have to understand the 
constraints these various semantic ambiguities place on 
the representational capacity of logic. 
(3.19) Every villager believes that a witch 
blighted their cows 
(3.20) They know who she is and are trying to 
catch her 
(3.21) They know who they are and are trying 
to catch them 
(3.22) If they ever discover who they are the 
villagers will burn them 
(3.23) They all agree it must have been the same one, 
and if they ever find her they will burn her. 
Table 3.1 shows the linear order constraints that 
the various ambiguities impose on the operators. If we 
look at the combinatoric ambiguity- a wide scope reading 
of the universal quantifier relative to the existential 
requires that the universal quantifier has widest scope, 
it must in any case stand outside the scope of 
'believes'. whilst the position of the existential 
operator is unconstrained within the scope of the 
universal. The orily constraint to represent in this case 
is 'Vy •• Bel'. If we consider the other possibility in 
the combinatoric ambiguity. where the existential is 
given wider scope, then two constraints are imposed. 
namely- 'Ex •• Vy' and 'Vy •• Bel'. It so happens that these 
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two constraints can be consistently obeyed. If we now 
consider the interaction of the specificity ambiguity 
with the combinatoric one we have additional constraints 
to accommodate. The question is can all the alleged 
interpretations be consistently represented using the 
scope of operators. 
Continuation (3.20) is an interpretation of (3.19) 
in which we imagine a situation where all the villagers 
are in collective agreement as to the particular 
individual responsible. The relevant quantifier and 
opaque operator must satisfy the constraints indicated in 
the first row of Table 3.1- indeed these constraints can 
be simultaneously satisfied. 
Table 3.1 
Interpretation Constraints on the linear ordering of operators 
cont by 3 .20 
cont by 3 .21 
cont by 3 .22 
cont by 3 .23 
Combinatoric 
Vy- .Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
Vy •• Bel 
Vy •• Ex 
Vy- .Bel 
Vy-.EX 
Vy •• Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
Specificity 
Ex •• Bel 
Ex •• Bel 
Bel-. Ex 
Bel •• Ex 
Continuation (3-21) is an interpretation of (3.19) where 
each individual villager has his own particular idea 
about which 'specific' witch it was that blighted the 
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cows. This reading is accommodated by the application of 
the consistent set of constraints represented in the 
second row of 3.1. The next case is continuation (3.22) 
where (3.19) is understood in the following way. Each 
villager has a belief that some witch or other, not 
specifically characterised, blighted the cows. Once again 
a consistent set of constraints exist- shown in the third 
row of Table 3.1. The next continuation (3.23) is a 
reading of (3.19) in which all the villagers together are 
seen to have beliefs which relate them all to the same 
non-specific characterisation of the indefinite noun 
phrase. Now if such an interpretation is possible 
(Geach's so called 'intentional identity' (Geach 1967)) 
then there is no linear ordering of operators that can 
represent it. This reading requires a wide scope reading 
of the existential relative to the universal for the 
combinatoric ambiguity, since the universal does not 
interact with the opaque context it must be represented 
outside it. However. if the indefinite is to be given a 
non-specific interpretation the particular quantifier 
must occur within the scope of the opaque operator. We 
are left with an irresolvable problem. We cannot do both 
jobs at once using the same logical machinery. We cannot 
satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously. 
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Now there has been some dispute as to whether (3.23) 
is a genuine reading of (3.19) 
it is predicted (correctly. we believe) 
that in example [3.24] it is impossible 
for 'a fish' to have a de dicto reading 
and at the same time have wider scope than 
'every man' (Dowty et al 1981:210) 
(3.24) Every man believes that a fish walks 
In this quote. from a part of their book where they 
are dealing with specificity. they use Montague's own 
terms de re and de dicto synonymously with the terms 
specific and non-specific. Presumably on their account 
what is at stake is the kind of object that each villager 
stands in a belief relation to. It seems. therefore, 
quite possible in terms of semantic ontoloqy that they 
should each be in a belief relation to the same semantic 
object- namely. an intension. 
So (3.23) seems a perfectly plausible reading of 
(3-19) in Montague's own terms. Alternatively, if we 
think for a moment what a cognitive explanation of this 
reading involves, it still seems plausible. We imagine a 
situation where all the villagers are agreed on the kind 
of witch which must have cast the spell. Perhaps because 
of some particular feature of the blight, lets say, it is 
believed that the witch must be the same one that has 
been causing havoc in surrounding areas. They have no way 
of actually identifying the individual. Thus according to 
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some formulations of the specificity distinction we can 
say that the noun phrase is understood non-specifically. 
We might say. following Geach, that their beliefs are 
about an 'Intensionally Identical' object. 
3 Compounding the paradoxes of scope 
If we agree, despite my earlier objections, to use scope 
to account for 'responsibility' we can produce situations 
in conjunction with other 'scopal' phenomena, such as the 
combinatoric or specific ambiguities, where scope becomes 
hopelessly overburdened. It is possible that a sentence 
like (3.25) would now become eight ways interpretable! I 
am assuming that (3.25) is in fact embedded under an 
implicit performative 'SAYS' and that this operator 
always has widest scope. 
(3.25) s SAYS Every villager wants to marry a witch 
Sentence (3.25) has three ambiguities- the combinatoric 
one, the specific and the ambiguity of responsibility. 
Three ambiguities imply eight interpretations. Table 3.2 
shows the various constraints that arise if each of these 
semantic dichotomies is represented in terms of the scope 
of logical operators. 
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Table 3.2 
Constraints on the linear ordering of operators 
Combinatoric Specificity Responsibility 
i Vy .• Bel Ex •• Bel W(x) •• Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
ii Vy •• Bel Ex •• Bel Bel •• W (x) 
Ex •• Vy 
iii Vy- .Bel Bel •• Ex W(x) •• Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
iv Vy •• Bel Bel •• Ex Bel •• W(x) 
Ex •• Vy 
v Vy-.Bel Ex •• Bel W(x) •• Bel 
Vy •• Ex 
vi Vy •• Bel Ex •• Bel Bel •• W(x) 
Vy •• Ex 
vii Vy .• Bel Bel •• Ex W(y) •• Bel 
Vy •• Ex 
viii Vy •• Bel Bel •• Ex Bel •• W(y) 
Vv-.Ex 
The constraints placed on the combinatoric and 
specificity ambiguities are the same as for (3.19) The 
ambiguity of responsibility revolves round the question 
of who is regarded as the originator of the predication 
'witch' in (3.25). The logical representation I will 
describe allows that a quantifier and term need not stand 
immediately next.to one another- although the term must 
be inside the scope of the quantifier. Although Montague 
does not use this formalism it is a more general one and 
allows the machinery of logic greater expressive power. 
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The two possibilities. represented in the third column of 
Table 3.2 , are that the non-loqical constant 'witch' 
stands outside or inside the scope of 'wants'. In the 
wide scope reading responsibility lies with s, whilst in 
the narrow scope reading it lies with the villagers. 
Of the eight possible combinations of ambiguities 
five are represented in a straightforward manner. namely-
combinations i, ii, v, vi and viii. Logical 
representations for these interpretations are given in 
Table 3.3. Three combinations of ambiguities are 
problematic- iii, iv and vii in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.3 
i S SAYS [ExVy Cwitch(x) & [villager(y) -> wants(y,marry(x)J)] 
ii S SAYS [ExVy Cvillager(y) -> wants(y,marry(x)& witch(x)))] 
v S SAYS [VyF.x Cwitch(x) & [villager(y) -> wantsCy,marry(x)])] 
vi S SAYS [VyEx Cvillager(y) -> wants(y,marry(x) & witch(x)))] 
viii s SAYS [Vy Cvillager(y) -> wants(x.Ex[marry(x) & witch(x)])] 
What are the problems with iii, iv and vii ? 
Combinations iii and iv fail, in part, because if Ioup's 
paradox- we want to interpret the noun phrase 'a witch' 
non-specifically and simultaneously provide a wide scope 
reading for the existential quantifier in the 
combinatoric ambiguity. 
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But notice that iii fails for the additional reason 
that specificity and responsibility conflict. We need to 
place the predication 'witch(x)' outside the scope of 
'wants' to indicate S's responsibility for the 
description- but the quantifier which is needed to bind 
the variable in 'witch(x)' is also required inside the 
scope of 'wants' for non-specificity. These two 
constraints cannot be jointly satisfied. 
Combination vii is also interesting. A conflict 
between the combinatoric and specific ambiguities is not 
the problem here. It is one of responsibility interacting 
with specificity. If S is responsible for the term 
'witch' it must be represented as standing outside the 
operator 'wants', but a non-specific interpretation of 
'witch' requires it to be inside the scope of 'wants'. 
But are the difficult combinations really possible 
interpretations of (3.25)? Consider the following 
continuations for (3.25): 
(3.25) Every villager wants to marry a witch 
C3-25)iii They all have the same ideal- though they'd never 
agree to my description of such a woman 
(3.25)iv They all have the same ideal- and they realise 
the status they would achieve marrying such a woman 
C3-25)v Every villager has his own ideal- one thing is for 
certain. they wouldn't like my description of the 
object of their desires 
These continuations are aimed at interpreting the notion 
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of specificity in terms of intensional identity. One 
could imagine alternative continuations if we were 
invited to construe non-specificity as a lack of the 
identif icatory knowledge required to recognise an 
individual- to pick the individual out as satisfying the 
indefinite predication. These alternative continuations 
are given below: 
(3.25)iii They don't know who she is-
and they certainly don't know she is a witch 
(3.25)iv They don't know who she is- but they do know the 
status they would acquire by marrying her 
C3-25)v None of the villagers know the identity of the women 
they want- nor that they are witches. 
The problem of whether such interpretations imply 
existence can be defused using Montague's approach- he 
drew his individuals from a set of possible individuals 
not all of whom have 'existence' predicated of them. 
Nevertheless, we still face the paradoxes of scope 
that arise when specificity interacts with other 
'scopally determined' phenomena. 
4 The origin of specificity 
Let us return now to considering specificity as a 
phenomenon in itself. We can distinguish two views as to 
the origin of the phenomenon; semantic and cognitive. 
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I am going to explore the notion of specificity as 
cognitive in nature; then return to the semantic 
analysis. Lyons argues that it is in an intenti~n to be 
specific that the property of specificity arises in the 
first place. Let us consider what some of the criteria 
might be in the specificity of an indefinite. 
In example (3.26) below it is quite possible that 
John knows a great deal about a particular work of art 
that has gone missing. He possesses very rich and 
detailed ways of 'predicatively identifying' this 
particular object. We would want to say in such a case 
that cognitively speaking John has a belief about a 
specific object. On the other hand. we can imagine a 
world in which he may have very little knowledge about 
the object, the only evidence he may have is the absence 
of a painting as indicated by a bright piece of 
untarnished wall. 
(3.26) John believes that a painting is missing 
Nevertheless, John has a belief about a quite specific 
object. He has a representation of this construct and he 
may talk to others about the missing object in quite 
definite terms. His understanding and communication 
manifests itself in such a way that we conclude John does 
hold a belief about a particular object. 
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This reveals an important feature of a cognitive 
analysis of the intention to be specific. the 
representation of the intended referent may be more or 
less detailed. more or less accurate- but is still a 
specific attempt. on the part of the speaker, to call to 
mind or recreate a particular representation in the 
mind(s) of his audience. 
Now the feature alluded to above is a fundamental 
property of cognitive representations- representations 
are 'empirically incomplete'. Imagine a couple in a 
Gallery staring at a painting long and hard. Later one 
reports of the other (3.27) 
(3-27) John has fallen in love with a Van Gogh 
Now they have studied this painting with the utmost care 
and have formed very detailed representations of it. They 
can go on at length about its subject, manner of 
composition. brushwork etc. But of course if an exact 
facsimile of the painting were manufactured their 
descriptions and representations would be quite 
inappropriate to the job of determining which is the 
original. This is a key aspect of our knowledge of the 
world. Our linguistic specifications no matter how 
detailed and 'specific' are incomplete descriptions of 
already incomplete representations. Our perceptual 
representations under-determine the objects that give 
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rise to them in the actual world. our language further 
under-determines these representations. 
Related to the property of representational 
incompleteness is the fallibility of representations and 
their cognitive embodiments. Imagine our couple in the 
Gallery trying to find another painting they particularly 
want to see. They are given directions, (3.28), by a not 
very well-informed Gallery attendant who has, in turn, 
got the instructions from an even less well-informed 
colleague Harry. Now the indefinite description might 
serve perfectly well to locate the part of the Gallery 
and the painting they are after. It might serve despite 
the fact that the landmark picture adjacent to the one 
sought is not a Constable at all. 
(3.28) Harry believes the painting you want is 
next to an unmistakable Constable 
This case illustrates that descriptions of objects 
which are in fact false from the vantage point of some 
better and greater authority. can still serve as 
perfectly good identif icatory criteria. We will return to 
this point when we look at definite descriptions. 
Cognitively understood 'specificity' is an aspect of 
"referential communication" which is grounded in the 
nature of mental representations. This allows us to 
account for other interesting uses of indefinites in 
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language. Often in an utterance the notion of specificity 
is working on a number of levels- working at the level of 
what are sometimes called in the literature tokens and 
types (alternative terms are exemplars and stereotypes or 
prototypes). 
In (3-29) John might be understood as asserting 
something about a particular car or else about a make of 
car, in the first case the object of reference is the 
perceptually present car, in the second case the 
perceptually present object serves only as an exemplar 
for a more abstract construct. In both interpretations 
'intentional specificity' is present in the desire to 
evoke certain sorts of representations in the hearer. 
C 3 -2 9) John says "That car is a lethal weapon" 
to Nigel 
By establishing topics and referents of discourse 
the speaker is ipso facto being specific- The nature of 
the 'specifically evoked' objects of discourse varies 
enormously. However when viewed in the context of 
discourse the concept of non-specificity disintegrates, 
in setting up the objects of discourse one is engaged in 
representational specificity. 
How is specificity understood within formal semantic 
proposals? As I have said the intensional proposals 
equate specificity and non-specificity with de re and de 
121 
dicto interpretations of expressions. As such the 
explanation for the specificity phenomenon in a sentence 
like (3.30) is through the relation of a subject to a 
certain sort of non-mental semantic object- an extension 
or intension. we gain no analysis of the 'mental 
specification' of the object of John's desire. 
(3.30) John wants a book 
However. this analysis gets things upside down. In the 
example above it is a mental state which decides whether 
John is concerned with a particular book on a particular 
shelf, a certain title, a certain genre of novel or 
whatever. 
Only if intensions were psychologised so as to be 
the mental carriers of meaning would be able to reconcile 
intensions with representational specificity. Though we 
would still be left with the problem of distinguishing 
when reference was to extensions or intensions 
(psychologised say as tokens and types respectively) 
Having argued against the standard intensional 
analysis it ought to be pointed out that many linguists 
do not use an intensional logic in talking about scope 
and specificity. Linguists who accept scopal accounts of 
specificity usually represent the possible 
interpretations using logical schema of the First Order 
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Calculus. But what is it about these logical schema that 
"explains" the concept of specificity? 
(3.31) John wants to marry a Swede 
(3-32) John wants CEx(John marry x)) 
(3.33) Ex(John wants (John marry x)) 
(3-34) John wants there to be at least one 
person such that that person is Swedish 
and John marries her 
(3.35) There is at least one person, a Swede 
such that John wants to marry her 
In the First Order account of (3.31). without intensional 
machinery, (3.31) may be paraphrased as (3.34) or (3.35). 
The difference then between (3.32) and (3.33) and their 
respective paraphrases (3.34) & (3.35) is that in (3.33) 
there is a commitment to the existence of an object that 
John stands in a relation of 'wanting to marry' - whilst 
in (3-32) he would like there to be such an object that 
he could marry- such an object on this analysis will be 
drawn from individuals in the 'world'. Suppose we were to 
present John with all the female Swedes there were and at 
each turn he declined the lady. would we say. when he had 
exhausted this extensional presentation, that (3.34) is 
false? This proposal seems to miss the point of John's 
utterance, he is referring to an 'intentional object', an 
object fulfilling an idiosyncratic set of wishes, 
desires, needs etc. He may carry this 'specific 
cognitive' recipe around never cashing it out 
extensionally. 
It is claimed that we need a scopal analysis of 
specificity otherwise it is not 
possible to explain such ambiguities 
except by means of the notion of scope, 
because we find a systematic relationship 
between the number of interpretations and 
the number of embedded sentences (of the 
proper type) (Bach 1968:107) 
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So in sentences like (3.36) a featural analysis will not 
do. 
(3.36) Bill thinks John wants to marry a Swede 
I will show, in chapter five, that this claim is not 
true. I will not discuss this point further since my 
solution requires the introduction of machinery that is 
best presented later. 
If we accept that 'specificity' is rooted, in so far 
as it exists at all. in the cognitive system then we are 
not able to use the model of specificity logic provides. 
The apparatus of extensionally interpreted 
predicate calculus (and its extensions 
that attempt to treat such intensional 
phenomena as tense and modality 
extensionally) is based on the idea that 
it is possible to give an account of the 
truth-conditional meaning of sentences in 
terms of the set relations of elements in 
a model- This idea can be seen as an 
idealized assumption of omniscience on the 
part of all users of the meta-language 
with regard to the domain of the object 
languaqe. Such concepts as 'knowledge' and 
'belief' are seen as problematic once 
sentences make explicit mention of them, 
but the propositional attitudes of the 
speakers and hearers of the object 
language toward the statements of that 
language have been idealised away [ ••• ] 
logic is seen to abstract away from all 
differences in knowledge and belief- the 
differences that are the very 
preconditions for the possibility of 
expository uses of language. (Stenning 
1980: ) 
This analysis suggests that any phenomenon rooted in 
cognitive propositional attitudes is liable to be 
distorted by standard logical treatments. The next 
section presents another characteristic of definite 
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nominals whose intentional nature renders a traditional 
logical analysis inappropriate. 
5 The Referential Attributive distinction revisited 
We saw in the last chapter how the referential 
attributive distinction has been handled scopally. 
However. in Donnellan's (1966a) original description of 
the phenomenon he argued that the distinction should not 
to be understood as semantic at all. It was not a 
phenomenon to be explained in terms of an absolute theory 
of truth and reference. 
in general whether or not a definite 
description is used referentially or 
attributively is a function of the 
speaker's intentions in a particular case. 
(Donnellan 1966a:297) 
It is in the intention of the speaker to use the definite 
description in various ways that a referential and 
attributive distinction arises. The distinction is not, 
for Donnellan, an intrinsically syntactico-semantic 
ambiguity depending on the scopal possibilities of the 
quantified expressions. 
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It will be useful for the discussion that follows to 
distinguish two expressions due to Donnellan (1978) and 
Kripke (1977). They talk of 'speaker's reference' and 
'semantic reference' - Speaker reference is what a speaker 
intends to denote by means of his use of an expression in 
language. Semantic reference is what, from an 'omniscient 
observers' Call knowing and all seeing) viewpoint, the 
expression does denote in formal absolute terms. The 
recursive formal semantic machinery of model theory, or 
any other system that fixes the semantic values of 
expressions in a language independent of processors, is 
interested in articulating the different truth conditions 
sentences have in terms of their semantic reference. 
There can only be, in the absolute space of truth 
conditions, appeal to the absolute semantic values that 
expressions in a language possess. This is required if 
we are to provide a correct and comprehensive system of 
entailments for the logic of the language. 
Donnellan's (1966a) article argues that the 
referential use of a definite description does not depend 
on a 'denotationalist' theory of reference. Such a theory 
requires that referential use entails that the speaker is 
referring to whatever happens to be uniquely denoted by 
the definite description. But this secures semantic 
reference- which as we shall see is not necessarily 
identical speaker reference. 
Let us remind ourselves how Donnellan draws the 
referential attributive distinction. 
A speaker who uses a definite description 
attributively in an assertion states 
something about whoever or whatever is the 
so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite 
description referentially in an assertion 
on the other hand, uses the description to 
enable his audience to pick out whom or 
what he is talking about and states 
something about that person or thing. In 
the first case the definite description 
might~be said to occur ..e..ssentially, for 
the speaker wishes to assert something 
about whatever or whoever fits the 
description; but in the referential use 
the definite description is merely one 
tool for doing a certain job- calling 
attention to a person or thing- and in 
general any other device for doing the 
same job, another description or name, 
would do as well. In the attributive use, 
the attribute of being the so-and-so is 
all important, which it is not in the 
referential use. (Donnellan 1966a:285) 
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In the next passage Donnellan presents an example which, 
he claims, demonstrates that the referential attributive 
distinction is intentional in origin. 
That these two uses of the definite 
description in the same sentence are quite 
different can perhaps best be brought out 
by considering the consequences of the 
assumption that Smith had no murderer ( 
for example he in fact committed suicide). 
In both situations, in using the definite 
description "Smith's murderer", the 
speaker in some sense presupposes or 
implies that there is a murderer. But when 
we hypothesise that the presuppositions or 
implications are false, there are 
different results from the two uses. In 
both cases we have used the predicate 'is 
insane', but in the first case, if there 
is no murderer. there is no person of whom 
it could be correctly said that we 
attributed insanity to him. Such a person 
could be identified correctly only in case 
someone fitted the description used. But 
in the second case, where the definite 
description is simply a means of 
identifying the person we want to talk 
about it is quite possible for the correct 
identification to be made even though no 
one fits the description we used. We were 
speaking about Jones even though he is not 
in fact Smith's murderer and. in the 
circumstances imagined, it was his 
behaviour we were commenting upon. Jones 
might. for example, accuse us of saying 
false things of him in calling him insane 
and it would be no defence, I should 
think, that our description, "the murderer 
of Smith" failed to fit him. (Donnellan 
l 966a: 2 85) 
The passage above would seem to show that in the 
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case of a referential use of the definite description one 
is able to 'refer' to an individual using a description 
which does not d~~ Jones in the strict semantic sense. 
Of course, this situation was not mentioned in 
Fodor's scopal treatment of the referential and 
attributive readings of def inites- it is fatal to her 
proposals. 
Suppose Smith had committed suicide- then the 
definite description in my utterance (3.37) does not on 
the denotationalist account denot~ the object I intended 
to _re_f e_r to. 
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(3-37) The murderer of Smith is insane 
Standard model theoretic logic determines the content of 
quantified noun phrases in part by the function which 
assigns basic expressions of the language their 
denotations. The actual individual which satisfies the 
predicative terms in the definite description 'the 
murderer of Smith' will not be the one that will allow 
speaker reference and semantic reference to coincide 
(Footnote 3.1). On the formal account the utterer of 
(3.37) stands in a relation to an object denoted by terms 
other than 'murderer of Smith'. Formally, in the context 
described (3.37) will always be false. 
We cannot, using a standard model theoretic account, 
produce an explanation of why (3.37) could be a 
'successful referential speech act'. 
The examples Fodor chooses are ones where speaker 
and semantic reference coincide. the coincidence seems to 
explain speakers successful reference but the 
"explanation" is parasitic on the "semantic reference" 
turning out to be the same as the speakers "intended 
reference". 
Footnote 3.1- This will be the case no matter what the 
assignment of values to variables 
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One might ask whether Fodor's scopal proposals are 
consistent in themselves- do they encounter paradoxes of 
the sort described for indefinite? Consider the sentence 
( 3. 3 8) 
(3.38) All the villagers know who the 
murderer of Smith is 
On Fodor's account the referential reading requires that 
the definite description is outside the scope of the 
relevant opaque operator; whilst the attributive reading 
requires it to be inside. 
Can we have combinatoric ambiguities involving 'iota 
x' and 'Vy'. Do the positional possibilities 'iota 
x ••• Vy' and 'Vy .•. iota x'yield intelligible 
interpretations. 
It seems perfectly possible that in (3.38) each 
villager should be in agreement about who they think the 
murderer of Smith is. The other interpretation is one in 
which they each think the murderer is unique- having 
different ideas about who it is. Combinatoric ambiguity 
seems possible. possibility of interactions. 
Do the combinatoric and referential ambiguities 
taken together produce problems for scopal 
representations? 
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The attributive reading requires the quantified noun 
phrase to be inside the scope of 'know'- a wide scope 
interpretation of the universal in the combinatoric 
ambiguity places the quantified expression outside the 
scope of the opaque operator. This interpretation of 
(3.38) is one we might gloss as- 'all the villagers 
believe that whoever he is the murder of Smith is 
insane'. It is an interpretation which cannot be 
represented if the scope of the definite is used to 
explain both phenomena. 
Issues of "responsibility", "specificity" and 
"referentiality" all seem to involve knowledge- what 
speakers and hearers know about certain objects. We keep 
returning to the question of the cognitive states of 
people who use "referential expressions". 
The absolute formal semantic position is 
straightforward- meanings are non-cognitive. The meanings 
of expressions are fixed independently of language users 
and these meanings are invariant. Moreover, the method of 
evaluating sentence~ as true of false relates sentences 
to objective states of affairs in the world. These are 
the central tenets of 'semantic reference'. 
we have looked, in this section, at how formal 
semantics struggles to account for certain semantic 
phenomena within its own framework. In the next section 
we ask whether semantic reference is the right concept to 
start from when trying to understand reference in natural 
language. We also consider the problems which systems of 
formal semantics face when they attempt to provide 
theoris of inference for natural language- these problems 
are, once again, associated with the formal definition of 
meaning. 
SECTION .TiiQ RADICAL OPACITY 
The formal proposals, as to how proper names, 
definite descriptions and indefinite expressions mean 
what they do, are both proscriptive and narrow. Frege 
alleges proper names and definite descriptions do refer 
but indefinites do not. Montague argues that only proper 
names are capable of direct denotation or reference. 
Russell claimed that none of these three categories of 
noun phrase actually denote. 
1 The context of reference 
The role of context in determining the semantic 
values of expressions is particularly poorly dealt with 
in formal accounts of reference. It ought to be self-
evident that a sentence like (3.39) devoid of any 
'contextual embedding' has no truth value. The question 
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of whether (3.39) is true or false does not even arise 
until we have provided a contextual embedding for (3.39). 
(3.39) Barry is wearing a tie 
Context determination is not a problem peculiar to 
proper names. In fact the putative analyses Russell and 
Montague give to definite and indefinite terms throws 
context, or the lack of it, into prominence again. 
In (3.40) do we suppose that on a 'de re' reading 
the only way the definite description can be truthfully 
discharged is if there exists one and only one individual 
in the world that has the property of being a fish and 
also the property of swimming? 
(3.40) The fish swims 
This seems totally counter intuitive as an analysis of 
(3.40). It is clear that the 'one and only one' part of 
the Russell/Montague analysis must be relativised to a 
context of some sort. 
[(3.40)] ••• would probably never be 
intended by a speaker of English to imply 
that one fish exists in the entire world, 
but rather would be used when a certain 
fish is uniquely identifiable to ~ 
hearer in the immediate surroundings or at 
least in the context of the immediately 
preceding discourse. (Dowty et al 
1981:197) 
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In such a case where the use of a definite 
description in a particular context results in the 
hearer's attention being directed in such a way that an 
individual is uniquely identifiable why should we not say 
that the definite description is a singular referring 
term? 
Parity of argument suggests that in an appropriate 
context an indefinite expression may also be held to 
identify a unique individual, as in (3.41). 
(3.41) A man Sam knew in Oxford has been appointed 
Again we might reason that in such cases the indefinite 
was acting as a singular referential term (cf for 
example, Chastain 1975, Wilson 1978, Fodor & Sag 1982). 
indefinite descriptions should, therefore, 
be added to the list of expressions, since 
in many contexts they purport to ref er and 
thus count as singular terms. (Chastain 
1975:206) 
Context seems to be the central concept here. What 
sort of contextual information is required to compute the 
semantic value of (3.39)-(3.41) and how does a term come 
to be embedded contextually? An obvious reply is through 
the use of that term by a language processor on a 
particular occasion. If contexts are crucial to the 
ref erring power of terms and ~ is crucial to context 
then we might suspect that ~ and reference are 
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intimately connected. This, I will argue, is exactly 
right. 
In formal semantics context has been articulated in 
terms of various spatio-temporal co-ordinates, 
occasionally throwing in extra elements such as previous 
discourse. Now formalists have recognised that this is a 
singularly impoverished view of context. Thus we find 
Lewis (1972) presenting a rather more extensive set of 
co-ordinates. These co-ordinates constitute the context 
against which the semantic values of expressions are to 
be evaluated. 
we must have several contextual co-
ordinates corresponding to familiar sorts 
of dependence on features of context. (The 
world co-ordinate might itself be regarded 
as a feature of context, since different 
possible utterances of a sentence are 
located in different possible worlds). We 
must have a time co-ordinate in view of 
tensed sentences and such sentences as 
'Today is Tuesday'; a place co-ordinate, 
in view of such sentences as 'Here there 
are tigers'; a speaker co-ordinate in view 
of such sentences as 'I am Porky'; an 
audience co-ordinate in view of such 
sentences as 'You are Porky'; an 
indicated-object co-ordinate in view of 
such sentences as 'That pig is Porky' or 
'Those men are Communists'; and a previous 
discourse co-ordinate in view of such 
sentences a·s 'The aforementioned pig is 
Porky'. (Lewis 1972:175) 
What is lacking in such contextual sets are elements 
to do with the internal states of language processors. 
To be fair to Lewis he does actually, in an appendix to 
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his 1972 paper, allow the possibility of one intentional 
co-ordinate. The consequences of this are potentially 
dramatic for a formal programme, but this co-ordinate is 
seldom mentioned or ref erred to in the literature. 
and only door that now exists is open; nor 
does it mean that the one and only door 
near the place of utterance, or pointed 
at, or mentioned in previous discourse, is 
open. Rather it means that the one and 
only door among the objects that are 
somehow prominent on the occasion is open. 
An object may be prominent because it is 
nearby, or pointed at, or mentioned; but 
none of these is a necessary condition of 
contextual prominence. so perhaps we need 
a prominent-objects co-ordinate, a new 
contextual co-ordinate independent of the 
others. It will be determined, on a given 
occasion of utterance of a sentence, by 
mental factors such as the speakers 
expectations regarding the things he is 
likely to bring to the attention of his 
audience. (Lewis 1972:214) 
Many scholars have reacted against the Formalists' 
exclusion of intentional states from accounts of 
reference. Morgan (1975) claims that we should view the 
speaker as generating the language he does in part as a 
means of directing his audience to inf er certain things 
about the speakers intentional states. For example, in 
considering why a particular nominal form is used in a 
sentence Morgan claims we should consider the question 
What can we infer about the speaker's 
intentions from the fact that he has 
chosen this particular description, rather 
than any of the others which would call to 
mind the same referent? (Morgan 1975:442) 
As an example consider the following situation. Sam 
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might say to Robert something like (3.42). It is quite 
possible Robert knows the referent 
( 3 • 4 2) s am says 
to Robert 
( 3 • 4 3 ) s am says 
to Robert 
'Louisa could get you some tablets'. 
'As, Dr Steel, Louisa could get 
you some tablets'. 
of 'Louisa' in this context to be Sam's wife without 
knowing that she is a Doctor. However, if Sam appreciated 
this gap in Robert's knowledge a more 'co-operative' 
utterance might have been (3.43). Certainly the manner 
of description is dependent on Sam's estimation of the 
intentional state of his recipient. 
a theory of linguistic reference will have 
to be combined with a systematic account 
of certain intentional states of the 
speaker- his thoughts, beliefs, 
perceptions, and so on- which are, so to 
speak the immediate links connecting the 
singular terms he utters with their 
referents out in the world. (Chastain 
1975:192) 
Context construed in this way gives language its 
intentional character and is at the root of the many 
claims that reference is an intentional phenomenon (cf 
for example Strawson 1950, Grice 1968, 1975, Searle 1969, 
1979, 1983, Chastain 1975, Lyons 1977, Grosz & Hendrix 
197 8, Nun berg 197 8, Webber 197 8, 1981, 1983, Allen 197 9, 
1983, Brown & Yule 1983). 
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In support of these claims lets look at some more 
referential acts. 
Suppose I walk into my off ice and see two colleagues 
waiting for me, one utters (3.44). Now we all three know 
a lot of people by the name of 'Sam', in fact we probably 
each know quite different sets of Sams. What does this 
utterance rely on to get me to to successful referential 
uptake (a realization of who is being referred to)? It 
isn't particularly the time and place (3.44) was uttered, 
nor the simple fact that Gerry reported it to me, nor was 
it any previous discourse history. What it relied on was 
a shared corpus of background beliefs, 
( 3. 44) Gerry says "Sam is wearing shoes today." 
to Nigel 
shared expectations, shared ideas about what is 
newsworthy, remarkable, unexpected etc. Why should (3.44) 
be remarkable? It so happens that in our little group it 
has been a noteworthy feature that a chap we all know, 
Sam, has for ~s long as we've known him not worn shoes. 
He pads about barefoot, convinced this is the natural, 
healthy condition for feet! Within our society this is 
rather unusual, not perhaps in the Outback of Australia, 
but certainly in the Northerly latitudes of Edinburgh. 
But is was not the spatio-temporal co-ordinates that 
allowed immediate uptake of reference. It was rather the 
'co-ordination' of a number of intentional elements 
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(Footnote 3.2). In this context the particular 
predication made in (3.44) was sufficient to absolutely 
and uniquely identify an intended referent. 
Similarly, consider a situation in which a group of 
academics are having lunch in the Refectory and observing 
their Head of Department and a colleague eating together 
at another table. Now in this context (3.45) succeeds as 
a unique act of reference, its success is secured via 
some complex intentional inferential work involving the 
appreciation of various authority structures and how they 
might be carried over by analogy into the current 
situation. The definite description may well have never 
been heard by the assembled audience before as applying 
to the intended referent, nevertheless as soon as it is 
used they all laugh heartily. 
(3.45) Smith says "I see the Head Boy is at it again". 
to Jones etc. 
In such cases as (3.44) & (3.45) we have to describe 
what is going on in terms of the beliefs and attitudes of 
speakers and hearers. The success of these acts can best 
be understood in terms of the reciprocal recognition of 
intentions by language users. The speaker relies on his 
Footnote 3.2. It cannot be over emphasized that the 
possession of any knowledge or, more appropriately, be-
liefs by a processor is an intentional fact. And to 
appeal to them is to appeal to intentional elements. 
audience being able to recall and reconstruct these 
appropriate intentions. 
the conditions of reference are satisfied 
in the light of a "total context", which 
includes the beliefs of the speaker and 
hearer (Nunberg 1978:34) 
The introduction of intentions allows reference to 
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operate against a rich and varied backdrop. In hearing 
(3.46) I might be completely confounded until a context 
is supplied- namely, a fast food restaurant where the 
needs and requirements o the workers lead to certain 
sorts of referential identification- idiosyncratic but 
perfectly comprehensible. (This example is due to 
Nunberg (1978)). 
(3.46) The ham sandwich is sat over by the jukebox 
The introduction of an intentional context into the 
referential relation brings with it other properties. 
Intentional states are fallible. we entertain mistaken 
beliefs, misconceptions of various sorts, including 
mistaken views about the beliefs of others. Intentional 
fallibility often manifests itself as various sorts of 
'referential misconstrual'. It is ironic that an 
adequate 'theory of reference' needs to say something 
about referential failure as well as success. We also 
require an explanation of what might be happening in the 
kinds of dialogue exemplified in (3.47) and (3.48). 
(3.47) A: Have you seen Steve's new car 
B: I have, I'd like a convertible myself 
A: But it isn't 
(3.48) A: Have you been to the Pub on 
Buccleuch Street? 
B: No but I heard it sells Real Ale 
A: Oh you're thinking of Proctor's Bar 
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What we need is an account of reference as an act 
which involves processors whose estimations of each 
others intentional states are constantly changing. These 
processors are constantly operating on only partial and 
incomplete descriptions of total contexts. 
2 Nominals and Polysemy 
Context shows up a feature of language which I ref er to 
as 'radical' or 'cognitive' opacity. To fix the meaning 
of terms we need to take into account the mental states 
of language users. Since we have no privileged access to 
the mental state of others we cannot establish as a 
necessary condition for language that our separate use of 
terms is identical. 
We could ignore this subjectivity of meaning many 
formalists have done and just assert intensional 
equivalence across speakers. But this has no explanatory 
force- it gives us no account of how such equivalence 
comes to exist- it is established by fiat. 
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Formal semantics provided us with a formal 
specification of a formal problem- the problem of 
substitutibility and referential opacity. we have 
examined formal ways to deal with the problem. The 
indications are that opacity involves a general problem 
not appropriately described in formal terms at all. 
Problems of opacity and substitutibility are rooted in 
fact that meaning is negotiable between speakers and 
exists against a dynamic background of human behaviour. 
We cannot substitute terms in a formal calculus and 
hope, thereby, to describe a fundamental property of 
natural language. The fact is that natural language terms 
are used 'analogical', 'metaphorically', on many levels 
simultaneously. In examining context we have seen the 
complex and rich background against which referential 
evaluation takes place. We shall now consider polysemy-
this phenomenon shows the huge variety of referential 
evaluation which individual terms are susceptible. 
Polysemy is quite distinct from another phenomenon 
often closely associated with it, homonymy. These two 
characteristics of certain words can best be illustrated 
by example. Take the word 'bank' used as a noun. There 
are two quite separate meanings for the word. It might 
refer to a certain sort of financial institution or else 
to a type of landscape feature associated with rivers 
etc. The word 'bank' is homonymous. Ambiguous when 
standing alone, but in context we perceive its two 
me an in gs , vi z C 3 • 4 9) & C 3 • 5 O ) • 
(3.49) The man cashed his cheque at the bank 
(3.50) The men were fishing along the bank 
(Footnote 3. 3) 
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Polysemy is a rather more subtle property of words. 
Consider the lexical item 'chicken', this might be used 
to ref er on one occasion to a kind of bird and on another 
to a kind of meat. Or again the word 'book' might refer 
to a particular object open in front of me now, or else a 
particular title, or else the general concept, cf for 
example (3.51)-(3.53). 
(3.51) The book is on the shelf. 
(3.52) The book was finally published by OUP. 
(3.53) The book will survive the IT revolution. 
Look at how the word 'radio' is used in (3.54)-(3.57) 
(after Nunberg 1978). In (3.54) it is used to refer to a 
physical object. In (3.55) it refers to a method of 
transmission. 'Radio' can also be used to refer to an 
industry as in (3.56). And a use like (3.57) where 
reference is to the quality of the product commonly 
transmitted over radio sets. 
Footnote 3.3. It is, of course, always possible for a 
suitably intricate context to over turn the preferred 
interpretation in cases such as (3.49) & (3.50) 
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(3.54) John bought the radio. 
(3.55) They got the news by radio. 
(3.56) He made a pile out of radio 
(3.57) Radio has gone downhill since TV came in. 
It is not obvious that we want to say that these are 
completely different meanings of the words 'chicken', 
'book', 'radio' etc. we might say that these are 
different uses of the same word. It is this phenomenon 
that is known as polysemy, we are not faced with multiple 
words 'radio' in (3.54)-(3.57). We are faced with 
different applications of "meaning". What we have to 
question is whether meaning can be reconciled with the 
monolithic ascription of intensions to words. These 
'facts' of language issue a direct challenge to the truth 
conditional semanticist. What kind of all embracing set 
theoretic notion of meaning can be constructed for words 
exhibiting such rich and varied sense. 
A newspaper copy and a newspaper company 
don't count as instances of the same kind 
of thing in anyone's ontology, nor do a 
plate of chicken wings and a chicken on 
the hoof. (Nunberg 197 8: 7) 
Another interesting aspect if polysemy is the fact 
that a nominal can serve a number of referential 
functions simultaneously, invoking a number of effects in 
the hearer. Thus in (3.58) the hearer is expected to be 
able to use reference to a physical object to secure 
144 
reference to a rather more abstract referent, a 
particular sort of institution. Similar examples can be 
found in (3.59)-(3.61). All are cases where 
(3.58) The newspaper you are reading has 
come out against hanging 
(3.59) The chair you are sitting on is commonly 
seen in Eighteenth Century interiors 
(3.60) The disposable cup you are drinking from 
is an environmental pollutant 
(3.61) The bullet entered the pancreas, which 
is a vital organ, and he died of his wounds 
initial referential uptake is only part of the story, 
once a physical referent is secured the audience is 
expected to use this uptake as a 'sign post' to the more 
general, important and abstract intended referent. 
The features of meaning presented in this section-
the context in which reference must be evaluated, what 
reference is to etc.- present problems for a Formalist 
account of semantics. The problems may be seen as 
resulting from a wish to sanitize meaning, to remove it 
to a non-psychological objective realm where transparency 
and determinateness of sense together secure an absolute 
theory of meaning, truth and reference. 
3 The problem of Logical Omniscience 
The omission of the cognitive processor from formal 
theories of meaning and reference has worried cognitive 
scientists. For example Johnson-Laird writes: 
Logicians have only related language to 
models in various ways, psychologists have 
only related it to the mind. The real task 
is to show how language relates to the 
world through the agency of the mind. 
(Johnson-Laird 1981:1) 
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How then are we to relate intensions to a psychologically 
plausible theory of language understanding? Surprisingly, 
many practitioners of formal semantics are candid in 
their admission that: 
the model-theoretic intension of a word 
has in principle nothing whatsoever to do 
with what goes on in a person's head when 
he uses that word. (Dowty 1979:375) 
Introducing a collection of Montague's work Thomason 
writes: 
According to Montague the syntax, 
semantics and pragmatics of natural 
language are branches of mathematics, not 
of psychology (Thomason 1974:3) 
This straightforward disavowal of any interest in 
psychology and the cognitive system is one response open 
to scholars. 
Other advocates of formal theories of meaning have 
been aware of the gulf between their theories and 
theories of a 'mentalistic' sort. Some have sought to 
bridge the gap. We shall look at these proposals using 
them, on the way, to highlight the substantial obstacles 
to the reconciliation of a Montague-type approach with 
psychology. 
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Barbara Partee (1979) places on record her concern 
to bring together these two views of semantics which she 
calls 'mathematical' (formal) and 'psychological'. In 
fact, she relates this concern directly back to some of 
the central issues exercising me in this thesis. 
I believe that we will not be able to find 
an adequate account of the semantics of 
propositional attitudes without a theory 
which reconciles the conflicting demands 
of these two kinds of views of what 
semantics is. (Partee 1979:1) 
She goes on to note: 
the view that semantics is not psychology 
can [ ••• ] be reasonably ascribed to Frege 
(1919), and seems to be either implicit or 
explicit in the work of many linguists and 
philosophers. (Ibid:l) 
The basic problem, in trying to bridge the gap from 
avowed anti-psychologism to psychologism, is that some of 
the idealisations the truth-conditional formalists make, 
seem incompatible with a view of semantics as psychology. 
One of Montague's idealisations is that the 
intensions of sentences are propositions, and 
propositions are functions from possible worlds to truth 
values. Now a consequence of this view is that any 
logically valid sentence Cone true in all possible 
worlds) will have the same intension as any other. This, 
together with the fact that Montague assumes that the 
objects of propositional attitudes are propositions, 
leads to some uncomfortable consequences. 
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Recall the modified logical schema for substitution 
of identical semantic values given in the last chapter, 
and restated here. 
(3.62) alpha=beta-->(PHI<-->PHialpha/beta), where 
alpha does not stand within the scope 
of A,NECC,Past or Fut 
(3 .63) Aalpha=Abeta--> (PHI<-->PHialpha/beta) 
These schema together with the other proposals cited in 
Montague's system generate the consequence that where P 
and Q have the same value, then as logical equivalents 
they are intersubstitutable everywhere. 
So in Montague's system the inference from (3.64) to 
(3 .65) is valid. (Footnote 3 .3) 
(3.64) John believes that two is even 
(3.65) John believes that the square of 
two is irrational 
In fact the problem is more general than this, the 
propositions do not have to be logically valid for the 
problem of inferences of the form (3.66) to (3.67) to 
hold, they can be logically false or simply logically 
equivalent. 
(3.66) John believes P 
(3.67) John believes Q 
Footnote 3.3. Assuming the not implausible supposition 
that these statements of arithmetic are in fact logically 
val id. 
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The principle that allows these troublesome 
entailments, is a grave embarrassment to Montague. After 
all, one of his aims was to provide a logic which would 
block illicit inferences in intensional contexts. 
Montague's main aim was to give a 
completely successful analysis of logical 
consequence, or entailment, for ordinary 
language. (Bennett 1974:5) 
Embarrassing entailments can be found in Montague's 
system outside of 'intensional' opacity inducing 
contexts. In standard possible world semantics any 
logically false sentence implies any sentence whatsoever, 
whilst any sentence implies a logically valid sentence. 
So that the inference moves (3.68) -> (3.69) and (3.70) 
-> (3.71), are both valid. This is a consequence of the 
standard way in which entailment is defined, a sentence A 
entails a sentence B if it is impossible that A is true 
and B is false. 
(3.68) Two plus two equals five 
(3.69) The room is made of green cheese 
(3.70) The unicorn is running for President 
(3.71) Two plus two equals four 
Tautologies and contradictions are logically 
equivalent outside intensional contexts, (3.72) could 
perfectly well entail (3.73). 
(3.72) 
(3.73) 
Two plus two equals four 
Either it is raining or it is not raining 
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Given our very clear intuitions about the 
inadmissibility of such inferences, it remains a very 
substantial concern that a system principally designed to 
deal with the notion of inference in languages should 
allow such entailments. 
Partee traces the root of the problem to the fact 
our judgements are embedded within propositional 
attitudes: 
propositional attitudes are psychological, 
and it is just these psychological 
limitations that make substitution of 
logical equivalents fail. (Partee 197 9: 8) 
In the quote from Partee above I find it surprising 
that she speaks of our failure to draw inferences of the 
sort canvassed as limitations. Even a super-competent 
cognitive being would presumably not make inferences such 
as ( 3. 7 O) -> ( 3. 71) • 
4 Proper Names and Logical Omniscience 
We have already noted that Montague's solution to the 
substitutability problems associated with proper names 
was to ignore them. Within his system we are left with 
the legitimacy of inferences such as (3.72) -> (3.73). 
(3.72) John believes Samuel Clemens 
is Samuel Clemens 
(3.73) John believes Samuel Clemens 
is Mark Twain 
I should point out one drawback of both my 
treatment and that of Russell: one must 
either prohibit the existence of two 
genuine proper names of the same 
individual, (so that, say 'Samuel Clemens' 
would be allowed in the language, but the 
purported name phrase 'Mark Twain' would 
be replaced by the common noun phrase 
'person called Mark Twain' [Footnote 3.4] 
or reconcile oneself to the unambiguous 
truth of such sentences as 'necessarily 
Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain'. (Montague 
1970b: 213) 
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Montague leaves us with the option of either denying 
certain apparent proper names the status of genuine 
proper names, or else accepting the view that proper 
names must be rigid designators (i.e. have the same 
denotations in all possible worlds). 
Treating proper names as if they were rigid 
designators has been advocated by, for example, Kripke 
(1972). Part of the enthusiasm for Kripke's proposal has 
been its associated theory of 'proper name use' • This 
theory is seen to explain how people can 'use' proper 
names to ref er to individuals they do not know personally 
and cannot identify using any first hand knowledge of the 
person or object named. This is the so-called 'causal 
theory of proper names' , (Kripke 197 2, Putnam 197 3 ,197 5, 
Donnellan 197 4) • 
A rough statement of this theory might be 
Footnote 3.4. Recall that this is the move advocated by 
Russell who thought no actual surface-level 'proper name' 
of English was a genuine proper name but was, rather, a 
truncated description. 
the following. An initial baptism takes 
place. Here the object may be named by 
ostension, or the reference of the name 
fixed by a description. When the name is 
'passed from link to link', the receiver 
of the name must, I think, intend when he 
hears it to use it with the same reference 
as the man from whom he heard it. (Kripke 
197 2: 302) 
When this dubbing or baptism takes place the 
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individual is now called by the relevant name. The name 
has rigid designation because an individual is for 
Kripke, as Montague, a possible individual, and one 
essential requirement for a theory of language semantics 
is to be able to individuate or specify possible 
individuals across different possible worlds. Johnson-
Laird wryly sums up the requirement: 
A formal semantics for propositional 
attitudes depends on the postulation of 
possible worlds and possible individuals 
to inhabit them [ ••• ] The question arises 
as to how the same individual is to be 
identified from one possible world to 
another - the problem of Trans-world Heir 
Lines, as Kaplan has dubbed it. (Johnson-
Laird 1982:42) 
Kripke thinks that nothing short of rigid 
designators will do. The particular case of proper names 
will be dealt with more fully in the section on denoting 
phrases. 
For now let us note that such a view commits us to 
the necessity of identity statements containing proper 
names that name the same object. On this view sentences 
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such as (3.76), (3.79) and (3.82), if the identities 
alleged are true, are necessarily true. This commits us 
to being able to infer (3.75) from (3.74), (3.78) from 
(3.77), (3.81) from (3.80) and so on. These seem, 
intuitively, an unreasonable set of inferences. 
(3.74) Claudius believes that Cicero 
denounced Catiline 
(3.75) Claudius believes that Tully 
denounced Catiline 
(3. 76) Cicero is Tully 
(3.77) Beverly believes that Hesperus is 
Hesperus 
( 3. 7 8) Beverly believes that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus 
( 3. 7 9) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
( 3. 80) Barbara wonders whether saltpetre 
is saltpetre 
( 3. 81) Barbara wonders whether saltpetre 
is potassium nitrate 
( 3. 82) Saltpetre is potassium nitrate 
In addition identities such as (3. 83) (after 
Johnson-Laird 1982), which on the rigid designator 
approach are necessary, fail to explain why the assertion 
contained in (3.84) is not equivalent to (3.85). We can 
imagine that (3.84) is true, whilst (3.85) looks as if it 
is false. Many contingent events, in the actual world 
contributed to the emergence of the character named by 
' George Orwell' • 
(3.83) George Orwell is Eric Blair 
(3.84) If Eric Blair had not existed then 
George Orwell wouldn't have either 
(3.85) If George Orwell had not existed then 
Eric Blair wouldn't have either 
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And Johnson-Laird points out another curious 
consequence of Kripke's baptismal and rigid designator 
views of proper names. As a question we know that (3.86) 
is sensible even though the two terms ref er to the same 
object. But if the identity of proper names is necessary 
it looks as if (3.86) is equivalent to (3.87). 
(3.86) Which was named first, Phosphorus or Hesperus? 
(3.87) Which was named first, Phosphorus or Phosphorus? 
Recent proposals in formal semantics (Kaplan (1977), 
Stalnaker (1978), Klein (1979) seek to remove the 
problems posed by these embarrassing entailments. Their 
common approach is to invoke the use of context in 
characterising meaning. Thus they define notions such as 
'propositional concept' (Stalnaker), or 'character' 
(Kaplan), which contribute, if you will, to two stage 
intensions, ie functions from contexts of use to 
propositions which are in turn functions from possible 
worlds to truth values. We can contrast these notions 









Possible worlds 1-----> Truth Values 
Fe = Character or Concept 
Fi = Intension 
Recent view: Meaning = Fe and Fi 
Trad view: Meaning = Fi 
Using the idea of a 'rich' context, these proposals 
aim to show that two stage interpretations of meaning 
block the various embarrassing entailments and 
equivalences. For example, in the case of the actual 
world a speaker of (3.88) picks out the necessarily true 
proposition because for that utterer his cognitive 
state/context determines that the two terms are co-
extensive. Whilst in the context of a world where the 
identity (3.88) was not known to hold, (3.88) would pick 
out the necessarily false proposition. 
(3.88) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
Now this whole approach has one very interesting 
feature: the contexts appealed to seem to involve the 
internal cognitive states of the speakers, hearers, 
holders etc. of propositions. These cognitive states are 
their belief worlds, embodying their understanding of 
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terms etc. It is not clear whether each speaker is now 
locked inside his own 'language', defined by his 
solipsistic context. Character and concept seem to be 
idiosyncratic notions. Nevertheless, they begin to 
recognise the central position cognitive states play in 
the determination of extensions. 
However, the intensions themselves are still 
objective external functions. And as such seem to be the 
objective aspect of meaning that humans are obliged to 
attempt to grasp in order to 'successfully' communicate. 
Thus the problem of proper names and their 
intensions (constant functions picking out the same 
extension at all indices) leads us into the more general 
problem of the essential plausibility of intensions as 
possible psychological or cognitive elements. 
5 Mental Procedures and Intensions 
Intensions as formally defined are far too powerful if 
they are to serve as the representations of words which 
humans possess. Thus Partee (1979) writes: 
the psychological representation is 
probably more like an incomplete and 
possibly incorrect definite description or 
a partial algorithm for picking out the 
referent. (Partee 197 9: 6) 
Dowty (1979) believes that the psychological 
representations of word meanings Che calls these 
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representations "concepts") grossly underdetermine the 
formal intensions of words. An example, much used by 
Putnam, is a word like 'water'. People in using this word 
have little idea of the necessary and sufficient criteria 
(physical and chemical composition and the like) that fix 
the extension of such terms in all circumstances. 
Following Putnam we might suggest that what a person 
understands, when he uses such a word, is perhaps a set 
of more or less standard entailments. These do not 
circumscribe an intension completely, and may often be 
inaccurate. 
How then to bring intensions more closely into 
correspondence with concepts? Johnson-Laird's recent 
suggestions have been radical and to the point. He argues 
that the only way to link formal intensional semantics to 
psychology is to relinquish the belief that meanings are 
non-mental entities. He proposes intensions as the very 
mental procedures which people operate with when they use 
and understand a word. He too notes that these mental 
procedures are often incomplete. He suggests we might 
conceive of them as constituting 'stereotypes'. These 
'stereotypes', Johnson-Laird hopes, will serve as 
candidates for our mental 'effective intensions'. Why 
should this be? what are stereotypes? 
A stereotype is a special sort of 
intension, very different from the 
logician's idea of a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. It is essentially 
a partial function from possible worlds to 
extensions. Hence, what we possess in our 
minds simply fails to cover all the cases 
that nature presents us with - we may have 
no grounds or criteria for deciding 
whether a given entity is a piece of 
furniture, or whether one item is 'at' 
another. The lexicon is open. Its 
phylogeny reflects its ontogeny: its 
present status reflects the way it is 
learnt. If sufficient problematic cases 
occur, then an intension may be modified, 
or a more precise 'test' may be 
introduced, in order to legislate about 
the problematic cases. Natural Language 
tolerates these uncertainties because it 
is used primarily for communication, which 
is largely a matter of conveying what you 
intend to ref er to and what properties you 
intend to designate, rather than conveying 
precise extensions. (Johnson-Laird 
1982: 29) 
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Johnson-Laird's account of "meaning" implies that 
our communicative acts are open to failure and 
indeterminacy of interpretation. We can of course 
entertain mistaken or inappropriate beliefs, beliefs 
which do not allow us to deal with all the situations we 
find ourselves in. 
Barbara Partee (1981), in trying to psychologise 
intensions, suggests relativising intensions to 
individuals, effectively specifying a separate semantics 
for each of the members of the speech community. However, 
she leaves out any consideration as to how all these 
idiolects can be brought into a stable correspondence 
with one another. Like Johnson-Laird, Partee recognises 
that these individualised intensions will be partial 
intensions. 
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As these proposals stand I have no argument with the 
claim that the mental representations of words fall far 
short of idealised intensions. Nor do I disagree with 
the idea that stereotypes or prototypes might be a 
psychologically fruitful way of thinking about lexical 
representations, this has a long and respectable history 
(cf for example Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956), Berlin & 
Kay (1969), Rosch (1973,1977), Rosch et al (1976), 
Rummelhart & Ortony (1977)). 
Having admitted this much I would still question 
characterising an effective mental procedure as a partial 
function from possible worlds to extensions. What exactly 
are the co-ordinates used in the possible worlds? What 
are the extensions which are mapped onto? Why are 
possible worlds invoked at all in the type of mental 
model theory Johnson-Laird suggests? 
He suggests that particular instantiations of mental 
model can be thought of as possible ways of discharging 
the truth conditions of a sentence. In this respect they 
can be seen as doing the kind of job the modal logician 
required of possible worlds. Of course the logician's 
possible worlds are too rich a notion to put inside the 
head of speakers and hearers. But Isard (1978), Johnson-
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Laird (1982, 1983) and others have suggested thinking 
about the construction of mental models as a constructive 
process. In this way we do not have to store all the 
possible instantiations of mental models, only rules for 
their construction. In just the same way we do not have 
all the integers explicitly represented in our heads but 
procedures for generating them. We have a generative 
capacity for model building. 
This is all well and good but the problem still 
remains exactly what does it mean to say that the meaning 
of a word is a partial function from these worlds or 
models onto extensions. Are these extensions in the world 
or in the head? 
Johnson-Laird suggests: 
Model-theoretic semantics maps the 
expressions of language into model 
structures, and in the case of natural 
language Montague (see Thomason 1974) and 
others have argued that these structures 
consist of 'possible worlds'. such a 
semantics cannot be inserted directly into 
the mind, because there are infinitely 
many possible worlds. Both Partee (1979) 
and Johnson-Laird (1982) have struggled 
with this problem of a rapprochement 
between semantic theory and psychology 
[ ••• ] I hav~ argued that there is a direct 
resolution of the problem: a mental model 
is a single representative sample from the 
set of models satisfying the 
assertion.(Johnson-Laird 1983:264) 
Lexical semantics presents no essential 
obstacle to our project of linking formal 
and psychological semantics. Intensions 
are knowable but very of ten they take the 
form of stereotypes. A stereotype is a 
special sort of intension r ••• l It is 
essentially a partial function from 
possible worlds to extensions. {Johnson-
Laird 1982:29) 
If a discourse has complete truth 
conditions, it is true with respect to the 
world if and only if it has at least one 
mental model that can be mapped into the 
real world. If a discourse has only 
partial truth conditions [ ••• ] it is false 
with respect to the world if it has no 
mental model that can be mapped into the 
real world. If its truth conditions are 
not fixed or not known, then to use 
Russell's aphorism about mathematics, we 
never know what we are talking about, nor 
whether what we are saying is true. 
{Johnson-Laird 1983:442) 
To realise Johnson-Laird's proposals that 
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stereotypes are the effective mental representations of 
meanings, we need to understand quite explicitly what the 
components of the partial functions {stereotypes) are. 
For example, what are the possible worlds referred to? 
From the quotes it appears that they are particular 
mental models. Now the standard definition from model 
theoretic semantics provides the following type of 
structure: 
M = < A,W,T,<,F > 
where: 
A is the set of objects/individuals in the model, 
W is the number of possible worlds available to the 
model. 
T is the set of time intervals at which the model 
is sampled. 
< is a linear ordering of the set T, this establishes 
the directionality and sequence of time. 
161 
F is a function that assigns semantic values of the 
appropriate sort to each non-logical constant of the language 
relative to each pair <w,t> where w-in-set-W and t-in-set-T. 
Johnson-Laird claims that mental models are 
particular instantiations from a range of possible 
models, instantiations containing representations of 
individuals and such like. Let us transport the model 
structure we defined above as part of the building blocks 
of mental models. Thew, T and > co-ordinates can be 
thought of as instantiations of one of a possible number 
of mental models, A is the set of mental objects to be 
seen as populating the model, and F assigns our 
'mentalese' or private language to elements out of the 
model. 
so L.:M:. 'mentalese' can be given an interpretation 
or model 
.M.:M:. = < A.:M:.,W.:M:.,T.:M:.,<.:M:.,F.:M:. > 
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But this hasn't yet got us to the real world! One of 
the suggestions Johnson-Laird makes is to borrow an idea 
of Isard's (1978), which is: 
to argue that the two domains are 
'equivalent with respect to a language', 
that is, anything that can truly be said 
about one is true if the other. (Johnson-
Laird 1982:32) 
So now we have two models, one the mental model, the 
other 'reality'. What enables a mental model to function 
as a model of reality, is that the 'mapping' Johnson-
Laird wants establishes a correspondence between models 
that can in principle make the same set of sentences in a 
language true. The language is not just private, but has 
two aspects, mentalistic and realistic, by virtue of the 
presumed equivalence of models with respect to a 
language. The formal constraint this places on the models 
is shown below in Table 3.5. 
The fact the two models can stand in this relation 
is presumably a fact about the 'utility' or 
'appropriateness' of our models qua the reality model. 
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Table 3.5 
.M.:R:. = < A.:R:.,W.:R:.,T.:R:.,<.:R:.,F.:R:. > I 
1--- L 
M.:M:. = < A.:M:.,W.:M:.,T.:M:.,<.:M:.,F.:M:. > I 
M.:M:. and M.:R:. are co-ordinated or equivalent wrt to L 
The condition to be satisfied is that for 
any sentence PHI of L 
if I [PHil I. :M: •• :M:. = 1 then I [PHI] I. :M: •• :R:. = 1 
AND 
if I [PH I ] I • : M : • • : M : • = 0 th en I [PH I ] I • : M : • • : R : • = 0 
This kind of proposal still relies on an absolute notion 
of truth. It still appeals to there being determinate 
truth conditions in the way our models and meanings in 
these models work. Without truth conditions as Johnson-
Laird says 'we never know what we are talking about'. 
What he is looking for is some guarantee of language 
success. He finds this in the relations of invariant and 
deterministic reference between language and models 
embodied in the language equivalence proposal. It is an 
old solution in a new guise. The key for success is the 
assumption that our mental models and reality can make 
the same sentences true. 
And yet Johnson-Laird's own work suggests he is 
suspicious of such deterministic and invariant accounts 
of our meanings and representations. 
C ••• l a representation can be a 
representation of a real thing but it is 
not the real thing itself. Hence the 
nature of the mind and its perceptual 
system exert a decisive effect on the 
world we perceive [ •• ~] our view of the 
world is causally dependent both on the 
way the world is and on the way we are 
[ ••• ] our knowledge indeed depends on our 
biological make up as well as on things-
in-themselves. (Johnson-Laird 1983:402-
403) 
What drives Johnson-Laird back into the arms of a 
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formally inspired account of reference is the need for a 
strong theory of language success. An explanation of why 
it is that: 
somehow behind the scenes [ ••• ] the 
extensions of terms are fixed. (Johnson-
Laird 1982:21) 
This attempt to psychologise intensions seems not to 
provide an acceptable solution. The problem remains of 
how to account for communicative success- how does 
language secure the objects of reference- and at the same 
time reflect incomplete and non-deterministic linguistic 
procedures. 
The original problem of opacity was articulated in 
formal systems. In certain contexts terms seemed to 
ref er to structures that went beyond simple reference to 
objects. The problem was to account for these structure 
and still preserve semantic transparency and a formal 
theory of logical entailments. 
Other approaches have attempted to square language 
success and the subjective, non-deterministic nature of 
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intensions. They have in general appealed to the notion 
of a mental model. In the next chapter we will examine 
in detail the concept of a mental model. Can mental 
models provide a means of understanding the phenomenon of 
reference? Do they offer explanations for the associated 
opacity problems? 
CHAPTER FOUR LANGUAGE AND .MENTAL MODELS- VIEWS FROM 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
What is needed to make psychological sense 
of propositional attitudes is, in my view, 
an extension of the notion of a mental 
model, a study of the semantics of such 
verbs as believe, and an analysis of cer-
tain aspects of ref erring expressions 
(Johnson-Laird 1982:48) 
The rest of this thesis is an attempt to discharge the 
requirements outlined above. We have, in previous 
chapters, examined logical proposals which seek to 
account for a wide range of the semantic data associated 
with intensional contexts, culminating in the use of 
Montague's Intensional Logic. Montague's system involves 
the deployment of 'model theoretic' apparatus. Is the 
appeal contained in the above quote merely an exhortation 
to extend the notion of a model as used, for example, in 
Montague Semantics? I argued in the last chapter that 
there are real problems with such a view. 
There exists a fundamental difference between the 
notion of 'models' as used in standard 'model theoretic' 
semantics and what we might call 'mental models' theory. 
The difference, in essence, is that mental models are, as 
the name implies, mental or cognitive in origin. 
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In mental model theory the relation between language 
and the world is absolutely dependent on, and mediated 
by, cognitive models. Mental models provide a way of 
understanding an organism's response to its environment. 
They offer an organism a representational ability, one 
which has evolved and developed so as to furnish the 
individual with information that is relevant to its needs 
whilst not completely at odds with its external 
environment. 
The vital caveat in talking of mental models is that 
the processes of model construction do not furnish 
irref ragable knowledge. The model building apparatus 
provides representations that at best provide reliable 
and usable beliefs, and not veridical access to an 
objective reality. 
This kind of argument is well developed in the work 
of the evolutionary epistemologists (cf for example 
Lorenz 1973, Vollmer 1975, Riedl 1979, Tennant 1982a, 
1982b). They posit, as a basic requirement of cognitive 
systems, the possession of a 'Weltbildapparat' (world 
building apparatus). This apparatus generates 
representations of the organism's environment. The 
representations, in turn, are tailored to those aspects 
of the organism's interaction with its environment that 
are important for reproduction and survival. 
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The 'Weltbildapparat' results in what we can call a 
'mental model'. Now of course within mental model theory 
access to the world is via representations. This 
introduces subjectivity. The problem for a theory of 
knowledge that takes mental models seriously, is to 
explain why they embody 'knowledge' that is reliable 
concerning the world outside our models. 
As Tennant (1982a) has pointed out the problem may 
be summarised in this way, 'how can subjective conditions 
of thought have objective reality?' (1982a:3.2) 
Evolutionary Epistemologists attempt to reply to 
this substantial worry in the following way. Firstly, 
they argue that successful advances in adaption (in terms 
of a Darwinian view of Evolution) correspond to an 
increase of information about the domain for which that 
adaption is significant. It follows that evolution may be 
characterised as an information increasing process. 
Secondly, cognitive structures, like other biological 
organs, evolve as a result of the process of natural 
selection. This suggests that cognitive structures should 
be reasonably well-adapted to those aspects of 'reality' 
that are of importance to the species concerned. A 
further consequence of this evolutionary line of argument 
is that there is no implausibility in supposing that 
certain items of information, or structures that result 
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in information-gain, can be inborn. And so, the argument 
goes, certain cognitive propensities and structures can 
be innate Contogenetically a priori) through having been 
slowly 'wired-in' by natural selection Cphylogenetically 
a posteriori). 
such a position involves a very direct contact with 
the 'real world', one of fundamental importance. The 
process of evolution affects organisms through the force 
of natural selection which constantly engineers organisms 
into successful accommodations with their environments. 
In characterising organisms as possessed of 'world 
building' apparatus, and as involved in gathering and 
interpreting information we must heed an important 
caveat. The processes of information processing, 
interpretation and model building do not lead to 
veridical or irref ragable knowledge. There is contact 
with an external reality, and this 'reality' takes an 
active and consistent role in the dynamic relation of an 
organism with its environment, directly shaping its 
cognitive structures. But the consequent cognitive 
structures provide 'representations' and 'models' that at 
best furnish reliable beliefs and not veridical 
knowledge. This sounds familiar, and it is interesting 
that it should surf ace explicitly time and time again in 
the work of, for example, Lorenz. He draws a distinction 
between the actuality of cognitive systems as 
glaubensgewinnenden (belief-achieving) , against the 
chimera of cognitive systems as erkenntnisgewinnenden 
(fact achieving). 
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Let's now consider under what conditions an organism 
would be constructing 'beliefs'. The organism needs to 
act to survive. To act it must process information, 
process it reasonably well and reasonably quickly. To do 
this it is likely that information processing strategies 
have developed that yield fast answers on 'degraded' 
input. It is not necessary for the survival of a species 
that it always gets the 'right' answer from its cognitive 
strategies, only that it responds appropriately more 
often than not, that its response is not at a chance 
level. One can imagine many such strategies that provide 
the organism with fast, computationally low-cost 
processing abilities. Reliability not irrefragability is 
the appropriate design criterion. 
On this view understanding the structure and content 
of the cognitive system requires understanding the 
crucial interaction of organism and environment. 
We also perceive a way of rendering truth and 
reference in a cognitive context, rooted in an assumed 
and theoretically required reality. Truth and reference 
become intentional notions because our representations 
are not irref ragable, nor do they need to be. 
We accord no sense to any conception of 
the world as it 'really' is, independently 
of our ways of perceiving, apprehending 
and organising it. {Tennant 1982b) 
Evolution in selecting our perceptual and 
intellectual abilities is not in the least 
interested in their capacity for truth but 
merely in whether or not they will help us 
to survive. {Olding 1983: 7) 
Mental models have been seen to have biological 
utility. But what of the view from other areas of 
Cognitive science- and, in particular, how do these 
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mental models relate to language? Let us consider some 
recent answers to this question. For expository purposes 
it is useful to classify these proposals according to the 
paradigms which inspired them. Figure 4.1 shows the 
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SECTION .QNE LINGUISTICS AND MENTAL MODELS 
Let us consider each area in turn. Karttunen 
proposes discourse models as part of the apparatus 
required by any linguistic theory capable of accounting 
for linguistic data. His description of a discourse model 
appeals to the notion of computational processes able to 
maintain a text history. Such a text history would 
contain, at least, 'discourse referents'. The 'discourse 
referents' are representations of the objects of 
discourse, i.e. what the discourse is about. The 
discourse model is incremented and updated as discourse 
proceeds. 
Consider a device designed to read a text 
in some natural language, interpret it and 
store the content in some manner, say, for 
the purpose of being able to answer some 
questions about it. To accomplish this 
task, the machine will have to fulfill at 
least the following requirements. It has 
to be able to build a file that consists 
of records of all the individuals, that 
is, events, objects, etc., mentioned in 
the text and, for each individual, record 
what is said about it. (Karttunen 
1976:364) 
Karttunen is concerned to explore the possibility of 
using the properties of such discourse models to explain 
a number of problems and ambiguities usually treated in a 
structural or linguistic fashion. The linguistic nature 
of Karttunen's interests are made quite clear in the 
'Discourse Referents' paper. 
Given an indefinite noun-phrase, under 
what circumstances is there supposed to be 
an individual described by this noun-
phrase? This need not be understood as 
some sort of ontological question subject 
to philosophical speculation. In this 
paper I intend to approach it from an 
entirely linguistic point of view. 
(Ibid:365) 
we are going to examine case by case 
certain aspects of sentence structure that 
play a role in determining whether an 
indefinite noun-phrase establishes a 
discourse referent. Cibid:387) 
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We can also see from these quotes that Karttunen 
regards sentences as containing instructions for the 
generation and interpretation of 'discourse model 
structures'. Karttunen has little to say concerning the 
representational nature of his discourse referents. 
However, he is at pains to square up his linguistic data 
with the semantic facts present in the putative truth-
conditions of sentences. For example, the following quote 
suggests that Karttunen is persuaded that the 'discourse 
model generator' must be sensitive to the effects of 
intensional contexts on sentential truth values. 
it [the text-interpreting device] must 
distinguish what exists for the speaker 
from what exists for somebody else. 
(Ibid:372) 
Although this passage suggests that assignments of truth 
to sentences may be made relative to other 'worlds' than 
the 'real one' he leaves untouched how this would fit 
together, and to" what model the assignment of truth would 
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finally make appeal. 
Jackendoff's (1975) and Fauconnier's (1979) work are 
closely related, indeed Fauconnier acknowledges that 
Jackendoff's work inspired his own. Both are concerned 
to account for linguistic data within linguistic theory. 
However, both see the consequences of their work for 
other disciplines, and acknowledge the influence of other 
disciplines on their thinking. 
Fauconnier's (1979) comments on mental models Che 
calls them 'mental spaces') illustrate what is perhaps 
the common theme running through all the mental model 
work to date. He talks of the 'topology of discourse 
processing' and of 'considering meaning as instructions 
for use'. A feature that might serve as a unifying 
theme, is that 
sentences contain [ •••• ] instructions for 
discourse processing; they can set up 
image spaces within the discourse, 
introduce new elements in such spaces 
[ •••• ] the sentence is a set of 
instructions for setting up and referring 
to the mental constructs which support the 
organisation of discourse. (Fauconnier 
1979:5) 
Fauconnier also supports, in line with my own 
remarks and Karttunen's, the view that these models are 
irredeemably subjective. He perceives the consequences 
of this subjectivity for the truth evaluation of 
sentences. 
The traditional approach to the problem of 
natural language logic [ ••• ] involves the 
notion of truth in real and possible 
worlds and the association of isolated 
sentences with representations akin to 
formulas of mathematical logic. The 
empirical linguistic evidence, however, 
suggests that truth conditions hold with 
respect to spaces, which are mental 
constructs produced by discourse. 
(Ibid:72) 
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Like Karttunen, Fauconnier suggests that many of the 
puzzles of natural language semantics might be the 
result of the various properties and mechanisms of 
discourse models. 
The properties these mental spaces or models possess 
as representations seem to be taken over entirely from 
Jackendoff (1975). Jackendoff, in considering the nature 
of reference in various language contexts, appeals to the 
'semantics of images'. The semantics of images 
distinguishes the actual referent and an image of that 
referent. Jackendoff is at pains to point out that in 
many contexts (eg belief contexts) what is at issue is 
not the actual referent itself but the image, how the 
image is described, whether it is supposed to be a 
"faithful representation" of the 'real referent' etc. 
The appeal to the semantics of images and the notion 
of faithful representations is expanded by Jackendoff. 
The notion of a faithful representation 
must of course be explicated. A 
particular medium of imagery represents 
only certain aspects of the objects it 
purports to represent r ••• J Each medium 
has a set of conventions that define and 
delimit the nature of the correspondence 
between images in that medium and their 
purported referents. A faithful 
representation within a particular medium 
corresponds point by point with those 
aspects of its purported referent that are 
taken into account by the conventions of 
the medium. (Jackendoff 1975:55) 
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There are a number of interesting points in this passage. 
Jackendoff appeals to the idea of a 'set of conventions' 
that already determine how an image is to be interpreted 
as a representation of its referent. These conventions 
work by taking into account certain aspects of the 
purported referent and provide ways of mapping features 
of the image onto features of the referent. The notion of 
convention is of course intentional; conventions have to 
be recognised and shared by human beings. And certainly 
Jackendof f realises that these image conventions carry 
with them a familiar subjective qualification: 
The linguistic properties of all the media 
of imagery are fundamentally the same, 
grounded in the semantic (or cognitive) 
relation x purports to refer to ~· 
(Ibid:60) 
Such a relation is open to error, and if we extend the 
lesson of the semantics of imagery in language to 
cognitive representations in general we arrive at a 
position similar to the one I have argued for in previous 
chapters. 
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SECTION TWO LOGIC AND MENTAL MODELS 
Let us now turn to proposals which involve 'mental 
models' and which arise out of logical traditions. Each 
of these proposals posit 'intermediate' discourse 
representations. These structures stand between language 
and the 'verification domain' that determines the truth 
or falsity of the sentences in the language. In other 
respects the proposals are, as we shall see, 
interestingly varied. 
Stenning's work {1977,1978,1980) attempts to explain 
the results of text generation or interpretation in terms 
of the strategies or heuristics a psychological subject 
uses. 
From a speaker's point of view these 
principles can be seen as principles of 
text construction - how to construct a 
text that will describe a given model. 
From a hearer's point of view they can be 
seen as principles of model construction -
how to construct a model given a text. 
{Stenning 1978:193) 
such principles have predictive content. It is an 
interesting, and empirically testable psychological claim 
that, for example, we build textual descriptions under a 
constraint of 'Anaphoric Conservatism', a principle which 
states that: 
Old elements are not implicitly given new 
descriptions, or conversely, a new 
indefinite description heralds a new set 
of elements. {Stenning 1978) 
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In using the apparatus of formal semantics Stenning is 
helping himself to what he considers a useful tool, with 
the following important caveat. In appealing to logical 
calculi he asserts that the semantic assumptions of such 
systems are relevant to only certain sorts of discourse. 
Moreover, these particular sorts of discourse are an 
idealisation away from how human subjects normally 
communicate. 
I shall argue that we can make best sense 
of the relations between logical structure 
and discourse function if we treat logic 
as an abstract theory of one particular 
type of discourse (call it argumentation 
for the present) rather than the 
foundation of a general theory of all 
types of discourse.(Stenning 1980) 
Logic, I have argued, is the study of 
argumentation under the idealisation that 
the participants' knowledge of the object-
language interpretation is complete and 
constant [ ••• ] Once this ideal state of 
equated extensional interpretation has 
been achieved, the meaning of predicates 
is completely fixed by their extension: 
but we could never arrive at such states 
unless we shared the procedures for 
applying each vocabulary item in each new 
interpretation. (Stenning 1980) 
It is implicit in his writing that processors engaged in 
the interpretation and generation of language cannot 
avail themselves of omniscience, omniscience is not a 
feature of our communicative activity: 
Ostension might help iron out some 
ambiguities but if we don't share common 
ways of categorising what we're pointing 
at, pointing is not going to help. 
Although reference, and ostension, in 
particular, are common courts of appeal in 
this process of checking agreement on an 
initial interpretation, they are only 
courts, not legislatures so-to-speak. 
(Stenning 1980) 
One of Stenning's conclusions is that a theory of 
17 9 
reference cannot be secured by a formal theory of sense. 
To take extensionalism as the foundation 
of a theory of meaning is to make 
reference (or at least denotation) out of 
sense, and the result is to make it 
impossible to make sense of reference in 
types of discourse other than 
argumentation. (Stenning 1980) 
Stenning sees the outlines of a solution to 
reference in language lying in our understanding of the 
different communicative functions of language and the 
various strategies and heuristics of referential 
activity. Seuren (1982,1983) also shares a concern for 
the cognitive processes which construct and maintain 
models of discourse. Seuren attempts to outline the 
various mechanisms that such 'discourse domains' utilize. 
Mechanisms that have to do with, for example; 
'orientation'- the focusing of information relevant to 
the immediate needs of communication; 'referential 
maintenance' and 'incrementation'- processes involved in 
the orderly assimilation and integration of the objects 
of discourse into the discourse domains themselves. 
In particular, Seuren sees these principles as 
contributing to the interpretation of utterances against 
a discourse context; utterances cannot be interpreted in 
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themselves but only as component parts of a discourse 
domain. His detailed proposals amount to an ambitious 
attempt to use 'discourse domain principles' in 
explaining a wide range of linguistic behaviour from 
presupposition, through anaphora to intensional contexts. 
Seuren's model does assume an absolute theory of 
truth and reference. In his view a discourse model is a 
cognitive model which relates to some verification domain 
(usually the real world). Relates in such a way that it 
contains representations which bear truth values with 
respect to the verification domain. The verification 
domain is a processor-independent model determining the 
relations of truth and reference for the discourse model. 
The use of an external processor-independent model 
to discharge the truth conditions of discourse models is 
also a feature of Kamp's (1981) proposal. However, the 
'discourse representations' do not, in themselves, have 
any semantic content at all since they are purely 
syntactic objects. His 'discourse representations' are 
ordered pairs consisting of a set of individual constants 
and occurrences of formulae of a language. Part of Kamp's 
formal definition of a Discourse Representation (DR) is 
given below 
DEFINITION 1. Let D be an L-Discourse 
1. A possible DR (discourse representation) of D 
is a pair <U,Con> with 
(i) U a subset of V the set of discourse 
referents 
Cii)Con is a set of occurrences in D of 
sentences of L' (U) 
(Kamp 19 81 : 3 0 6 ) 
Note that L' (U) is a language obtained from L by 
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adding a subset u of V to the set of basic terms together 
with a set of sentences (those occurring in the 
discourse). Such a characterisation entails that DRs are 
syntactic objects. DRs are pairs of individual constants 
and sets of occurrences of sentences. 
Strictly speaking, Kamp's DRs are intermediate 
structures between discourse and models, one presumes 
between discourse and the world. To provide a theory of 
truth for these DRs Kamp uses a two stage definition of 
truth. In fact his definition boils down to the addition 
of a further 'interpretation function'. In the 
construction of DRs new individual constants (discourse 
referents) are introduced. In order to interpret them 
(as they constitute an addition to the language L) we 
need an additional interpretation function. Recall that 
in standard model theory, to give an interpretation for L 
you give a model M=<A,F>, where A is a non-empty set and 
F assigns elements and sets of elements of A to the basic 
expression of L. To interpret the expanded language L' CU) 
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with the additional syntactic elements u (the discourse 
referents) we need an additional interpretation function 
f. This provides a full model M' for the language L'(U), 
viz M'=<A,F,f,U>. As Reichgelt (1981) points out, Kamp's 
method for providing an interpretation of DRs is 
[ ••• ] in fact quite similar to a strategy 
used in Henkin-type completeness proofs 
where one expands the language to 
'exemplify' existential formulas (cf 
Henkin (1949)) (Reichgelt 1981: 10) 
In so far as DRs are syntactic structures rather 
like the syntactic structures of language, and since 
truth and reference are fixed by assignment functions, 
Kamp is still adhering to a traditional absolute, 
objective theory of meaning for the actual expressions of 
language. He does not indicate that different processors, 
who presumably instantiate these DRs, have different 
assignment functions for the basic expressions of the 
language. However, Kamp's proposals do offer a dynamic 
and incremental model of DR construction. 
SECTION THREE PSYCHOLOGY AND MENTAL MODELS 
Let us turn now to two proposals arising out of 
psychology. In both proposals discourse models are 
essential to the underlying theories of language 
generation and interpretation. we have already discussed 
at some length aspects of Johnson-Laird's work, but we 
have not yet referred to the work of Sanford and Garrod. 
Johnson-Laird has over a number of years and in 
numerous articles (cf for example Johnson-Laird 1977, 
1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, Johnson-Laird & Garnham 
1980) argued that to understand language processing we 
are 
forced to postulate a crucial role for 
what we call mental models of discourse, 
or more simply, discourse models. A 
discourse model is a mental object that 
constitutes an individual's knowledge of a 
discourse. (Johnson-Laird & Garnham 
1980: 371) 
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I am in agreement with much of what Johnson-Laird 
has said about the nature, origin and need for mental 
models. In discussing his views, echoes of my discussion 
as to the nature of models and representations will be 
evident. 
The need to postulate models has two main elements, 
firstly the utility and advantage they confer on the 
organism, secondly their ability to help account for a 
substantial amount of psychological data. 
Johnson-Laird's endorsement of the advantage which 
mental models confer is unequivocal. 
It is now plausible to suppose that mental 
models play a central and unifying role in 
representing objects, states of affairs, 
sequences of events, the way the world is, 
and the social and psychological actions 
of daily life. They enable individuals to 
make inferences and predictions, to 
understand phenomena, to decide what 
action to take and to control its 
execution, and above all to experience 
events by proxy; they allow language to be 
used to create representations comparable 
to those deriving from direct acquaintance 
with the world; and they relate words to 
the world by way of conception and 
perception. (Johnson-Laird 1983:397) 
[mental models] can be used in much the 
same way that a navigator uses a map to 
avoid danger and to reach a desired 
destination in safety. The richer and more 
veridical the internal model, the greater 
will be the organisms chance of survival. 
(Ibid:402) 
Once again we are confronted by the issue of the 
184 
fallibility of representations and whether truth is in 
principle attainable for cognitive systems. What Johnson-
Laird says above, together with his discussion of 
intensions and the use of model theory, might suggest he 
is adopting an absolutist theory of truth to provide 
semantic content for his models. 
Johnson-Laird does sometimes talk as if this were an 
assumption in his work. It is most apparent in his 1983 
work where he urges the adoption of Kamp's theory of 
truth for DRs. Kamp's is a theory which, as we have seen, 
is rooted in an absolutist theory of truth, reference and 
meaning. 
How then is truth to be defined with such 
a conception of a mental model? In my 
view, the way to proceed is to take 
advantage of Kamp's essential insight and 
to argue that a discourse is true if there 
is a proper embedding of at least one of 
its discourse models in the real world 
model. (Johnson-Laird 1983:372) 
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However, Johnson-Laird on many occasions does 
justice to the 'subjective nature' of our knowledge. The 
notion of veridicality mentioned in the (1983:402) quote 
is ameliorated by assertions that 
You may say that you perceive the world 
directly but in fact what you experience 
depends on a model of the world [ ••• ] all 
our knowledge of the world depends on our 
ability to construct models of it. Since 
this ability is a product of natural 
selection, our knowledge indeed depends on 
our biological make-up as well as on 
things-in-themselves. (Johnson-Laird 
1983: 402-403) 
This has profound consequences for the way he is bound to 
view reference, a view not at all dissimilar to my own. A 
view that highlights intentions, that allows the 
possibility of successful communication transcending 
what, from a God's eye position, would be a literal 
failure of reference. 
Reference certainly requires 
representations that correspond to 
elements in the world, but it is a mistake 
to confuse reference with mere 
correspondence. The use of natural 
language to communicate depends on an 
intentional correspondence between a 
symbolic expression and a state of affairs 
[ •••• ] People, however, use linguistic 
expressions with the intention of picking 
out certain states of affairs. successful 
communication may transcend literal 
failures of reference [ •••• ] because a 
listener may be able to recover a 
speaker's referential intentions. Human 
communication therefore depends on a tacit 
understanding that symbolic expressions 
can either correspond or fail to 
correspond ·to reality. (Ibid 1983:405) 
However, even in this passage there is a tension between 
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the use of absolute truth conditions and fallible 
approximations to them. The implication is that if only 
we had enough information equally shared, communication 
would become transparent and veridical. Whilst there is a 
perception of how intentions relativise all talk of truth 
conditions, there is at the same time a commitment to 
some larger theory of absolute truth underwriting our 
mental models. This tension is again evident in the 
passages below 
the mental model is constructed on the 
basis of the truth conditions of the 
propositions expressed by the sentences of 
the discourse. (Ibid 1983:407) 
the truth conditions of the proposition 
expressed by a sentence therefore depend 
on the meaning of the sentence, its 
context of utterance Cas represented by 
the current mental model), and the 
implicit inferences that it triggers from 
background knowledge. (Ibid 1983:407) 
The contexts which relativise truth conditions are, on 
Johnson-Laird's own admission, complex sets of 
considerations including intentional elements. It must be 
reiterated that, understood intentionally, the 
'evaluation conditions' for a sentence such as (4.1) do 
not have to do with an exact particular state of affairs 
obtaining in the world. The sense in which (4.1) is 
'true' depends on the interlocutor's needs. A recurrent 
theme in Johnson-Laird's writing is this conflict between 
truth-conditional theories of meaning and intentional 
constructivist views of meaning. The resulting tensions 
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of this conflict are also a feature, as we shall see, of 
most AI approaches to discourse model building. 
(4.1) New York is a hundred miles from 
Boston 
Why does Johnson-Laird require the Procrustean 
theory of truth for the semantics of his mental models? 
It may be that the method of instantiation of these 
models in the mind suggests such a theory of truth. 
Johnson-Laird argues that the apparatus of mental models 
should be regarded procedurally. In particular, mental 
models may be realised as computational algorithms 
[ •••• ] the essential character of mental 
models: they derive from a relatively 
small set of elements and recursive 
operations on these elements; their 
representational power depends on a 
further set of procedures for constructing 
and evaluating them. (Ibid 1983: 429) 
This computability constraint together with a wish 
to 'psychologise formal semantics' and subsequently to 
use its machinery in mental models, leads to the adoption 
of a standard theory of truth and reference. And yet set 
against this is Johnson-Laird's admiration for the work 
of Wittgenstein, work which suggests that truth and 
reference are not the appropriate foundation upon which 
to build a theory of meaning. 
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I will not at this stage present any of Johnson-
Laird' s detailed proposals concerning the architecture of 
mental models. Some of these will receive discussion when 
I present the elements of my Discourse Models. 
What I will add is that Johnson-Laird presents 
compelling evidence for the deployment of the general 
concept of mental models. He cites work on inference and 
reasoning, memory and verbal recall, word and narrative 
understanding etc. all of which suggest the mediation of 
mental models in our cognitive processes (summarised in 
Johnson-Laird 1980a, 1983). Illustrative of these claims 
is the evidence that in narrative comprehension and 
recall a constructive rather than interpretive 
representation is implicated in the human processor (cf 
for example Bransford, Barclay & Franks 1972, Bransford & 
Mccarrell 1975). An interpretive theory suggests that the 
representations constructed when, say, narrative is 
understood, are .fJll.l analyses of ~ semantic content of 
the narrative. On this view each sentence is represented 
in some propositional form in which the meaning of each 
element and the interpretation of the whole preserves the 
original input structure. A constructive theory suggests 
that individuals build representations that go beyond the 
'semantic content' of input in various ways. The evidence 
is quite strong that constructivism is at work in 
linguistic interpretation. This evidence supports a 
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speculation Johnson-Laird advanced some years before the 
appearance of his more fully worked out theory of mental 
models. 
It is natural to wonder whether the 
sentence is the largest unit normally 
involved in the recall of language. It is 
possible that from the meanings of 
sentences in a connected discourse, the 
listener implicitly sets up a much 
abbreviated and not especially linguistic 
model of the narrative, and that recall is 
very much an active reconstruction based 
on what remains of this model. Where the 
model is incomplete, material may even be 
unwittingly invented to render memory more 
meaningful or more plausible - a process 
which has its parallel in the initial 
construction of the model. (Johnson-Laird 
1970) 
The promise of mental models seems large in 
psychological terms. Two researchers who have reason to 
agree are Sanford and Garrod. They regard much of the 
processing involved in the cognitive task of reading as 
being 
motivated by the attempt to discover some 
unique mental model of what the writer is 
talking about. (Sanford & Garrod 1981:8) 
Notice that Sanford & Garrod are discussing text not 
spoken discourse. In general, their research has focused 
on text rather than spoken discourse because it provides 
a more structured and controllable domain for linguistic 
generation and interpretation. Nevertheless, the central 
elements in their account of mental models have a 
familiar look 
rather than simply describe text as a 
linguistic object, it therefore seems more 
appropriate to describe it as a set of 
instructions which tell the reader how to 
utilise the knowledge he already has [ ••• ] 
(Sanford & Garrod 1981: 8) 
The basis on which discourse is produced 
and understood is essentially contractual. 
A writer wishes to convey an idea to his 
readers. In essence, this means that he 
must establish in the minds of his readers 
a situational model which is the same as 
(or closely similar to) the one in his own 
mind. He can then refer to this model as 
his discourse unfolds and be reasonably 
certain that what he says will be 
intelligible. (Ibid) 
We discover in these quotes a processing view of 
language behaviour, regarding elements in language as 
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instructions for discourse model manufacture. The quotes 
also advance a framework within which the reciprocal 
recognition of intentions lies at the heart of successful 
communication. This view, Sanford & Garrod argue, buys us 
a great deal 
If we accept that a discourse produces 
models of situations in the minds of the 
reader, and that readers are under some 
sort of psychological contract to relate 
all discourse to such models, then the 
various forms of inference can all be 
handled within this common framework. 
(Sanford & Garrod 1981:11) 
Their ideas as presented in various articles (Garrod 
& Sanford 1978,1982, Sanford & Garrod 1981) centre on 
questions of inference, anaphora, focus, reference 
evaluation, memory partitioning and knowledge 
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representation. They draw on insights from formal 
semantics, linguistics, artificial intelligence as well 
as psychology in an attempt to produce a workable, 
procedural account of text generation and interpretation. 
Of particular relevance to this thesis are their 
ideas about reference and reference evaluation. They 
write: 
Problems of reference have two major 
aspects. For any entity which is mentioned 
in text, there must be some referring 
expression. such expressions can take a 
variety of forms: for instance, pronouns, 
noun-phrases, both definite and 
indefinite, or even whole clauses. One of 
our concerns is to explore how these 
expressions could serve as processing 
directions, and so enable the reader to 
construct a unique configuration 
reflecting the relationships amongst the 
things mentioned in the text. Such an 
approach could be construed as an exercise 
in producing a procedural semantics of 
reference. The second aspect of the 
reference problem is the way in which the 
text as a whole seems to ref er to 
recognisable events and episodes, of which 
the reader has general knowledge. The 
configuration of entities has to be mapped 
into general knowledge if the significance 
of the text is to be understood. (Sanford 
& Gar rod 19 81 : 15 9 > 
Inasmuch as Sanford & Garrod are attempting to 
account for psychological data they come to the problem 
of reference in natural language without any particular 
theory of truth and reference. In fact, the passage above 
suggests that they view expressions as 'referring 
expressions' to the extent that they lead to the 
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establishment and maintenance of 'discourse tokens' or 
'discourse entities', elements inhabiting the discourse 
model and having no privileged special existence in the 
world. 
Also the relation of reference does not have the 
absolute flavour that Johnson-Laird's own view implies. 
In the first place communicative exchange is a 
contractual affair. This means that 'efficient 
communication' requires co-operation, co-operation in 
turn requires reciprocal recognition and interpretation 
of each other's 'mental models'. This introduces a wide 
latitude for 'differential interpretation'; if we 
maintain models of one another's models, we may carry 
our own particular assumptions about word meaning, 
appropriateness of descriptions for particular objects 
etc. with us into these models. The opportunities for 
differential interpretation are huge, especially if there 
is no pre-ordained theory of meaning which fixes the 
extension of each term for each user of the language as 
being the same. In this respect Sanford and Garrod's 
work is amongst the most congenial to my own. 
SECTION ..E.QJJ.B ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MENTAL 
MODELS 
Sanford and Garrod acknowledge how much of their own 
work is informed by work from Artificial Intelligence. It 
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is appropriate now to look at the proposals originating 
from AI work which relate to mental models of discourse. 
Most of the AI work in this area which has a cognitive 
orientation adopts a strongly Intentionalist view of 
language. 
Linguistic behaviour is basically about 
communicative behaviour. [ •••• ] On the 
communicative view then, the job of a 
hearer is to somehow reconstruct a portion 
of the speaker's life - namely, those the 
speaker wishes to convey (call them the 
speaker's message, or communicative 
intent, or whatever) - and the job of the 
speaker is to somehow facilitate this 
reconstruction. (Berwick 1983: 27) 
As Berwick points out this view implies a simple, 
embryonic theory of language which has, at least, the 
major components indicated in Figure 4.2 
Figure 4.2 
Speaker 
Intentions= {beliefs, needs, 
goals etc.} 
Expressed in If 
I I 
I I 




Intentions= {beliefs, needs, 
goals etc.} 
Expressed in If 
If = Internal formalism 
Ef = External formalism 
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In this theory processors possess intentions, some 
of which are to 'share knowledge', 'inform', 'dispute', 
'question' etc. It is further assumed that these rich 
intentional states are instantiated by some 
'representational code' or 'language of thought' (cf for 
example Fodor 1975). 
The cornerstone of their research and 
almost all cognitively oriented Artificial 
Intelligence work generally [ •••• ] the 
assumption that mental processes are 
computational, where by computational one 
may take Fodor's definition of 
computation; operations defined over 
(mental) representations. (Berwick 
1983:36) 
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The model of communication suggested in Figure 4.2 
requires that a 'bridge' is established between speaker 
and hearer (the various processors in the discourse 
situation). The bridge is an utterance or set of 
utterances. These utterances comprise a system which the 
descriptive linguist is in the business of analysing. But 
what makes language work? Here again 'cognitively-
oriented' Artificial Intelligence wears its intentional 
colours on its sleeve. 
A whole series of regularities [ •••• ] 
phonological, syntactic, semantic, 
pragmatic - intervene so as to dictate 
what can and cannot be counted as an 
utterance that properly conveys any 
intended message. It is the hearer's 
knowledge of these well-formedness 
requirements that permit the recovery of 
my intended message; similarly, it is my 
knowledge of these very same constraints 
and my knowledge that my listener knows 
about these constraints) that guides the 
exterior form that I produce. In brief, 
the hearer knows the rules of the game by 
which I produced my utterance, and uses 
these rules to infer inner form from 
exterior utterance. Shared knowledge makes 
further sharing possible [ ••• ] (Ibid:28) 
The regularities of the language system work through 
their instantiation in us the language users. It looks 
then as if AI research will provide a useful set of 
concepts for the view of language and reference I am 
advocating. This is true, as I think will become 
apparent, only in part. Most of the work acknowledges the 
crucial importance of processors and their states in the 
theories of natural language understanding we build, but 
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most work still assumes a fixed theory of meaning which 
will guarantee communicative coordination between 
systems. On this view a situation such as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 works not because of an equal distribution of 
knowledge about our shared world but because of the 
assumption that the 'intensions' of the terms used in the 
speakers' and hearers' Ifs are the same, that is pick out 
the same extensions. This is, I think, where my own 
proposals depart from most of the AI work I am aware of. 
To justify this claim let us look at some of the 
most recent and widely acclaimed of this AI work. 
Very generally we might distinguish three themes in 
the work I am going to discuss here. The first 
exemplified by, for example, Webber 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 
1981, 1983), Grosz (1977, 1978, 1979, 1981) and Sidner 
(1978, 1979, 1983) is primarily concerned with providing 
mechanisms for the representation and manipulation of 
'discourse structures' and the 'discourse entities' that 
populate them. 
Webber's conception of a discourse model is simple 
and straightforward 
a discourse model may be described as the 
set of entities 'naturally evoked' by a 
discourse and linked together by the 
relations they participate in. (Webber 
197 Ba: 21) 
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In the same way that Kamp (1981) provides syntactic 
apparatus to construct discourse representations from the 
surface syntax (external form) of sentences, so too 
Webber seeks to provide a calculus to describe and 
represent the content of the models of discourse we are 
presumed to construct. 
The formal calculus for describing and representing 
these models of discourse is a type of First Order 
Calculus with lambda abstraction. In effect, Webber's 
system places expressions of her formal language, which 
are translations out of surface strings of English, into 
pair-wise correspondence with some kind of internal and 
presumably mentalistic representation of the objects of 
discourse. Understood in this way the resemblance of 
Kamp's and Webber's work is all the more striking: the 
discourse entities 'naturally' evoked form a set of 
objects A. Webber's proposals aim to establish an 
interpretation for her logical formalism (LF) in terms of 
a mapping from discourse objects to formulas in the LF. 
The rules and processes that support and determine 
this mapping form the substance of her ideas. In turn her 
formalism and rules for discourse object evaluation etc 
are much influenced by the need to account for the wide 
range of anaphora or abbreviated reference in language. 
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Any full theory of discourse models and discourse 
reference has to propose mechanisms by which the 
abbreviated references in the examples below are seen to 
work, that is relate back to a particular antecedent 
(4.2) John went to the pub. He got very drunk. 
(4.3) Bev gave Nigel a jumper. It didn't fit. 
(4.4) Take a cup of flour, mix in some butter. Moisten 
it with milk and knead it into a dough. 
(4.5) Mary became a violinist because she thought it a 
beautiful instrument. 
(4.6) Few doctors smoke. They know it causes cancer. 
(4.7) The wine is very good but it seems to have gone. 
(4.8) Every young man's ambition is to appear suave. 
So he spends hours perfecting his image. 
(4.9) A fox is a cunning animal. They live 
constantly on their wits. 
In each case the antecedent of the various pronouns 
Canaphors) in the above examples are rather different 
sorts of object. In (4.2) reference both in the proper 
name 'John' and its associated anaphor 'he' is to a 
specific individual, presumably uniquely identifiable in 
the context of the utterance of (4.2). In (4.3) a 
particular object is at issue, this time introduced 
initially using an indefinite expression. In (4.4) 
subsequent abbreviated reference is back to an object 
that is undergoing constant modification and change. 
Example (4.5) offers a case where the initial indefinite 
predication allows recovery via the pronoun 'it' of the 
'concept' of a particular kind of instrument. In (4.6) 
subsequent reference is back to a set of doctors which 
could be construed as the complement of the set 
199 
originally mentioned! In (4.7) reference is back to a 
rather indefinite amount of wine. In (4.8) and (4.9) the 
pronouns in the second sentences refer back to 'a 
prototypical' element and a 'generic' class respectively. 
The range of types of antecedent, and through them, 
referents available in natural language can be seen to be 
very large indeed. 
What my research has been directed at then 
is Cl) a definition of what text makes 
available for anaphora that can 
accommodate the kinds of examples 
presented and also be amenable to a 
computational treatment and (2) within 
that computational treatment, a 
characterisation of features of a 
representational formalism (or set of 
formalisms) that would most effectively 
support the procedures. (Webber 1983:334) 
We need a formalism equivalent to the job. We also 
require a formalism that can draw the kinds of semantic 
distinction we have looked at extensively already. 
Namely, the ambiguity present in sentences like (4.10). 
(4.10) Three boys ate a pizza. 
Webber's formalism, based as it is on a logical calculus, 
uses scope to make the various distinctions which 
different interpretations of (4.10) require (Footnote 
4.1). In discharging these requirements Webber is 
Footnote 4.1. The two interpretations of this sentence are 
represented in Webber's formalism using the logical schemas 
(1) and (2) below. 
(1) ?m(v:SET(boy)) [ (Ey:pizza)& ate v,y & Iv 1=3] 
sensitive to the general context of mental model 
construction within which her work is placed. 
My assumption is that one objective of 
discourse is to communicate a model: the 
speaker has a model of some situation 
which for one reason or another, s/he 
wishes to communicate to a listener. Thus 
the ensuing discourse is, at one level, an 
attempt by the speaker to direct the 
listener in synthesising a similar model. 
(In this sense I am equating 
'understanding' with 'synthesising an 
appropriate model'.) (Webber 1978a:21) 
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In the context of these models Webber sees a wide range 
of nominal expressions as appropriate in evoking or 
'referring' to discourse objects. 
When the speaker wants to ref er to an 
entity in his or her discourse model, s/he 
may do so with a definite pronoun [ ••• ] 
Alternatively, the speaker may refer to an 
entity in his or her discourse model by 
constructing a description of it in terms 
of some or all of its known properties 
and/or relations Ceg. 'a red balloon', 
'Mary's mother' , etc.) • The speaker may or 
may not assume that the entity has a 
counterpart in the listener's discourse 
model. (Webber 197 8a: 22) 
(2) ?m(u:SET(?m(v:boy[ (Ey:pizza)& ate v,yl))) [ lu 1=3] 
She has introduced a new operator SET which is capable of 
scopal variation. The first reading (collective interpreta-
tion) in which all the boys ate the same pizza, has a 
logical representation which uses the SET operator to form a 
set, a set of boys, having cardinality three, and which as a 
set has the property of 'eating a pizza'. The second reading 
(distributive interpretation) is one in which each boy had 
at least one pizza each. In this reading the SET operator 
forms a set of boys each eating a pizza, the cardinality of 
this set is fixed in the formula as three. 
201 
Reference for Webber is always modulo the evocation 
or accessing of a discourse entity. Discourse entities 
are fundamental in the act of referring. 
A discourse entity inhabits a speaker's 
discourse model and represents something 
the speaker has ref erred to. A speaker 
refers to something by utterances that 
either evoke (if first reference) or 
access (if subsequent reference) its 
corresponding discourse entity. (Webber 
1983: 335) 
Webber's introduction of discourse models to 
establish a vital link between language and the world is 
reminiscent of Johnson-Laird's approach. 
Webber also considers how 'reference' can be 
achieved by other than linguistic means to evoke or 
access discourse entities. Discourse entities may be 
evoked into a listener's model either (1) linguistically 
from explicit discourse; (2) perceptually, from the 
immediate spatio-temporal environment and context; and 
(3) inferentially, reasoning from the existence of other 
discourse entities. Just how intentional Webber regards 
these methods of evocation is revealed when she writes: 
the discourse itself provides explicit 
descriptions. These may reflect things 
like the speaker's knowledge and attitudes 
(eg 'a rock' as opposed to 'a fine grained 
porphyry'), the speaker's beliefs about 
the listener's knowledge, the speaker's 
intention [ •••• ] an entity may be evoked 
into the speaker or listener's discourse 
model as a result of what s/he perceives. 
How it is described will depend upon how 
s/he classifies that perception 
linguistically. Webber 1978a:23-24 
The discourse entities themselves are regarded by 
Webber as 'conceptual coathooks' on which to hang 
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descriptions of the entity's real world or hypothetical 
world correspondent. They act in a sense almost like 
Russell's logically proper names, devoid in themselves of 
descriptive content, serving as points about which 
descriptions can adhere. 
What of the level of representation of the discourse 
objects themselves? In her work with Bobrow (Bobrow & 
Webber 1980a, 1980b, 1981), a knowledge representation 
language KL-ONE (based in part on Brachman's semantic 
network proposals 1978, 1979) is used to represent 
knowledge of the objects of discourse. Webber's logical 
formalism can then be seen as a method of describing 
parts of the underlying level of knowledge 
representation, the knowledge base itself. 
The next question is how do these representations 
work as representations of objects in the world? How does 
the logical formalism that Webber uses to represent the 
discourse objects obtain its own semantics? There is 
little discussion of these points in her work. The 
logical appearance of her LF suggests a standard theory 
of truth, reference and meaning. However, Webber's 
recognition of the intentional component of reference, 
along with comments she makes about the negotiation of 
'terms of reference' between cognitive systems, all 
suggest that an absolutist view of reference is not in 
accord with the spirit of her research. 
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Grosz' and Sidner's work has much in common with 
Webber's. Grosz and Sidner are concerned to provide an 
account of how 'focus operates in discourse', in 
particular, how focus aids the interpretation of 
anaphors. The mechanisms of focus would seem to be 
closely related to the manipulation of discourse entities 
over the life time of a discourse. 
Both Grosz's and Sidner regard focus as a mechanism 
for establishing a focus space (what Reichman 1978 calls 
a context space). Such spaces are the subset of a 
spe'aker' s total knowledge that is relevant to a part of 
discourse. The question then is how does the process of 
focus work? 
Sidner proposes a 'focus algorithm' responsible for 
the implementation of focus. The algorithm consists of 
three interacting processes which function in a cycle for 
each sentence of a discourse. The relationship of these 
processes is given below in Figure 4.3. The first process 
chooses foci based on what the speaker initially says. An 
interpretation process uses this set of foci together 
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with rules of anaphora interpretation to resolve the 
various anaphors in the sentence. The third process 
updates the foci if necessary and highlights one of these 
foci as the current focus of the discourse so far. 
Figure 4.3 







Sidner illustrates how this cycle operates on the piece 
of discourse below: 
1. Last week there were some nice strawberries in 
the refrigerator 
2. They came from our food co-op and were unusually fresh 
3. I went to use them for dinner, but someone had 
eaten them all 
4. Later I discovered it was Mark who had eaten them 
5. Mark has a hollow leg, and it's impossible to keep 
.food around when his stomach needs filling 
Suppose the first focusing process 
initially guesses that strawberries are 
the focus in 1. Next a pronoun interpreter 
would apply a rule that says 'A pronoun 
that can be replaced by the focus phrase, 
with the resulting phrase remaining 
syntactically acceptable, co-specifies 
with the focus, unless some pragmatic 
knowledge rules out that co-specifier', to 
determine that strawberries can replace 
.tlLe.y in 2 with no syntactic failure. An 
inference process, governed by the pronoun 
interpreter could confirm that 
strawberries can come from food co-ops and 
can be fresh; that is that no 
contradiction in general knowledge 
results. Finally, a third process can 
confirm strawberries as the focus since it 
has been re-mentioned and because other 
objects mentioned in 1, the refrigerator 
and the previous week, were not discussed 
in 2 • ( s i dn er 1 9 83 : 27 9) 
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It is interesting that on this view anaphora helps 
constrain both the focus and the potential foci serving 
as antecedents for the anaphors. Initial focus is 
postulated on the basis of a number of different sorts of 
information. For example, syntactic form might be used; 
particular forms are closely associated with topic 
foregrounding Cie focus highlighting). The sentences 
(4.11)-(4.13) below use clefting, pseudo-clefting, there 
insertion as highlighting devices. 
(4.11) It was Barry who admired 
the waitress. CLEFT 
(4.12) What Barry admired was 
Radio 3 PSEUDO CLEFT 
(4.13) There was a programme-which did 
strange things to the computer THERE INSERTION 
Where no clear focus prediction is possible Sidner's 
algorithm resorts to a case analysis of the sentence (cf 
for example Fillmore 1968, Jackendoff 1972) in order to 
provide role fillers as potential foci, one of which will 
be subsequently selected. 
The discourse elements themselves, which provide 
candidates for focus, are structured out of semantic 
knowledge networks. These networks have properties found 
in various AI knowledge representation formalisms such as 
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KL-ONE (Brachman 1978) and KRL (Bobrow and Winograd 
1977) • 
Sidner, like Webber, is careful to recognise the 
intentional nature of the referential relation in 
language. But she conveniently avoids the difficult 
question of how it is that her discourse entities succeed 
as representations of real world objects. There is no 
explicit theory of meaning in Sidner's proposals. 
What is the relation of specifications to 
the real world? One might like to claim 
that a reference relation exists between 
specified cognitive elements and objects 
in the world, but since ref erring is what 
people do with words, this relation is 
problematic for cognitive elements. 
Instead, specifications will be said to 
represent the objects referred to, that 
is, they bear a well-structured 
correspondence to objects in the world. 
CSidner 1983:269) 
Grosz's work centres on many of the same issues as 
Sidner's. The most significant difference is that Grosz 
restricts her research into discourse which occurs in 
task-oriented dialogues. This results in mechanisms for 
changing focus that are not directly governed by the 
syntax of the discourse or the semantics of particular 
words in the discourse as in Sidner's work. Grosz's 
mechanisms of focus change are driven by close attention 
to the 'structure of the task' to which the dialogue is 
directed. 
Mechanisms are required for updating the 
focus representation, because, as a 
dialogue progresses, the objects and 
actions that are relevant to the 
conversation, and therefore in the 
participants' focus of attention, change. 
Procedures are described for deciding 
where and how to shift focus in task-
or iented dialogues, ie, in dialogues in 
which the participants are co-operating in 
a shared task. These procedures are guided 
by a representation of the task being 
performed. (Grosz 1977:iii) 
Her recognition of the importance of intentional 
contexts in semantic evaluation and her use of rich 
knowledge networks to represent the objects of focus 
(discourse objects), means that she is in substantial 
concord with much of Webber's and Sidner's work. 
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In respect of the first point we find her writing 
with Hendrix: 
The interpretation of an expression 
depends on who is doing the interpreting; 
speaker and hearer are considered as 
distinct interpreters (or processors) each 
with their own conception of the world 
[ ••• ] The state of these processors, their 
condition at a given time plays a crucial 
role in the analysis of the interpretation 
of an utterance. (Grosz & Hendrix 1978) 
Apropos her use of semantic nets, Grosz makes use of 
the partitioned network formalism developed by Hendrix 
(1975a,b). In so far as these formalisms represent the 
objects of knowledge which processors have, it is not 
clear whether Grosz is stuck with a uniform assignment of 
knowledge structures to all individual processors. Such a 
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uniform assignment of the same structures would ensure 
that processors have effectively the same intensions for 
the same concepts. I suspect that she is probably more 
aware than most of the problems this would raise despite 
providing a nice, neat, univocal connection of knowledge 
structures throughout processors to the same set of 
objects in the world. In her 1979 article she writes 
that a crucial limitation on all natural language systems 
constructed to date is that 
The knowledge and beliefs of all 
participants in a discourse are assumed to 
be identical. (Grosz 1979:17) 
The limitation of which she speaks is made explicit 
in the next piece of work I want to consider, that of 
Kaplan (1978, 1979, 1983). He implements a completely 
extensional semantics for his natural language 
understanding system. Far from seeing this as a 
'limitation' Kaplan regards this approach as well-suited 
to his particular needs. Kaplan is concerned to construct 
an efficient database query language, a language capable 
of being used to question a database clearly and 
unambiguously. To allow a fully extensional language to 
succeed as a database query language Kaplan adopts a 
simple solution. Rather than complicating the language to 
account for the complexities of the world, he simplifies 
the world to suit the language. 
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He boils down the complex world of intentions to the 
single goal of asking questions, asking questions about a 
world of objects defined exclusively as property sets. 
Berwick captures the extensional flavour of Kaplan's 
proposals rather well; - the world Kaplan's system can 
converse about is a database: 
we could define such a database as a 
triple <X,D:.i,I.:,U>. Xis a finite set 
of objects like 'John' ,'Mary', 'Computer 
Science 101'. I is a finite set of 
attributes used to index the domain D such 
as 'sex', 'Grade', or 'year'. u is a 
function defined over attributes and their 
values that retrieves the set of objects 
that have a particular value of a 
specified attribute, eg U(sex, male) will 
return the subset of X that has the 
attribute 'sex' with the value 'male'-
John etc. The crucial point is that a 
database is defined so that it has a 
quintessentially extensional semantics-
what u returns is a set of objects. A 
question asked of a database, a database 
query, is then simply some sequence of 
calls to the interpretation function u. 
(Berwick 1983:63) 
In so far as the database includes clean, 
unproblematic, extensional characterisations of objects 
the problems of polysemy, vagueness etc. are avoided. The 
other simplification is in the impoverished theory of 
action and belief that his approach uses. The intentions 
of agents consist solely in trying to find out the 
answers to queries about a database. 
The work of Allen (1979,1983), Allen & Perrault 
(1980), Cohen Cl97 8), Perrault, Allen & Cohen (197 8), 
Perrault & Allen (1980), Perrault & Cohen (1981) 
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exemplifies a much more serious and realistic approach to 
the question of analysing intention in language. The 
unifying theme is the belief that we cannot fully 
understand either the generation or interpretation of 
language without understanding the complex intentions 
that underlie the use of language. 
A point made right at the beginning of my thesis and 
embodied in the Principle of Context was that discourse 
involves separate agents with differing views of the 
world. Therefore language processors must be able to 
handle and represent the beliefs and knowledge of other 
people. Included in a model a processor builds is a view 
of the other processors' models. Processors have models 
of ·the models of other processors. 
work in developing AI planning systems, of which 
Allen and his colleagues' work are all examples, has to 
recognise that intelligent agents (whether artefactual or 
natural) must be endowed with reasoning and inference 
procedures, able to handle and distinguish separate 
agents' beliefs and knowledge. Furthermore, they must be 
able to operate on incomplete and sometimes inconsistent 
information. The agents have to ascribe intentions, 
211 
beliefs, and goals to other agents to explain behaviour, 
particularly linguistic behaviour. 
The plan-based approach to natural language 
understanding found in Allen et al and elsewhere (cf for 
example Bruce 1978, 1980, 198la, 198lb, Wilensky 1978) is 
geared to a dynamic evaluation of the underlying 
intentions behind 'speech acts'. Since Allen and his 
colleagues' work is a computational formulation of speech 
act theory, we ought to take a look at the general 
concepts behind speech act theory itself. Such a review 
is perhaps overdue since the theory has traditionally 
been closely associated with Intentionalist views of 
meaning. 
Three philosophers are responsible for the 
development of modern speech act theories, Austin (1962, 
1910), Grice (1957, 1967, 1968, 1975,1978) and Searle 
(1969, 1975, 1979, 1983). These philosophers have all 
noted the relationship between meaning and intention. For 
example, Grice (1957) presents his formulation of meaning 
as: 
'S meant something by X' is (roughly) 
equivalent to 'S intended the utterance of 
X to produce some effect in an addressee 
by means of the recognition of this 
intention•.· Grice 1957:385 
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Austin was one of the first philosophers to question 
the generally received notion that the meaning of an 
utterance was exhausted by its truth conditions. Austin 
noted that many utterances occasioned the performance of 
actions. Many of these actions resulted from the presence 
of explicit performative verbs, ie 'promise', 'warn', 
'regret' etc. Sentences such as (4.14)-(4.16) when 
uttered in appropriate contexts allowed the utterer to 
perform certain acts. 
(4.14) I promise I will come to the party 
(4.15) I warn you not to touch that wire 
(4.16) John regrets the pain he has caused you 
As utterances (4.14)-(4.16) may succeed or fail to 
achieve or perform the relevant actions. Someone might 
touch the wire despite the warning of (4.15). 
Nevertheless we cannot talk of utterances (4.14)-(4.16) 
as being true or false. such predicates are not 
appropriate to these performative utterances. 
Austin's work led to a view that all utterances 
could be viewed as actions, actions termed 'speech acts'. 
Austin classified these acts into three types; 
locutionary acts, illocutionary acts and perlocutionary 
acts. 
In uttering (4.15) we can identify these various 
acts. The very act of saying (4.15) performs a 
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locutionary act, a relatively uninteresting act from our 
point of view. It is the remaining two classes of act 
that will preoccupy us. As a speaker of (4.15) I intend 
to effect a change in what I think will be your future 
behaviour, I attempt to effect such change via the 
performance of the illocutionary act of warning. The 
actual effect of this utterance may be to amuse you, 
perhaps because you think the danger is exaggerated, or 
you know what I do not, that the electricity is off etc. 
The actual effect of my uttering (4.15) in a certain 
context is a perlocutionary act. Of particular interest 
is an analysis and understanding of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the successful performance of 
an illocutionary act such as contained in (4.15). 
Se~rle's work is relevant here through what he refers to 
as 'felicity' conditions for the performance of speech 
acts. 
suppose I want to perform the illocutionary act of 
making a request, and so suppose I utter (4.17). 
(4.17) Help me lift the projector 
The felicity conditions for such an act to succeed will 
include various 'preparatory' conditions: 
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where H is hearer, s myself the speaker 
( i) H is able to do the act 
(ii) s believes that H is able to do the act 
(iii) It is not obvious to s and H that H will 
do it of his own accord 
To this we might add a 'sincerity' condition: 
(iv) S wants H to do the act 
This kind of analysis of the preconditions underlying a 
speech act, the necessary steps involved in executing it, 
is good material for translation into 'planning 
procedures' and 'protocols'. The planning aspect of 
intentional speech acts is forcefully described by Allen: 
Underlying this model of conversation is 
the assumption that the participants in 
dialogue are rational human beings who are 
co-operating [Footnote 4.2] to help each 
other. In particular, each is continually 
'executing' processes to 
1 Achieve goals based upon what 
he believes 
2 Adopt goals of other agents as 
his own 
3 Infer goals of other agents 
4 Predict the future behaviour of 
other agents 
Consider two agents, A and H, in 
conversation. Each knows that the other is 
executing these processes, and both know 
that each other knows. In particular, when 
A speaks to H, any inferences that H makes 
by executing these processes based solely 
on what A said and on what H believes A 
knows about H's beliefs and processes, may 
be taken (by H) as intended .t.Q !Le 
communicated by A. (Allen 1979:79) 
Footnote 4.2. Grice's work is concerned to outline rules of 
co-operative conversational behaviours- co-called conversa-
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This is exactly the point I have made elsewhere 
about the reciprocal recognition of intentions. Because 
we are equipped as 'rational belief systems' with similar 
problem solving strategies and maxims for speech act 
construction, we can achieve our communicative ends with 
relative success. We can do this even where beliefs 
about the domain of discourse are unevenly shared. 
Actually achieving some measure of wider 
inf ormedness is one of the top level intentional goals of 
communication. As I have written elsewhere: 
The intention of an utterance is the 
attempt to bring about some change by 
affecting the models of situations which 
addressees have in their heads. Indeed 
this intention to discover, contrast or 
change models of what people believe can 
be seen as the mainspring of linguistic 
communication. Of course language can 
state the obvious, almost gratuitously 
describing the way the world is. But so 
often our linguistic behaviour is 
concerned to communicate new facts, elicit 
new information. We engage in a constant 
process of modifying our own and other 
peoples' views of the world. (Shadbolt 
1983: 66) 
Automating the process of plan formation in the 
generation of speech acts, and automating plan deduction 
in the interpretation of speech acts, is the main aim of 
Allen's work. To illustrate the close connection between 
planning and linguistic acts consider an agent A asking a 
tional maxims. 
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question of another agent ~' say (4.18) 
(4.18) What time does the language lecture start? 
We may assume that A has a top level goal of wanting 
to attend the lecture. We can understand A'a uttering 
(4.18) as an attempt to remove an 'obstacle' that 
inhibits achievement of the top level goal Cie A doesn't 
know what time to turn up). Now this obstacle can be 
viewed as a subgoal that needs to be achieved Cie the 
time found out), moreover it is a subgoal that cannot be 
satisfied without assistance. It is one of Allen's claims 
that many instances of helpful behaviour on the part of 
an audience to questions such as (4.18) arise because the 
observing agent recognises an obstacle in the other 
agent's plan and acts to remove the obstacle. 
Thus in our example A asks a question of B which B 
then answers. A has a top level goal, A creates a plan 
(plan construction) that involves asking B a question 
whose answer provides some information necessary to 
achieving the goal. A can be viewed in (4.18) as 
executing a plan - by performing an action - the speech 
act of questioning. In interpreting (4.18) ~ attempts to 
infer what A 's goal could have been, this is 'plan 
inference'. The inferred top level goal will include a 
number of subgoals and it is B 's recognition that some 
of these are not achievable without his assistance, and 
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which therefore represent obstacles to A, that leads to 
his recognition of the force and requirement of (4.18). 
In building and designing such planning systems 
Allen and his colleagues realise that they are dealing 
with systems which have to co-operate with different sets 
of initial beliefs. But these beliefs are to do with what 
states of affairs s knows about, what states of affairs s 
thinks H knows about, what states of affairs s thinks are 
recognised as mutually shared Cie s thinks H thinks s 
knows, and which S thinks H thinks S thinks H thinks). As 
such they utilise logics of belief, wants and actions 
which make reference to propositions describing states of 
affairs. For example, the logical schema representing an 
agent S's belief that some other agent A knows that Pis 
true is (4.19). This implies that S believes A believes 
P, but also that s believes P as well. 
(4.19) BELIEVES(S,P & BELIEVES(A,P)) 
What is generally left aside are the grounds for 
assuming that the proposition 'P' comprises elements 
whose meanings are the same for each agent. Relativising 
propositions in.this radical sense would, of course, have 
dramatic effects on the grounds for the licenced 
inference of one set of propositions from another. 
218 
Interestingly Berwick acknowledges this problem but 
does not seem to realise its full implications. 
Intensions as formally and objectively defined as 
equivalent for all speakers cannot do as a model of human 
communication. 
Allen's model centers on the causal 
connection between human actions and the 
world. It involves in an essential way 
what the speaker or hearer wants or 
intends. On different occasions depending 
on the belief, desires and party 
allegiance of the agents involved, one and 
the same set of formal objects (hence 
objects with the same properties, hence 
same extensions) could have different 
intensions. (Berwick 1983:33) 
Whilst it is no longer clear what the relationship 
is between these sorts of intensions and extensions, it 
is certainly not the one defined by, for example, 
Montague semantics. 
This is not to diminish this planning work. It is a 
substantial achievement to get the logic of belief and 
action detailed enough to explain how a speaker might 
construct (4.18) as an effective question and have the 
hearer interpret it as such. 
(4.20) Is paracetamol dangerous? 
My point is that our task becomes more difficult, or 
approximates reality more closely, when the terms that 
constitute the question are liable to have different 
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intensions for s and A, yet still have sufficiently much 
in common for (4.20) to work as a communicative act. 
A significant part of explaining how (4.20) works, 
when asked of a GP by, for example, a frightened 
housewife, consists in the GP's assessment of how to 
judge the meaning of the terms used by the housewife in 
(4.20), modulo the needs, desires etc. of his patient 
relative again to his own detailed and extensive 
knowledge of the objects involved and their 'properties'. 
It is this additional aspect, dropping the 
assumption of the equivalence of intensions, that marks 
off my research from the work discussed here. 
Having reviewed at some length the roles mental 
models have played in cognitive science research I want 
now to turn to my own application of models to the 
question of reference in 'opaque contexts'. 
CHAPTER FIVE PROCESSORS, REFERENCE AND MODELS- A SYSTEM OF 
REFERENTIAL DESCRIPTION 
It might be worth presenting a resume of the main points 
I have tried to establish with regard to reference and 
language processors. 
When a processor is involved in generating or 
interpreting a piece of natural language a model is built 
based on the states of affairs described through the 
language. The construction of these models is a major 
component in our understanding of language. 
Plainly, discourse involves separate agents with 
differing views of the world. Language processors must 
be able to represent the beliefs and knowledge of other 
pe~ple. Included in a model a processor builds is a view 
of the models of other processors'. 
All issues involving reference must involve language 
processors. Linguistic expressions in themselves do not 
refer. A linguistic expression lacks reference unless it 
is invested with reference through a particular speaker's 
use of it. 
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Reference depends on two things the importance of 
which it is impossible to exaggerate. Firstly, the 
context of utterance; the notion of context I have 
elaborated on at some length, it includes, at least, the 
time, the place, the speaker, the immediate focus of 
interest, the current histories and states of the speaker 
and addressees. Intimately connected with context (indeed 
an intrinsic part of it) is the intentional state of 
language processors. 
Intentions are the driving force behind 
communication, both in the construction and 
interpretation of linguistic acts. 
When I take a noise or a mark on a piece 
of paper to be an instance of linguistic 
communication, as a message, one of the 
things I must assume is that the noise or 
mark was produced by a being or beings 
more or less like myself and produced with 
certain kinds of INTENTIONS. (Searle 
196 9) 
Intended meaning relies, in part, on the following 
beliefs for the speaker and hearer; beliefs about the 
current situation, beliefs about each others beliefs and 
goals, beliefs about the context of discussion, and even 
beliefs about their mutual beliefs. (For example, the 
mutual beliefs of A and B would be those beliefs that A 
and B both believe and furthermore that they both believe 
that they both believe, and they believe that they both 
believe that they both believe etc.) 
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Scholars from psychology, A.I., linguistics and 
philosophy, all admit the central importance of intention 
in understanding behaviour in general and linguistic 
behaviour in particular. For example, the American 
philosopher Dennett (1978) regards intentionality as the 
fundamental concept behind certain sorts of systems. He 
argues that intensional referential phenomena inevitably 
arise out of language-using IntenTional Systems. The 
connection is so close for Dennett that he talks of 
intenTional linguistic contexts and idioms (1978:3). 
I have tried to show that this view of Dennett's is 
correct. By assuming beliefs in other systems to which 
we have no privileged or veridical access we encounter 
all the problems of referential opacity. Consequently, in 
utterances such as (5.1) whoever is referred to by 'he', 
may not know of the object he has the belief about, that 
it is a pendulum-bob, or he may think it exists when in 
fact it doesn't etc. (Footnote 5.1) 
(5.1) Nigel says 
to Sam 
He believes the pendulum-bob 
is moving 
The point I am seeking to establish is that referential 
Footnote 5.1. Artificial Intelligence systems already 
exhibit a degree of intensionality. The Meche project at 
Edinburgh University consists of a set of programs some 
of which represent the micro-world (applied mechanics) 
the system 'knows' about. Objects in the micro-world are 
represented as sets of descriptions. In such a system, if 
a description is used to talk about an object and the 
system does not know of the object under this descrip-
tion, we find ourselves confronted by the type of opacity 
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phenomena, including intenSionality, arise out of 
intenTional acts. The Intentional acts themselves issue 
from Intentional Systems that operate in complex 
contexts, these contexts include internal as well as 
external states. 
Two further points need to be made. Firstly I have 
argued that traditional logical attempts to solve and 
explain intensional and referential puzzles fail because 
the Theory of Meaning embodied in such approaches does 
not allow for an intenTional dimension to language. It 
does not allow for users who may hold beliefs whose 
contents cannot be guaranteed equivalent. Secondly, the 
logical proposals do not reflect the manner in which 
intenTional systems are connected to the world. The 
models that organisms support are the product of a 
complex interaction, there is no single correspondence 
theory of truth that can adequately capture our embedding 
in that external reality. 
By modifying certain basic assumptions, it may be 
possible that the logical proposals could be 'fixed up' 
At the very least, we can claim that the logical 
proposals which I have examined fail to highlight crucial 
problem exemplified in (5.1). Bien (1976,1980) has dis-
cussed the emergence of these sorts of opacity problems 
in connection with the evaluation of expressions within 
computational systems. 
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features of intensional phenomena. 
The task now is to present a system of referential 
description that embodies the various points I have made, 
and which allows us to lay out an utterance's referential 
possibilities. 
SECTION ONE THE PROCESSOR-CENTRIC MODEL 
1 Components of the Model 
The diagram in Figure 5.1 represents what I have called 
the Processor-Centric (P-C) standpoint. It is a division 
of the language processor into functionally convenient 
components. The partitioning is determined by the two 
considerations mentioned above; that it should embody 
the various conjectures about language and its processing 
discussed in the last section, the representation should 
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The representation distinguishes as part of a language 
user (or what we might call the General Processor State), 
two functionally distinct areas; the Epistemic Model 
(EM), and the Discourse Model (DM). 
Let us look first at the role of the Discourse Model 
(DM). It is here that a processor constructs a model of 
the elements introduced in a discourse. This will 
constitute, in part, his understanding of a piece of 
discourse. Discourse as it occurs has a 'public aspect'. 
The various linguistic elements used, are, under normal 
conditions, presumed to be available to all participants 
in a particular discourse. 
The discourse model, will be populated with elements 
representing the objects referred to in discourse. These 
elements I have called Discourse Objects (DOs). The 
discourse objects themselves can be viewed as 'loci'. 
The 'locus' is well established in A.I Knowledge 
Engineering, and intuitively serves as the 
'representational object' about which properties can 
adhere. Webber (1983) for example talks of 'discourse 
entities' or 'discourse objects' as 
a 'conceptual coathook' Ca term coined by 
William woods) on which to hang 
descriptions of the entity's real world or 
hypothetical world correspondent. As soon 
as a discourse entity is evoked it gets a 
description. Over the course of the text, 
the descriptions it receives are derived 
from both the content of the speaker's 
utterances and their position within 
discourse (Webber 1983:337) 
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Loci, in this respect, fulfill a similar function to 
Russell's Logically Proper Names. They are radically 
simple ways of accessing information, the locus is empty 
of descriptive content. Discourse objects in my 
descriptive system will be symbolised using subscripted 
labels, eg. such as 'dol', 'do2 1 , •••• ,'don 1 etc. The 
information associated with discourse objects will be 
laid out in a format to be described a little later. 
So far I have kept DOs divorced from any information 
other than that explicitly introduced in discourse. Of 
course, discourse does not, and cannot, proceed in 
isolation from the general or specific 'background' 
knowledge a processor has. In fact the early stages of 
discourse are often explicitly directed toward the 
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retrieval and activation of relevant background knowledge 
from the 'long term Knowledge base' (cf for example, 
Garrod and Sandford 1982). 
I have confined to the DM information explicitly 
contained in discourse. Any other information relevant 
to the interpretation of these discourse objects I 
confine to what I have called Epistemic Models CEMs). In 
the EM an object of knowledge can be individuated as a 
locus Can Epistemic Object EO). Information from many 
sources attaches to these EOs. Epistemic Objects are 
distinguished using a similar notation to that used for 
discourse objects, ie 'eol', 'eo2', •••• ,'eon' etc. Once 
more the radically simple nature of these EO loci allows 
us to access their associated knowledge without 
descriptive commitment. 
Talk of EOs raises questions about how knowledge is 
to be represented, how the 'knowledge bases' are to be 
partitioned etc. These questions are familiar topics in 
Philosophical Epistemology, Cognitive Psychology and 
Artificial Intelligence. Without getting sidetracked 
into a lengthy discussion on 'knowledge representation' 
we can make some obvious and important points. 
The knowledge which will contribute to the content 
of EOs is open to revision and change. Knowledge may be 
gained and enter EMs from various sources, different 
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modalities and mediums etc. Some of the knowledge we 
possess is relati~ely long term and stable, other 
knowledge is more short lived, more transitory. Most 
psychologists theorise different types of knowledge 
store. We find, for example, Long Term Memory for the 
long term knowledge, Short Term Memory for more short 
lived information etc. None of this is contentious, some 
sort of distinction between long term and short term 
knowledge stores, together with a differentiation of 
their respective contents, can be found in virtually all 
theories of human cognition (cf for example, Waugh & 
Norman 1965, Kintsch 1970, Baddeley & Patterson 1971, 
Craik & Lockhart 1972). 
No detailed theory of the structure of knowledge 
bases and their contents can suppose that the various 
components of the system are independent and autonomous 
of the results of other components. For example, as 
discourse proceeds, settings change. This requires that 
different long term knowledge needs to be 'activated', 
whilst knowledge currently active may be placed in the 
backqround. Information assimilated from the discourse 
itself may eventually be consolidated in the longer term 
knowledge structures. Dynamic interaction and activation 
of knowledge is a feature of most recent models of 
memory, attention and semantic representation (cf for 
example, Underwood 1976, Chafe 1979, 1972, 1974, 1976, 
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Prince 1981, Sanford & Garrod 1981). 
However having mentioned these rather obvious 
points, I am not about to embody in my system any 
detailed claims about how to represent long, medium and 
short term knowledge. Neither will I propose mechanisms 
for the activation of knowledge. 
Even with this large set of disclaimers one can 
still impose interesting requirements on the nature of 
Epistemic and Discourse Models, and on the objects they 
contain. 
2 Partitioned Perspectives 
One thing we must provide is a means by which a processor 
can represent perspectives, other than his own, on the 
objects known to, and discussed by, discourse 
participants. This is the requirement that any 
sophisticated intentional system should be able to model, 
as part of its own knowledge, the knowledge it believes 
other agents to have. 
For example, I might know a great deal about the 
philosopher Socrates. Suppose I also believe that Bill 
knows very little about this individual, except perhaps 
that he was a Greek philosopher. In addition, I might 
believe that Bill does not know that I have such 
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comprehensive knowledge of Socrates. These various 
beliefs all form different perspectives on the same 
individual represented in my 'knowledge base'. Since I am 
concerned with those objects of knowledge individuated in 
referential acts, I will need different perspectives on 
the contents of any EM. These I will represent using the 
convention shown in Figure 5.2 (Footnote 5.2). 
FIGURE 5.2 







eoll nep [ ••• ] 
I n/bep [ ••• l 








doll ndp [ ••• ] 
I n/bdp [ ••• l 
I n/b/ndp [ ••• l 
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Notice that Nigel's EM in Figure 5.2 is referred to as 
'Nigel's Active EM'. This serves to remind us that not 
all EM knowledge is equally activated at any point in 
Footnote 5.2. Partitioning knowledge to represent dif-
ferent perspectives is proposed elsewhere in the litera-
ture (Perrault and Cohen 1981, Clark and Marshall 1981). 
However, the partitioning is not used to account for the 
range of phenomena to which I apply it. 
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language production or interpretation. The active EM will 
contain those most salient objects involved in the 
current stage of discourse. 
We are to understand the EO representation in the 
following way. The EO representing Socrates is identified 
as 'eol', there are three active perspectives shown 
associated with this object- namely, Nigel's view of the 
object, 'nep' (Nigel's Epistemic Perspective), Nigel's 
view of Bill's view of the object, 'n/bep', and Nigel's 
view of Bill's view of Nigel's view of the object, 
'n/b/nep'. The square brackets following the perspective 
labels represent the contents of this particular 
perspective (not as yet detailed). 
A similar representational device is observed in 
Figure 5.2 for DOs. This represents the intuition that 
whilst a discourse itself is public, the interpretation a 
processor places on how a discourse object is being 
understood, (for example, which EO it is associated with) 
may differ according to which perspective he is 
considering. The need for multiple perspectives in 
discourse models will be apparent in later sections when 
we consider various forms of referential misconstrual. 
The brackets following the abbreviated perspective labels 
will contain an·indication of which EO the DO is to be 
associated with, as well as a representation of the 
232 
information explicitly mentioned by each discourse 
participant. 
Note that three embedded perspectives on either EOs 
or DOs represents a particularly interesting case of 
multiple perspectives. The three perspectives given in 
Figure 5.2 for 'eol', establish conditions of 'subjective 
mutual belief' (Footnote 5.3). 
For example, I believe the object Socrates is 
'mutually known' to Bill and myself if the following 
epistemic perspectives exist for the relevant EO; my own 
perspective on the object, my view of Bill's view of the 
object, my view of Bill's view of my view of the object. 
Notice, however, that this only secures the following - I 
believe Bill knows of an object known to me, I also 
believe that he believes I know of this object. Whilst 
these perspectives can in principle be indefinitely 
embedded, leading to a series such as nep, n/bep, 
n/b/nep, n/b/n/bep, n/b/n/b/nep, ••••• , three 
perspectives serve to establish a 'pragmatic halt'. This 
pragmatic halt is a consequence of the fact that if I 
believe Bill knows of an object, and I think he knows I 
Footnote 5.3. I have used the term 'subjective mutual 
belief' rather than the more usual term 'mutual belief' 
to highlight the fact that, from a P-C standpoint, what 
is believed to be mutually known is yet another case of 
subjective belief. Wherever the phrase 'mutually known' 
is encountered this qualification should be noted. 
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know about that object, then I can proceed in referential 
discourse on the assumption that in terms of the 
distribution of knowledge about what objects can serve as 
a common pool of potential discourse objects, Bill and I 
are similarly informed. 
Artificial Intelligence has shown that there are 
many ways mutual knowledge may be implemented in 
knowledge-based systems (cf for example, Allen 1979, 
1983, Perrault & Cohen 1981, Steel 1984). In such 
Knowledge Based Systems one could check against a data 
base in which mutual knowledge is explicitly stored, or 
the mutual knowledge could be generated dynamically in 
some type of proof system. This is not of immediate 
concern to our project which merely aims to represent, in 
a perspicuous way, a processor's view of what is mutually 
known. 
It should be pointed out that it is possible that an 
EO be known to a particular processor only through his 
views of other peoples perspectives on that object. 
Epistemic objects on which a processor has an immediate 
perspective we will call 'directly instantiated'. EOs 
which are only known to him via his views of other 
processor's beliefs about these objects, we will call 
'indirectly instantiated'. Clearly both indirectly and 
directly instantiated EOs form all those objects a 
processor knows something about. 
3 Representing the Objects of Knowledge and Discourse 
The range of types of object which can serve as 
'Intentional Referents' which are accessible as EOs is 
huge. Cases of polysemy, such as those given on pages 
141 et seq., demonstrate the ability of expressions to 
'refer' to different 'types' of object. 
In some cases nominals seem to be operating 
simultaneously at different levels in a typology of 
objects. 
(5.2) The chair you are sitting on is commonly 
seen in Eighteenth Century Interiors. 
One possible account of this phenomenon is that whilst 
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only one DO has been introduced, it serves as a means of 
retrieving two EOs. One of which is an object with 
spatio-temporal co-ordinates, weight, an individual 
history etc. The other is an abstract characterisation of 
a type of object, embodying information extensible to all 
members of the type. 
The interesting feature of types is the way that 
these abstract characterisations can be used in an 
extensional or token-like way. A processor's intentions 
can intervene to create a new level at which properties 
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and objects can be inaugurated and treated as individual 
discrete tokens. This is the extensional consequence of 
organising knowledge around any discrete locus. The 
aggregation of knowledge can be seen as constituting an 
object/individual in its own right. A favourite example 
of mine comes from a POP2 programming manual. 
(5.3) Take the result and place it 
on the stack 
Nowhere in the hardware of the machine does it make sense 
to look for either of the two referents introduced via 
the DOs in (5.3). The stack in POP2 is, typically, a 
functional concept far removed from the actual electronic 
hardware of the computer which supports the POP2 
language. The path which leads from certain semi-
conductor states to high level computer languages has 
many intervening levels of description. Each level 
relies on objects, states and processes being interpreted 
at another level as different kinds of objects, states 
and processes (Footnote 5.4). In so far as a level of 
description is useful we can and do talk about the 
objects, states and processes that comprise it in a 
perfectly extensional way. we do not worry if an object, 
such as a stack, at one level of description lacks an 
Footnote 5.4. See Smith (1982) for excellent discussion 
of the issues of levels of interpretation in understand-
ing the semantics of programming languages. 
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obvious correlation with a particular individual state at 
a lower level of description (Footnote 5.5). 
Another aspect of the flexibility of nominal 
interpretation is the abstraction of a previously 
instantiated token- moving from a token to a type. One 
can take any object no matter how 'solidly instantiated', 
and move up a level from talking about it as an object to 
talking about its constitutive criteria, cf (5.4) for 
example. 
(5.4) He is not the Barry I once knew 
As processors we move easily from talk of objects as 
'tokens', through to talk of objects of ever more 
abstract 'types'. We also treat these abstract 'types' as 
just another sort of 'token'. How ought a descriptive 
system, concerned to detail the states of knowledge 
relevant to referential communication, model this feature 
of ·our linguistic practice? 
From the point of view of DOs one possibility is to 
claim that since no significant syntactic or grammatical 
distinctions are apparent in nominals used as 'types' and 
nominals used as 'tokens', then no distinction in DOs 
Footnote S.S. For example the physical size and location 
of the stack may for reasons of efficiency be changed at 
a lower level without any apparent change in the higher 
level object's properties. 
237 
should be made. In the system I present, none is made. 
What of the objects of knowledge themselves? One 
response is to ignore this source of linguistic variety 
and assume an epistemology in which the only objects of 
knowledge are 'tokens' in a single level object typology. 
This approach is taken, as we have seen, by Kaplan 
(1978,1979,1983), Grosz (1977,1981) and many others. 
Another approach is to implement a level of 
'prototypical knowledge', Minsky's FRAME proposals 
(1974), and Bobrow and Winograd's KRL system 
(1977a,1977b) can be viewed as such implementations. 
Frames themselves are objects of knowledge- they are 
abstractions serving as general schemas from which 
individual instances of the frame type can be generated. 
Using this approach we can think of an EO either as a 
frame or the result of instantiating a frame. Both are 
legitimate objects of knowledge. Thus we can think of a 
concept such as our knowledge of what constitutes a car 
as being a frame. When the frame is instantiated, that is 
its attributes take on values, we have an example of the 
concept. In this case, for example, an individual car 
with a registration number, recoded mileage and so on. 
To represent this feature of language, and the 
knowledge structures which support it, EMs will contain 
two sorts of EO. I will assume that EOs are either types 
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or tokens; either frames or instances of frames (Footnote 
5 .6) 
I will now introduce simplified notations which 
represent the informational content of EOs and nos. Let 
me stress from the outset that this notation reflects no 
commitment to any particular form of knowledge 
representation. Any formalism would suffice which was 
capable of representing the properties, qualities and 
attributes of the objects of our knowledge. I will 
associate with EO sets of pairs, each pair consisting of 
an 'attribute' and its associated 'value'. Thus one 
attribute might appear as A2, whilst a value for this 
attribute might be LARGE. The attribute A2 corresponds 
intuitively to the concept of SIZE. I have used non-
descriptive labels for the attribute component of the 
attribute value pair so as to suggest that this 
information is not to be thought of as part of 'Internal 
English'. The attribute value pairs, as represented 
here, provide a short hand for the kind of information 
that is active at a certain moment in a processor's 
perspective on an object. Moreover, the attribute value 
structures are not meant to suggest that this is the 
only, or indeed a likely, way in which knowledge is 
Footnote 5.6. This is something of a simplification- we 
can have many-tiered hierarchies of types and tokens. 
However, the basic feature of types and tokens is 
represented. 
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organised. Information constituting, for example, the 
value LARGE of an attribute SIZE is likely to be embodied 
in complex cognitive procedures. These procedures will 
consist of criteria sensitive to context. These criteria 
amount to our rules of use for the properties, qualities 
and attributes that constitute our knowledge of objects 
themselves. For example, part our criteria for the 
concept LARGE applied to any object, once contextualised 
for the type of object in question, might be the amount 
of the perceptual field it fills at a certain distance, 
or even, when the object is unseen, the sound it makes as 
it falls over! 
I also need a means of representing the difference 
between types and tokens. To represent the difference 
between these two sorts of EO I will reserve the first 
two attributes of the EO knowledge structure; the value 
associated with the first attribute CAO) will indicate 
whether the EO is a type or a token, whilst the value of 
the second will indicate the concept of which the EO is 
either the schema or an instance. An example of this type 
of representation is shown below 
.eo <AO,type>,<Al,car> l 
.eo <AO,token>,<Al,car> l 
When the types or tokens which occur in EMs are 
associated with DOs then we can always talk of 
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'referential specificity', a term I introduced in an 
earlier chapter, Discourse objects point back to 
particular and specific collocations of knowledge- these 
collocations, whether types or tokens, are particular EOs 
Figure 5.3 illustrates how an EO and its related 
perspectives are associated with 'knowledge' about the 
object. In this case the EO represents a token, 'eo3' is 
a partial representation of the information I will have 
to activate in my EM prior to uttering (5.5). Only 
information which will be directly involved in the 
utterance is shown as part of the structure of 'eo3'. 
(5.5) Nigel says 
to Bill 
FIGURE 5.3 
I discovered Barry is twenty six 
ACTIVATED EPISTEMIC TOKEN OBJECT FORMING PART OF 
AN ACTIVE EPISTEMIC MODEL 






eo31 nep [<AO,TO>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,BARRY>,<A3,26>] 
I n/bep [ <A3 ,2 8>] 
I n/b/nep [ ] 
'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~ 
It is reasonable to suppose that utterances such as (5.5) 
are based, in part, on my perception of incongruences of 
information between myself and Bill. If we look at 
Figure 5.3 the representation reveals the case in which I 
have one view of Barry'g age whilst I believe Bill to 
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have another. I do, however, expect us both to know the 
individual Barry by the proper name 'Barry'. Thus 
although in the representation there is no explicit set 
of intentions that prompt a processor to say anything in 
the first place, informational differences {embodied as 
perspectival differences) are partly responsible for 
'energising' communicative acts. 
Notice that some attribute value pairs present in 
nep are not shown explicitly in n/bep or n/b/nep. I 
adopt the convention of showing three perspectives on an 
EO to indicate that it is 'subjectively mutually known', 
but I only note attribute value pairs to a depth at which 
significant differences are found between that level and 
the one immediately above. Consequently, Figure 5.5 also 
embodies the assumption that I believe Bill to believe 
that I agree with him as to Barry's age. If I was unsure 
of Bill's view of my view about this attribute value pair 
the representation would be 
n/b/nep[<AO,TO><Al,MAN><A2,BARRY>,<A3,?>], 
we should note that there are really two sorts of 
ignorance about potential values etc, I may not know what 
value Bill associates with an attribute, or there is a 
stronger epistemological case where I know for certain 
that Bill does not know the value of some attribute. To 
avoid ambiguity in the notation the later case of 
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'understood ignorance' is represented as '??'. 
Before leaving the issue of the contents of Eos it 
should be noted that the processors involved in discourse 
will themselves be represented as EOs in the knowledge 
bases. Thus a perspective, say a/bep on an object, is 
really part of the structure of the EO representing b. 
Any perspectives a processor has of another processor's 
view of an object implies an EO for that other processor. 
Thus in Figure 5.3 the EO which we maintain of b is 
implied but not shown. There are occasions when explicit 
reference to EOs of this sort is a useful device within 
PC representation. 
Let us now consider how the contents of the DOs are 
represented. The content of a DO is that information 
explicitly introduced by a processor in discourse. These 
contents are associated with relevant discourse 
perspectives, ie my understanding of who has said what 
about an object, my understanding of a fellow 
interlocutor's understanding of who has said what about 
an object etc. 
The contents actually associated with DOs are not 
full lexical strings, but rather those ascriptions, 
predications and descriptions, made of objects in the 
lifetime of a discourse. The choice of exactly what 
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parts of any utterance to represent as explicitly 
attached to DOs is difficult. Especially since the 
evidence suggests that surface forms are not the manner 
in which information is stored in models of discourse (cf 
for example, Bransford, Barclay & Franks 1972, Bransford 
& Mccarrell 1975). 
Figure 5.4 below represents the contents of a DO I 
might establish in response to my own utterance of (5.5). 
The DM and its objects serve as an indication of the 
history of a discourse. Information from the DM is 
constantly being compared to what is known in the EM, 
relevant adjustments in the EMs are subsequently made. 
The DO, 'do3', indicates my view of the separate 
discourse participants' views of who said what about that 
object of discourse. 
FIGURE 5.4 
DISCOURSE OBJECT FORMING PART OF A DISCOURSE MODEL 








do31 ndp [eo3,[ndcll 
I n/bdp [ l 





In Figure 5.4 the DO, 'do3', is shown as containing 
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various perspectives. My perspective on this object is 
shown as 'npd' {Nigel's Discourse Perspective), my 
perspective of Bill's perspective on the DO is shown as 
'n/bdp' {Nigel's view of Bill's Discourse Perspective) 
etc. Following these perspectival indicators there is an 
indication of which EO the DO is derived from. This 
information is then followed by a list containing my view 
of who has said what about a DO, and which perspective 
this contribution can be regarded as having originated 
from. In this particular case there has, so far, only 
been one contribution, represented as 'ndc' {Nigel's 
Discourse Contribution). Associated with 'ndc' are the 
salient predications/ascriptions made by myself of the 
object and the epistemic perspective out of which it is 
presumed the descriptions have been lexicalised. This 
information is something of a reduplication of 
information already contained in the EM. The 
representation of 'ndc' in Figure 5.4 shows that I have 
made two 'predications', or 'ascriptions' of the DO 
'do3'- namely, 'barry' and 'twenty six'. Both of these 
ascriptions are assumed to have originated out of Nigel's 
Epistemic Perspective 'nep' on 'eo3' {the EO itself 
contains the more detailed considerations concerning 
which of these ascriptions are held to be 'mutually 
known'). 
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Note that a similar convention is adopted to that 
governing embedded epistemic perspectives, ie if there is 
no assumed difference between my view of the discourse, 
'npd', and my view of Bill's view of the discourse, 
'n/bdp', the contents are not replicated at the lower 
embedded level. 
4 Quantification in the PC Model 
The problem of representing quantified nominals in 
'mental models' such as the PC system is a serious one. 
Any 'mental model' approach, which seeks to be 
psychologically plausible, faces the problem of 
representing, in finite models, nominals such as 'all the 
stars in the galaxy', 'all the prime numbers' etc. 
Proposals which seek to establish how DOs are established 
find themselves overwhelmed if such expressions are seen 
to introduce a separate DO for each element of classes 
like 'stars in the galaxy', 'prime numbers' etc. There 
are, fortunately, a number of ways in which quantified 
nominals could be accommodated within a PC framework. 
One approach, which we might term 'type 
exemplification', suggests that part of the knowledge 
activated, when -certain nominals are used, includes a 
means of generating inductively a particular member out 
of what is potentially a very large, perhaps infinite, 
set. For example, consider (5.6). 
(5.6) A to B Think of a number, multiply 
it by twelve 
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Rather than suppose that people have to carry an infinite 
number of EOs about with them, each of which represents 
one of the natural numbers, it seems more reasonable to 
suppose that concepts like the integers are stored as 
inductive rule schemas- these can be thought of as EO 
types for integers. such a schema allows us to generate 
any member in the series as needed- to generate a token 
from a type. On hearing (5.6), a single DO is introduced 
and associated in the first instance, not with a 
particular number, but with the type EO which allows 
number generation. 
Notice that this gives us a way of importing 
universality to nominals such as indefinites which would 
not receive such treatments on logical accounts. What of 
explicit universal quantifiers? How are they to be 
understood as instructions for model construction and 
model search? 
we could adopt the view outlined above. Accordingly 
we would have to claim that despite appearances to the 
contrary nominals like 'every number', 'all men', 
introduce a single DO into discourse. This is a DO which 
is associated with a certain sort of EO- namely, a type. 
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Any ascription is now an ascription made of a DO 
associated with a type EO. This is an EO capable of 
modification which affects the entire class of objects 
which can be 'generated out' of the schema. Thus an 
assertion such as (5.7) bears on the level of knowledge 
which is the schema for generating the primes themselves. 
(5.7) A to B Every prime must have a root which 
is real 
In a similar way an utterance such as (5.8) could be 
understood as a comment about the instigator's view of 
the 'mandatory' properties which he ascribes to a 
particular sort of object. Thus (5.9) and (5.10} have 
the same force as (5.8), in all cases reference is to DOs 
which are associated with a type characterisation. 
(5.8) A to B 
(5.9) A to B 
(5.10) A to B 
Every tiger is fierce 
A tiger is fierce 
The tiger is fierce 
These proposals appear to work reasonably well for 
universal and individual terms. It is less immediately 
clear how examples such as (5.11} are to be treated. 
(5.11) A to B Some tigers are fierce 
One approach suggested in a series of articles by 
Johnson-Laird (cf for example Johnson-Laird 1975a, 
Johnson-Laird & Steedman 1978, Johnson-Laird & Bara 
1982). His proposals were originally meant to account for 
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the data derived form subjects performing syllogistic 
inference tasks. 
In syllogisms such as CS.12) Johnson-Laird models 
the two premises by setting up a 'tableau' of tokens. 
Each token is seen to represent an individual from the 
classes mentioned. A mental model or tableau for the 
first premise is shown in Figure S.S. The second premise 
extends and revises the tableau to that shown in Figure 
S.6. 
CS.12) All vicars are gardeners 
All gardeners are vegetarians 
All vicars are vegetarians 
FIGURE S.S 
FIGURE 
TOKEN TABLEAU CONSTRUCTED IN RESPONSE 
TO FIRST PREMISE OF (S.12) 
vicar = gardener 
vicar = gardener 




TOKEN TABLEAU CONSTRUCTED IN RESPONSE 
TO FIRST & SECOND PREMISES OF CS.12) 
vicar = gardener = vegetarian 
vicar = gardener = vegetarian 
vicar = gardener = vegetarian 
(gardener) = (vegetarian) 
(gardener) = (vegetarian) 
(vegetarian) 
The tokens in parentheses are introduced as possible 
individuals, since although it is possible that from the 
first premise the sets of vicars and gardeners are equal, 
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the first premise is also consistent with the situation 
in which 'vicars' are a subset of 'gardeners'. This is 
the possibility which is captured by the additional 
bracketed elements. The second premise extends the 
model, again it is possible that the sets of gardeners 
and vegetarians are equivalent, or that there are more 
vegetarians than gardeners. With such straightforward 
models a simple inspection of the model can provide 
conclusions such as 'All vicars are vegetarians'. 
A similar approach to quantified discourse objects 
could be adopted within the PC model. Tableaus could be 
up in the DMs and EMs to represent the content of the 
quantifiers. This could be done explicitly as in Figure 
5.7 in response to an utterance such as (5.15). Or 
through EM perspectives on the EO representing Bill as in 
Figure 5.8. 
(5.15 ) Robert to Sam All the villagers love Bill 
FIGURE 5.7 EXPLICIT REPRESENTATION OF A SET OF TOKENS 
ESTABLISHING A TABLEAU FOR QUANTIFIED 
INFORMATION IN (5.13) 
Robert's EM.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
1 
I • eo8 .eo9 
I 
.eo5 










where eo8-eoll have structure 
I rep [<AO,TOKEN><Al,VILLAGER>l I 
I rep [<A3,LOVES BILL>] I 
I r/sep [ I 
I r/s/rep[ I 
where eo5 has structure 
I rep [<AO,TOKEN><Al,MAN>l I 
I r/sep [ I 
I r/s/rep[ I 
and dol-do4 have structure (where eon 
is a separate eo out of the EM) 
I rdp [eon, [ rdcl l I 
I r/sdp [ l I 
I r/s/rdp[ : l I 
rdc={villager,rep},{loves Bill,rep} 
and do5 has structure 
I rdp [eoS,[rdcll 
I r /sdp [ l 




FIGURE 5.8 REPRESENTATION OF (5.13) USING MULTIPLE 












<A3 ,vl LOVES>] I 
I 
<A3 ,v2 LOVES>] I 
I 
<A3 ,v3 LOVES>] I 
I 
<A3,v4 LOVES>] I 
This gives us a rudimentary system for the representation 
of quantified expressions. We have type instantiation for 
universal and generic knowledge, and token tableau for 
universal as well as other combinatoric possibilities. 
5 Modelling a Referential Exchange 
we need to show how the various elements in the 
descriptive system link up, how the EM, EOs, DM and DOs 
are related to one another. A good way of doing this is 
to present an example of the system in use. The aim of 
this system is to display the possibilities of 
interpretation open to processor's in their referential 
acts. How then would the system cope with the canonical 
case of 'alleged successful reference' in (5.14)? 
C Footnote 5 • 7) 
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(5.14) Sam to Robert Barry is ill 
First, we should note that the PC system highlights a 
fact to which I have previously alluded; there are two 
sorts of intensional context. Language always has one 
type present, the second only occurs if certain lexical 
items are present. I have called the first implicit 
intensional contexts and the second explicit intensional 
contexts. 
In explicit intensional contexts an intensional 
operator occurs as a lexical item in the linguistic 
string. These constitute the so-called 'classic' 
intensional contexts discussed at length already in this 
thesis. Explicit intensional operators can be seen in 
utterances (5.15), (5.16) & (5.17). In these examples 
they occur with a second type of intensional operator. 
This is the covert or implicit intensional context, what 
others have referred to as the 'performatives'. In the 
system presented here natural language use always 
involves implicit intensional operators, thus creating a 
total blanket of intensionality over language. 
Footnote 5.7. The term 'alleged' is, as a hope to show, 
entirely appropriate. 
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Implicit intensional contexts arise out of the fact 
that all 'natural' language has an origin. It is 
generated by someone. This amounts to the covert 
intensional operator 'X says that " ••• "', 'X writes that 
" ••• "' etc. Natural language also has a destination. It 
has percipients. This supplies another covert 
intensional context, 'Y hears that" ••• "', 'Y reads that 
" ••• "'etc. Examples (5.15), (5.16) and (5.17) all 
exhibit these implicit as well as the explicit 
intensional operators, whilst (5.18) presents us with a 
case in which only the implicit intensional context is 
present. 
(5.15) Sam says 
to Nigel 
(5.16) Sam says 
to Nigel 
(5.17) Sam says 
to Nigel 
( 5 .18) Sam says 
to Nigel 
Robert says your girlfriend just rang 
Robert thinks he saw your girlfriend 
Robert wants to invite your 
girlfriend out 
Your girlfriend just rang 
Our descriptions have to be indexed from a point of 
origin to a point of percipience to make clear who said 
what to who. In this respect all language, by virtue of 
having been generated and needing to be interpreted, has 
opaque possibilities. 
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Implicit operators present no problems for logical 
representations as long as perf ormative analyses are 
used. The PC model, however, presents us with an 
immediate perf ormative analysis of language. 
Let us return to the case of reference in (5.14). In 
referential acts I will term the person who first 
performs an act of reference with a particular discourse 
object the 'instigator' of the referential act; the 
person to whom it is directed will be the 'interpreter'. 
First consider the matter from the point of view of Sam 
the instigator of the referential act. After uttering 
(5.14) we will assume that he thinks his referential act 
successful. Thus, he thinks his interpreter has construed 
the proper name in a uniquely referring way. So although 
Sam and his interpreter may know a number of Barrys the 
occasion of his utterance is such that Sam believes the 
name selects a unique individual, and does so in such a 
way that Sam believes his partner and himself are not 
thinking of different objects. 
(5.14) Sam says 
to Robert 
Barry is ill 
Let us suppose the context of utterance of (5.14) was of 
the following sort. Sam walks past Barry's office and 
sees Robert sitting waiting there. Part of the 
intentional story behind an utterance like (5.14) may be 
explained in terms of plan generation and recognition. 
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Robert has a goal, to see Barry, Sam recognises that this 
is a likely goal of Robert's. Now Sam possesses 
information which will violate a precondition of Robert's 
goal being achieved- namely, the information that Barry 
is ill. Finally, Sam will rely on Robert's ability to 
recognise his contribution as one which is relevant to 
the goal Robert currently entertains. Whilst this rich 
plan generation and plan recognition is not represented 
in the descriptive system, part of the information 
necessary for it to proceed is provided. This consists of 
Sam's beliefs that; Barry is ill, and that Robert does 
not know that Barry is ill. This difference is encoded 
and represented as a perspective difference on a 
'mutually known' object. 
Figure 5.9 provides a processor-centric 
representation embodying this perceived difference of 
inf ormedness. It is assumed in all the Figures that 
follow in this example that the first two attributes of 
the EO representing Barry have the values 
[<AO,TYPE>,<Al,MAN>]. 
FIGURE 5.9 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF SAM 
PRIOR TO UTTERANCE OF {5.14) 
Sam's Activated EM 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
I .eo71 sep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL> ] I 
I I s/rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,WELL>] I 










After uttering {5.14), Sam's Processor Centric 
representation is modified as shown in Figure 5.10. A 
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discourse object has been introduced into discourse for 
the first time, in effect an act of discourse object 
creation has occurred. This DO, 'dol', is the discourse 
manifestation of the EO, 'eo7'. Discourse object creation 
will involve a process of identifier lexicalisation, a 
way of identifying 'eo7' which is believed by Sam to be a 
mutually known way if identifying the individual in 
question {Footnote 5.8). 
A referential identifier, such as 'Barry', succeeds 
as a means of signaling discourse object introduction by 
relying, in part, on syntactical/grammatical conventions 
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governing its position within discourse, in part, on 
intonational conventions (cf for example, Halliday 1967). 
The process by which a particular lexicalisation is 
chosen for an EO is bound to be complex Presumably an EO 
can be described in terms of many of its properties. At 
the very least, to succeed as a referential device for a 
discourse interpreter, the referential instigator must 
believe that a particular property, which he selects as 
the referential device, is mutually known to instigator 
and interpreter. 
After the utterance of (5.14), we represent ,in 
Figure 5.10, the DO, 'dol', inheriting the object 
relevant information contained in the utterance. This 
information is indexed for its contributer and 
'perspective of origin'. It is assumed by Sam at this 
stage that his discourse participant will adopt his view 
of the DO introduced. 
Footnote 5.8. The information used to lexicalise an 
identifier 'Barry' is represented as <A2,BARRY>. It was 
pointed out that this representation is not to be thought 
of as English. What allows us to relate the elements 
'BARRY' and 'Barry'? I am relying on the assumption that 
part of our knowledge of concepts does include, at some 
level, information about how concepts may be realised as 
elements in our public language. Thus the information in 
the EO represented as BARRY is that information in the 
'internal menta.l formalism' that will be realised as 
'Barry' in the external formalism of English. 
FIGURE 5.10 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF SAM AFTER 
UTTERANCE OF (5.14) 
Sam's Activated EM 
·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
I • eo7 I sep [ <A2 ,BARRY>' <A3 'ILL> ] I 
I I s/rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,WELL>l I 






I .doll sdp [eo7,[sdc]] I 
I I s/rdp [ l I 





we are modelling alleged successful reference -
Sam's belief that he has evoked in Robert's mind a 
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knowledge structure representing an object which he wants 
to introduce in discourse. What effect can Sam suppose 
this introduction of a discourse object (with the 
properties ascribed to it) will have on his discourse 
partner? 
A possible final P-C representation of Sam after 
(5.14) is shown in Figure 5.11. This shows that a 
modification of the 's/rep' perspective on 'eo7' has 
taken place. The modification represents Sam's belief 
that Robert has treated Sam's contribution in (5.14) as 
sincere and authoritative. 
FIGURE 5.11 
Sam's Activated EM 
---~~~--~~~~~·-~~~-
' I • eo7 I sep [ <A2 ,BARRY>, <A3, ILL> ] 
I I s/rep [ J 









.dol I sdp [eo7, [sdc]] 
I s/rdp [ J 




The system will allow us to represent a more 
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cautious approach by Sam. A 'conservative modification' 
involves moving from the 'eol' configuration in Figure 
5.10 to that shown in Figure 5.12. Sam is not sure what 
effect his utterance has had on Robert's perspective on 
'eol', but at the very least he can modify the s/r/sep 









.eo71 sep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL> 11 
I s/rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3, ? > ] I 
I s/r/sep[<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL> l I 
!~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~ 
Let us now turn to the interpreter of (5.14) and 
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consider his referential interpretation in the light of a 
P-C representation? Let us suppose that the interpreter 
also believes successful reference to have occurred. This 
means that Robert, in the context described for (5.14), 
has had evoked in his mind a representation of an object 
which he believes Sam intended to ref er to. The stages by 
which the interpreter arrives at this condition are as 
follows. 
On hearing (5.14), the first state represented is 
one in which Robert recognises the introduction of a DO. 
The DO will have associated with it various ascriptions, 
these are collectively labeled 'sdc', ie Sam's 
Footnote 5.9. To guarantee even this one would have to 
presume something like a felicity condition of 'sinceri-
ty'. It should also be noted that there are two choices 
open at a lower level again, ie 's/r/s/rep' could have 
the configuration [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL>l, or 
[<A2,BARRY>,<A3,?>l. Although this does mean that a per-
spective not shown 's/r/s/rep' is different than 
's/r/sep' the pattern established by considering yet 
deeper levels settles down to a choice between •••• /rep 
[<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL>l' or •••• /rep[<A2,BARRY>,<A3,?>l. 
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Descriptive Contribution. Robert assumes these 
ascriptions to have arisen out of Sam's epistemic 
perspective on an as yet unlocated object of knowledge. 
This first stage then is represented in Figure 5.13. 
Notice that the condition of not yet having located an 
object of knowledge to associate with the discourse 
entity is shown in the P-C representation as an 
unspecified EO token, 'eo?', associated with the newly 
established DO, 'dol'. 
FIGURE 5.13 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF ROBERT 
IMMEDIATELY AFTER HEARING (5.14) 










.dol I rdp [eo?, [sdc] J 
I r/sdp [ J 




The second stage of referential interpretation 
requires using information derived from the discourse and 
intentional context to locate an appropriate object of 
knowledge, in P-C terms to find an EO to associate with 
the DO 'dol'. Both processors are aware of the situative 
262 
context, that Robert has the likely goal of waiting for 
the occupant of the room etc. This type of inferential 
capability will obviously aid Robert in the search of his 
Knowledge bases. Figure 5.14 represents the state where 
Robert has selected an object of knowledge to associate 
with the newly introduced discourse object. This 
condition is represented as an EO, 'eo8', serving as the 




I .eo81 rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,WELL>l 
I I r I sep [ : l 





I .dol I rdp [eo8, [sdcl l I 
I I r/sdp [ l I 





Finally there arises the question of what 
modification Robert should make to his knowledge in the 
light of Sam's discourse contribution. There are a number 
of possibilities assuming Robert takes Sam's contribution 
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to be sincere. The possibilities revolve round whether 
Robert regards Sam as authoritative and whether Robert 
believes that Sam believes there is mutual recognition of 
his authority. Some of these possibilities, at least in 
terms of the consequences for the EO perspectives, are 
shown in Figures 5.15-5.18. 
Figure 5.15 shows a case where Robert believes that 
Sam is authoritative and believes that Sam believes that 
Robert will treat him as such. Figure 5.16 shows the case 
where Robert believes Sam as authoritative but is unsure 
as to whether Sam believes that Robert will treat him as 
such. Figure 5.17 is the case where Robert does not 
believe Sam's information as authoritative but thinks 
that Sam will believe that Robert will regard it as such. 
Figure 5.18 shows a situation where Robert does not 
believe Sam's information, and he is not sure how Sam 
thinks his contribution will be taken. There are even 
more possibilities than these four, for example, Sam's 
utterance may simply cast doubt on Robert's 'rep' 
perspective of 'eo8' without directly changing it to 
another definite value. 
Figure 5.15 
POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF ROBERT'S EM 
AFTER INTERPRETATION OF (5.14) 






.eo81 rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL >l 
I r/sep [ l 
I r/s/rep[ l 
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~ 
Figure 5.16 
POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF ROBERT'S EM 
AFTER INTERPRETATION OF (5.14) 






.eo81 rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL >l 
I r/sep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL >l 
I r/s/rep[<A2,BARRY>,<A3, ? >l 
!~~~·--~~~~~~~~~~------~~~~~ 
Figure 5.17 
POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF ROBERT'S EM 
AFTER INTERPRETATION OF (5.14) 






.eo81 rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,WELL>l 
I r/sep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL >l 




POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF ROBERT'S EM 
AFTER INTERPRETATION OF (5.14) 
Robert's Active EM_~~~~-
1 I 
I .eo81 rep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,WELL>] I 
I I r/sep [<A2,BARRY>,<A3,ILL >] I 




In this section I have outlined the main elements of the 
P-C descriptive system. In describing the system we 
looked at a 'straightforward' case of referential commun-
ication. But what of some of the classic semantic prob-
lems of reference? What can the descriptive system 
contribute to these areas? 
SECTION .TN.Q MODELLING ASPECTS OF REFERENCE 
1 Modelling Ascriptive Responsibility 
One very important feature of the PC system is its 
ability to represent the processor perspectives out of 
which descriptions of objects are held to originate. This 
problem, discussed in chapters two and three, is the 
problem of expressive or 'ascriptive' responsibility. 
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Language, such as that contained in (5.19), presents 
a number of problems for logical accounts of reference 
(Footnote 5.10) 




The man drinking water is ill 
The man drinking water is drinking 
gin and he is drunk 
First of all how does one represent responsibility 
for a description? Intensional logic can distinguish, as 
we have seen, the types of semantic object a participant 
is related to. However, it does not simultaneously 
determine ascriptive responsibility. 
A second problem is to explain how the descriptions 
used to 'refer' to objects, are able to refer at all, 
when different processors dispute the truth of the 
descriptions. If a description is false of an object, 
then it cannot serve logically as a means of uniquely 
identifying or naming that object. Consequently, as 
Perrault & Cohen (1981) point out, we find statements of 
the following sort stipulating the necessary conditions 
for successful reference. 
A necessary condition for the successful 
performance of a definite reference by a 
speaker s using a description D in a 
context C is that s believes that D is 
Footnote 5.10. Example (5.19) is a freely adapted version 
of the problem first raised in Donnellan (1966) • In-
teresting discussions of such examples can also be found 
in Perrault & Cohen (1981), and Clark & Marshall (1981). 
fulfilled inc. (Footnote 5.11) (Perrault 
& Cohen 1981) 
We can demonstrate quite easily that the above 
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requirement is neither sufficient nor necessary. Consider 
the following situation. A and B are at a party. They 
watch together as water and gin are poured into two 
identical glasses and given to women C and D 
resvectively. Now suppose that unbeknownst to B, A sees c 
and D exchange glasses. Later A utters (5.20) to B. 
(5.20) A says The woman with the gin is Louisa 
to B 
There is no doubt that A successfully ref erred to D even 
though D was not drinking gin, nor did A believe D was 
drinking gin, but A believes that B believed she was, and 
A believed that B believed that A believed she was. 
The PC descriptive system captures some of the 
critical states which A is likely to entertain in his 
execution of a 'successful' referential act. Figure 5.19 
represents A's state before seeing the exchange of 
drinks. Figure 5.20 is A's state after witnessing the 
exchange of glasses and realising that B has not seen the 
event. We will assume throughout this example that the 
attribute value AO in all the EOs is <AO,TOKEN>. 
Footnote 5.11. As Perrault and Cohen use the term we may 
understand 'context' as something like the set of enti~ 
ties 'known' to speaker and hearer, and 'D is fulfilled 
in C' means that exactly one entity in C satisfies D. 
Figure 5.19 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF A PRIOR TO 
WITNESSING EXCHANGE OF GLASSES 
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A's activated EM -------------------
' I .eoll aep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS WATER>] 
I I a/bep [ l 






.eo21 aep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS GIN>,<A3,LOUISA>l 
I a/bep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS GIN>,<A3, ? >l 
I a/b/aep[ ] 






PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF A AFTER 
UTTERANCE OF (5.20) 
A's activated EM._ _________________ ~ 
I I 
I • eol I aep [<Al ,WOMAN>, <A2 ,HAS GIN >l I 
I I a/bep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS WATER>] I 
I I a/b/aep[ l I 
I I 
I I 
l.eo21 aep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS WATER>,<A3,LOUISA>l I I 
I I a/bep [<Al,WOMAN>,<A2,HAS GIN >,<A3 ,LOUISA>] 11 








a/bdp [ : l 






adp[adcl={the woman drinking gin,a/bep} 
{louisa,aep} 
a/bdp[adcl={the woman drinking gin,aep} 
{louisa,aep} 
A's representation of c, ie 'eol', could not have 
been what A was seeking to evoke, since A does not 
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believe that B could recognise 'the woman with the gin' 
as ref erring to c. Note also that if A presumes 
successful referential uptake by B neither A nor B's 
belief, about who the woman with the gin is, need be 
revised. The only area where A might be 'faulted' is in 
violating conversational maxims, ie not correcting B's 
presupposition about the object of interest as displayed 
in the perspectives 'a/bep' and 'a/b/aep' on 'eol' and 
'eo2'. Example (5.20) shows that understanding which 
perspective processors regard as the origin of 
descriptions is an important feature in explaining how 
certain sorts of referential uptake occur. 
A problem related to the one just discussed is that 
illustrated by our first example in this section- (5.19), 
where two mutually exclusive descriptions are being used 
by separate processors to designate the same individual. 




The man drinking water is ill 
The man drinking water is drinking 
gin and he is drunk 
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The problem is that in logic there is no account of how 
contradictory descriptions of an object may 'refer'. 
The processor centric representations, however, are 
able to offer a series of 'snapshots' of different 
perspectives on our representations of objects. This 
allows us to chart a processor's view of ascriptive 
responsibility throughout discourse. In the system 
presented language originates out of processor 
perspectives. Moreover, multiple, and even contradictory 
descriptions of objects can be represented within one 
processor as long as the perspectival partitioning and 
segregation of these beliefs is maintained. 
The descriptive machinery extends quite naturally to 
deal with ascriptive responsibility involving multiple 
processors. Take for example utterance (5.21). 
(5.21) A says John said he saw the informer 
to B 
(5.22) A says Bill said John said he saw 
to B the informer 
In the first case we have to determine who is 
responsible for the expression 'the informer'; ascriptive 
responsibility can either be A's, or John's. These two 
possibilities would be represented in A's DM as Figures 
5.21 or 5.22 (where 'dol' is the DO introduced by the 
nominal 'John', and 'do2' is the DO introduced by the 
description 'the informer'). In Figure 5.21 the 
perspectival origin hence the responsibility for the 
terms of description of 'dol' and 'do2' are both from 
'aep', In other words A is taking responsibility for 
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describing an object in these terms. A is also assuming 
that his interlocutor has this view of the ascriptive 
origin of these terms. 
In Figure 5.22 responsibility for the mode of 
description of 'dol' is A's, but for 'do2' responsibility 
is held by A to be his view of John's mode of 
description, indicated by 'a/jep'. A assumes in this 
representation that his interlocutor has a similar view 
as to the placement of ascriptive responsibility. Notice 
that an additional perspective has arisen because of the 
use of an 'explicit' intensional operator, 'said'. The 
effect of such operators is to open up the possibility of 
relating discourse material back to perspectives other 
than just the two discourse participants. In this case 

















PART OF A POSSIBLE PROCESSOR CENTRIC 
REPRESENTATION FOR A AFTER AN UTTERANCE OF (5.21) 
A's DM 
I 
I .doll adp [eol, [ adcl l 
I I a/bdp [ ] 
I I a/b/adp [ . ] . 
I 
I .do21 adp [eo2, [ adcl l 
I I a/bdp [ ] 
I I a/b/adp [ : ] 
I 
where 
doll adc I={ john, aep} 
do21 adc l={informer,aep} 
Figure 5.22 
PART OF A POSSIBLE PROCESSOR CENTRIC 
REPRESENTATION FOR A AFTER AN UTTERANCE OF (5.21) 
A's DM 
I 
I .doll adp [eol, [adcl l 
I I a/bdp [ ] 
I I a/b/adp [ : . ] . 
I 
I .do21 adp [eo2, [adcl l 
I I a/bdp [ ] 
I I a/b/adp [ . . ] . . 
I 
where 
doll adc l={john,aep} 
do21 adc l={informer,a/jep} 
In utterance (5.22) ascriptive responsibility can rest 
with either A, Bill or John. 
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The question of ascriptive responsibility actually 
comprises two elements. The first concerns the 
perspective of origin of the mode of description. The 
second has to do with the perspectives that may be 
inherited by a description. In other words who would know 
or would assent to the object under this description or 
that predication? In the simplest case, we can suggest 
that the origin for a description is taken to be the 
immediate discourse participant who is the referential 
instigator. Propagation is then assumed to proceed to all 
other processor perspectives either overtly or covertly 
mentioned in the relevant part of the discourse. 
Of course, much more complex possibilities than this 
may be envisaged. The origin of a description may be 
placed in a perspective other than the referential 
instigator. Propagation may be restricted to only some of 
the implicated processors. The processor-centric 
representations, through the use of perspectives and 
differential attribute value lists, is able to represent 
the straightforward, as well as the more complex cases of 
expressive responsibility. 
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2 Modelling Specificity 
The semantic phenomenon of specificity revolves round the 




John wants to buy a car 
John wants to marry a Swede 
We have seen that there is considerable disagreement over 
what specificity is. Some argue it is a type/token 
distinction; a distinction between individuals and 
generic classes. Others argue that it is a matter of 
having the necessary information to identify a relevant 
individual. 
No matter what view is taken some formalists have 
argued, as we saw in Chapter 2, that specificity is 
scopal in origin. On such a view indefinite expressions 
are not marked with a specific or non-specific feature. 
It must be scopal, they argue, because we find a 
systematic relationship between the number of 
interpretations and the number of embedded sentences. 
Nevertheless, a natural way within our PC model of 
representing one version of the specificity dichotomy is 
to use the distinction between EO types and tokens. A 
non-specific reading of the nominal 'a car' in (5.23) is 
to be understood as a reference to an EO which is a type. 
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The specific reading is the interpretation where the 
relevant DO introduced by 'a car' is associated with an 
EO which is a token. 
This approach is essentially featural. Nominals can 
be associated with two sorts of value - types or tokens. 
Let us use the PC model to represent (5.23). Imagine a 
scenario where the object in question, a car, has been 
indirectly instantiated- S's only view of the object is 
through a conversation he has had with John about it. It 
is a feature of the basic architecture of the PC model 
that it can capture the range of possibilities present in 
such a context. Figure 5.23 represents a possible 
configuration of S's EM after uttering (5.23). The 
configuration represents the straightforward case where s 
thinks all the relevant individuals have the same view 
about the object of John's desires - namely, that he 
wants a particular, specific car. S's assumption of 
unanimity is reflected in the fact that only a single EO 
is evoked and it has the relevant processor perspectives. 
FIGURE 5.23 
.eo21 S/jep [<AO,TOKEN>,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
I I 
I S/H/jep[ ] I 
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There could be more complex situations than the one 
described. Different individuals might come to have 
different beliefs about the object of John's wants. For 
example, suppose s comes to believe that H believes 
something different than s intended through the use of 
the indefinite nominal. 
Consider discourses (5.25)-(5.28) regarded as 
continuations to (5.23) - these indicate the range of 
beliefs about the object of John's wants which s and H 
may entertain. It is an important feature of the PC 
model that it should be able to describe these sorts 
dynamic belief change - that it should be able to 
represent the range of interpretations to which the 
indefinite is susceptible. Figures (5.23)-(5.26) 
represent the relevant EM which S must have immediately 
after each of H's replies in continuations (5.25)-(5.28) 
respectively. Thus the effects of H's reply in (5.25) are 
represented in Figure 5.23, the effects (5.26) are 
embodied in Figure 5.24, (5.27) in Figure 5.25, and 
(5.28) in Figure 5.26. 
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(5.23) s to H John wants to buy a car 
(5.25) H to s Which one? 
s to H One his neighbour is selling 
(5.26) H to s He doesn't have a particular one in mind then? Ii 
s to H No i 
(5.27) H to s Which one? 
s to H He doesn't have a particular one in mind 
( 5. 2 8) H to s He doesn't have a particular -one in mind then? 
s to H He does, it's one his neighbour is selling 
FIGURE 5.24 
PART OF S's EM AFTER H's UTTERANCE IN (5.26) 
S's Epistemic Model.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
.eoll S/jep [<AO,TYPE >,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
I I 
I S/H/jep [ I 
FIGURE 5.25 
PART OF S's EM AFTER H's UTTERANCE IN (5.27) 
S's Epistemic Model~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
.eo21 S/jep [<AO,TYPE >,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
.eoll S/H/jep[<AO,TOKEN>,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
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FIGURE 5.26 
PART OF S's EM AFTER H's UTTERANCE IN (5.28) 
S's Epistemic Model~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
.eoll S/jep [<AO,TOKEN>,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
.eo21 S/H/jep[<AO,TYPE >,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
It is interesting that this style of analysis suggests a 
rather different way in which logic could attempt to 
model such situations. We could have the logic model the 
various belief states that different processors maintain 
in the contexts described. To do this we need a logical 
means of representing the partitioned perspectives. One 
such representation is given below 
1 2 
thinks( s, wants( John, x)) 
& 1 2 
thinks( s, thinks( H, wants( John, x))) 
This logical schema represents a schema for S's belief 
about what John wants, and what s believes H believes 
John wants. Now remembering we are modelling the beliefs 
of a particular individual the existential can be placed 
at either the positions marked 1 or the positions marked 
2. we are now able to model, using this logic of beliefs, 
the four possibilities captured in the PC Figures (5.23)-
(5.26). Formulae (5.29)-(5.32) correspond to 
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interpretations for S's beliefs after H's reply in 
continuations (5.25)-(5.28) respectively. 
(5.29) thinks(S,Ex(car(x) & wants(John,x))) 






& thinksCS,thinksCH,EyCcar(y) & wants(John,y)))) 
(5.32 thinksCS,Ex(car(x) & wants(John,x))) 
& thinks(S,thinks(H,wants(John,Ey(car(y))))) 
we have captured the possibilities by having the logic 
model beliefs- this is quite a different enterprise than 
having it represent the possibilities of construal from 
the surface form of sentences. The logic is modelling 
partitions using predication. If this partitioning is the 
foundation of ascriptive responsibility then the logical 
machinery used is no longer scopal. It, effectively, only 
uses two positions of the indefinite together with 
partitions- a bivalent treatment just like bivalent 
features. This is clearly seen if we consider (5.33). 
(5.33) s to H Bill believes John wants a car 
(5.34) s to H Though he doesn't know 
he already has one marked out 
The range of different interpretations for (5.33) can be 
obtained by constructing partitions for the relevant 
individuals and then having the indefinite placed inside 
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or outside the scope of the most deeply embedded operator 
'wants'. Thus suppose we have a context in which s knows 
John to have a particular car in mind whilst Bill doesn't 
think he has- assuming s believes H to be in accord with 
his own perspective a continuation such as (5.34) 
suggests a PC representation for S's EM as in Figure 
(5.27). This can be represented using a partitioned 
belief logic as in (5.35) 
FIGURE 5.27 
PART OF S's EM AFTER UTTERANCE OF (5.34) AS 
A CONTINUATION OF (5.33) 
S's Epistemic Model~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
.eoll S/jep [<AO,TOKEN>,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
I S/H/jep [ ] I 
.eo21 S/B/jep[<AO,TYPE>,<Al,CAR>,<A2,WANTS JOHN>] I 
I S/H/B/jep[ : ] I 
(5.35) thinks(S,Ex(car(x) & wants(John,x))) 





There is an alternative way of understanding the specific 
non-specific dichotomy- that is in terms of the amount of 
predicative information associated with the indefinite. 
2fil 
If there is sufficient information then we have a 
specific reading- otherwise it is non-specific. This 
difference is bound to be difficult to characterise. But 
whatever the degree of information required to secure 
specificity if it is regarded as a semantic dichotomy 
then a +spec or -spec feature associated with token EOs 
will secure the range of interpretations required. The 
machinery of partitioned perspectives operates on the 
bivalent values of + spec or - spec attached to tokens. 
Whatever account of the specificity phenomenon we choose, 
we can be assured of being able to capture the required 
range of interpretations. 
3 Modelling Referentiality 
The referential attributive distinction was originally 
analysed by Donnellan in terms of the intentions of 
speakers. The attributive use centred on the fact that 
the content of the definite description was an essential 
property of whatever object, if one existed at all, 
satisfied the description. 
This 'essentialist' view of the attributive could be 
regard~d as characterising a type of object. The meaning 
of the constitutive terms in the description are seen to 
provide a characterisation for a type of object. The 
singular fact about the definite is that only one object 
can instantiate the type at any particular instant. Thus 
282 
whilst there is only ever one referent satisfying the 
description in (5.36), there is a procedure which allows 
us to determine that at different times different objects 
instantiate the description. 
(5.36) A to B The League Champions look set for 
another title 
The referential reading of the definite is one in which 
the description is one of many that could have been 
applied- it served merely as a means of identifying a 
token. 
Such a view of the referential attributive dichotomy 
could be represented in two sorts of EO exemplified 
below. 
eol Aep [<AO,TYPE>,<Al,MURDERER OF SMITH>] I 
eol Aep [<AO,TOKEN>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,MURDERER OF SMITH>] I 
There is an alternative view of the referential 
attributive ambiguity. It centres on whether or not a 
particular individual is held by the attributee of the 
definite to have some property, and whether, in addition, 
the attributee has a means of knowing who the individual 
was (Fodor 1970:131). In the first case we have the 
attributive sense of a definite description in the second 
the referential. such an account could be accommodated by 
postulating two token EOs- the difference being 
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represented in the value of an attribute- an attribute 
taking the values REF or ATT. These attribute values 
indicate whether the EO contains sufficient information 
to secure an identification of the individual of whom the 
definite description holds. 
As with the analysis of specificity within the PC 
framework we have a choice of interpreting the nature of 
the referential attributive dichotomy. And as with 
specificity the mechanism of partitioned perspectives 
together with a bivalent representation of the dichotomy 
allows us to represent the range of interpretations that 
any logical scopal account could capture. 
Consider an utterance of (5.37). I will assume, for 
this analysis, a featural account of the referential 
ambiguity using the values REF and ATT on on attribute 
slot. Figures 5.28 and 5.29 show part of an EM which S 
could maintain after uttering (5.37). In both cases the 
EO is indirectly instantiated- s knows of John's view of 
the definite only through Jill's view of John. In Figure 
5.29 we see that Jill believes John is using the definite 
description in its referential sense whilst in Figure 
5.28 she believes he is using it attributively. 
(5.37) s to H Jill thinks John believes the murderer of 
Smith is insane 
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FIGURE 5.28 
PART OF S's EM AFTER UTTERANCE OF (5.37) 
.eoll S/Jill/jep [<AO,TOK>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,M OF S><A3,ATT>l I I 





PART OF S's EM AFTER UTTERANCE OF (5.37) 
.eoll S/Jill/jep [<AO,TOK>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,M OF S><A3,REF>l I I 




we can imagine alternative scenarios where S knows 
John to be using the definite in a way incompatible with 
Jill' views. We can represent such situations by invoking 





I .eol I 
I I 
I I 
PART OF S's EM AFTER UTTERANCE OF () 
I 
I 
S/jep C<AO,TOK>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,M OF S><A3,REF> ] I I 
S/H/jep[ l 11 
I I 
I I S/Jill/jep C<AO,TOK>,<Al,MAN>,<A2,M OF S><A3,ATT>l I I 




we should note that as with specificity a logic 
which modelled individuals' beliefs could cope with these 
readings without using the scope of the definite except 
in two positions- effectively using it to represent a 
bivalent interpretation of the noun phrase. Thus the 
formula (5.38) represents the content of the perspectives 
S/jep, S/Hjep, S/Jill/jep and S/H/Jill/jep found in 
Figure 5.30. 







iotaz(M_of_S(z) & insane(z)))))) 
& w=z 
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4 Modelling the Paradoxes 
The apparatus of the PC model which we have developed 
will be applied to some of the interactions of semantic 
ambiguities we looked at in Section One of Chapter Three. 
We saw that such interactions taxed logically based 
scopal accounts. First consider the interaction of 
specificity with responsibility, exemplified in (5.39). 
(5.39) S to H John still wants to marry a witch 
In the case of the above we are concerned particularly to 
get the reading where 'a witch' is non-specific but 
responsibility is S's. Traditional logical modelling of 
the surface form of sentences could not get this reading. 
Our PC representation would deal with (5.39) as shown in 
Figure 5.31. I assume that S has his own view about the 
non-specific indefinite and I have adopted a type based 
analysis of non-specificity. 
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FIGURE 5.31 

















Sep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY JOHN>] 
S/Hep [ ] 
S/H/Sep[ ] 








.doll Sdp [eo4,[Sdcll 
I S/Hdp [ l 
I S/H/Sdp [ l 
!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
where 
dol ISdcl = {witch,sep}{marry John,sep} 
This is a similar analysis to that given on page 272 et 
seq. for ascriptive responsibility, but we have, in 
addition, the specific non-specific ambiguity. 
Let us consider now the additional complication of 
the combinatoric ambiguity interacting with specificity 
and responsibility. In a sentence such as (5.40) we find 
all of these semantic ambiguities. 
(5.40) s to H Every villager wants to marry a witch 
Remember from Chapter Three that in a sentence such as 
(5.40) there are three sets of constraints which when 
taken together standard logical scope treatments have 
difficulty representing. These are shown below: 
Constraints on the linear ordering of operators 
Combinatoric 
i Vy •• Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
ii Vy •• Bel 
Vy •• Ex 
iii Vy •• Bel 
Ex •• Vy 
Specificity Responsibility 
Bel •• Ex W(x) •• Bel 
Bel •• Ex W(y) •• Bel 
Bel •• Ex Bel •• W(x) 
we will adopt a type interpretation of the non-
specific. We will represent the quantif icational 
information as multiple processor perspectives 
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(representing the villagers) related to the relevant EO 
associated with 'a witch'. Figure CS.32) is a PC 
representation using these conventions of the constraints 
embodied in Ci) - namely, a non-specific interpretation 
of the indefinite, S assuming ascriptive responsibility, 
and a many to one interpretation of the combinatoric 
ambiguity. 
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FIGURE 5.32 A PC REPRESENTATION OF (5.40) EMBODYING 
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I .do41 Sdp [eo4,[Sdcll .doll Sdp [eol,[Sdcll I I 
I I S/Hdp [ ] I S/Hdp [ ] I I 
I I S/H/Sdp[ ] I S/H/Sdp [ ] I I 
I I 
I .do21 Sdp [eo2,[Sdcll .do31 Sdp [eo3, [Sdcl l I I 
I I S/Hdp [ ] I S/Hdp [ ] I I 
I I S/H/Sdp [ ] I S/H/Sdp [ ] I I 
I I 
where 
do4 ISdc I = {witch,sep} 
dol ISdc I = {villager,sep} 
do2 ISdc I = {villager,sep} 
do3 ISdc I = {villager,sep} 
where eol-eo3 have structure 
eon ISep [A0,TO>,<Al,VILLAGER>,<A3,M'Y eo4>l I 
IS/Hep [ l I 
IS/H/Sep [ : : l I 
The constraints in Cii) would simply instantiate a 
separate EO representing a separate type of witch for 
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each villager. Figure (5.33) is the relevant part of S's 
EM for such a PC representation. 
FIGURE 5.33 
















.eo41 Sep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY eol>] I 
I S/H/eolep[<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY eol>] I 
I S/eolep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WOMAN>,<A3,MARRY eol>] I 
.eo51 Sep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY eo2>] I 
I S/H/eo2ep[<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY eo2>] I 
I S/eo2ep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WOMAN>,<A3,MARRY eo2>] I 
.eo61 Sep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY -eo3>] I 
I S/H/eolep[<AO,TY>,<Al,WITCH>,<A3,MARRY eo3>] I 
I S/eo3ep [<AO,TY>,<Al,WOMAN>,<A3,MARRY eo3>] I 
I .eol .eo2 .eo3 
'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
where eol-eo3 have structure 
eon ISep [A0,TO>,<Al,VILLAGER>,<A3,M'Y eo4>] I 
IS/Hep [ ] I 
I S/H/Sep [ ] I 
Finally the constraints in Ciii) would be 
represented as in Figure (5.32) except that the issue of 
ascriptive responsibility would not be raised- thus Al 
for eo4 would be the value WITCH in all perspectives. 
were a logic of belief to use predication for 
partitioned perspectives, and individuate individuals as 
holding sets of beliefs then we would relieve logic of 
some of its paradoxes- but only at the cost of relieving 
scope of its explanatory function. 
2fil 
What of the referential attributive ambiguity 
interacting with other semantic ambiguities? In effect, 
we can use PC representations similar to those used for 
the semantic interactions of specificity, responsibility 
and the combinatoric ambiguity. 
An example will serve to illustrate the point. 
Sentence (5.41) , which we met in Chapter Three, has a 
possible interpretation where the definite is attributive 
and the universal has narrow scope relative to the 
definite. This is problematic on a standard scopal 
treatment. 
(5.41) s to H All the villagers know the murderer of 
Smith is insane 
Figure 5.34 shows a possible configuration of S's EM 
after uttering (5.41). We see an EO represented 
attributively with a set of multiple perspectives, of 
villagers holding propositional attitudes which 'refer' 
to the same intentional object- the murderer of Smith, 



































where eo2-eo4 have structure 
eon !Sep [AO,TO>,<Al,VILLAGER> •• l I 
IS/Hep [ l I 
IS/H/Sep [ l I 
The system presented in this chapter separates out 
'specificity', 'referentiality, 'responsibility' and 
quantification. Each is dealt with using a separate 
mechanism; responsibility arises out of perspectival 
partitioning, specificity and referentiality is 
determined in the properties of EOs, quantification is 
dealt with, in a rudimentary manner, using type 
modification, token tableau instantiation, or where 
appropriate multiple processor perspectives. 
It is obviously advantageous to evade the paradoxes 
of scope, and the methods outlined seem to offer a way 
out of the problems. Paradoxically, in advancing a model 
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that puts beliefs centre-stage we have seen ways in which 
logical accounts could represent some of semantic 
phenomena we have been concerned with. But only at the 
expense of abandoning a general application of scope to 
these phenomena. 
5 Radical Opacity within the PC Model 
It should be apparent that the system presented here 
makes no direct use of objects .in the world. How can we 
ever guarantee that our acts of intended reference have 
been successful? The short answer is that we cannot. Once 
we take the processors part we are shrouded in a cloak of 
intentionality. Language becomes in a certain sense 
'radically opaque'. In a 1983 paper I wrote: 
As Intentional Systems who use language, 
build models and generate descriptions of 
the world, we encounter intensionality. 
There are no irref ragable Omniscient 
Observers able to look inside processors 
heads and determine with certainty what is 
true of them, their descriptions, their 
predications and the world. No veridical 
'God's eye view' exists for cognitive 
processors. We as humans cannot stand 
outside ourselves as Intentional Systems. 
Everything we have is a constructed model 
of reality, a model our various modalities 
endeavour to construct. 
But as I have constantly argued this is not a 
council of despair. we can, by appreciating the 
relationship of an intentional system to its environment, 
understand the large degree of concordance and 'success' 
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in linguistic communication. We do have much in common, a 
common Fregean ground. A commonality based on a common 
phylogenetic history, shared cognitive structures, 
similar ontogenetic histories and experience. 
This common ground cannot secure an invariant recipe 
for success and failure in language. Referential 
communication will always be a somewhat 'risky' business. 
Misconstrual is always a danger, sometimes a never 
realised one. In the next chapter I consider data from 
natural discourse which seeks to support this view. It is 
a view of communication as intrinsically opaque and 
liable to misconstrual. But it is communication 
supported by negotiation, requiring the reciprocal 
recognition by processors of each others intentional 
states. In particular the negotiation requires modelling 
the models which other processors' have. In so far as the 
system developed here is especially sensitive to multiple 
perspectives, the data also provides a good test of the 
systems ability to cast insight on the 'mechanics of 
reference'. 
CHAPTER ,.SlX DEPLOYING THE MODEL- REFERENCE IN 
DISCOURSE 
The model presented in the last chapter was used to 
describe the mechanics of simple referential acts. It was 
also used to help account for some of the associated 
phenomena of reference. 
Key elements of the model included- structured 
objects of discourse and knowledge, processing areas for 
these objects, and the use of partitioned perspectives to 
represent multiple user views of these objects. 
The model was able to capture aspects of 'successful 
reference', 'referential misconstrual', and 'referential 
repair'. It was able to pinpoint 'ascriptive -
responsibility', and distinguish the same discourse 
objects referring to different sorts of knowledge 
structure. The model helped us represent some of the 
possibilities of interpretation in opaque contexts which 
traditional logic had originally uncovered. 
In the process of describing the model I made the 
point that it also highlighted the fact that we as 
language users are subject to the phenomenon of what I 
termed 'radical opacity'. If meaning and reference arise 
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out of processors' beliefs and intentions we can never be 
certain that the same terms, employed by different 
processors, will be intensionally and extensionally 
equivalent. I suggested that radical opacity should be 
confronted head on and accepted as a fundamental fact of 
language. Radical opacity should not be regarded as an 
abberration to be side-stepped on occasion, nor as a 
nuisance for which special semantic machinery is 
required. 
Radical opacity would seem to place at risk 
'communicative success', indeed properly understood it 
changes our notion of what success is. The communicative 
risk which is a consequence of radical opacity has its 
roots in the intentionality of behaviour. Communicative 
risk arises out of three inter-related features of 
intentional systems: 
1. The essentially idiosyncratic and 
subjective nature of the 'semantic 
criteria' associated by different 
processors with linguistic terms. 
2. The possibility of misjudging the 
intentional states of other processors; 
their perspectives on opjects, their 
understanding of linguistic expressions, 
and even of the top level intentional 
strategies and assumptions which other 
processors have in play. 
3. Most of our concepts are incomplete. we 
do not have full specifications of the 
objects to which our representations 
correspond in the world. This is in part 
a consequence of the incompleteness of the 
perceptual process. This may be an 
unavoidable feature of any intentional 
system's knowledge of its environment. 
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In this chapter I will be looking at discourse data 
which highlights both the intentional aspects of language 
generation and interpretation, and the attendant 
riskiness of such processes. The first part will 
concentrate on the use by processors of their estimation 
of the knowledge states of their interlocutors. We will 
look at how this 'derivative knowledge' is used in 
performing referential acts. The second part of the 
chapter looks at examples of referential misconstrual and 
attempts to trace their origin back to intentional 
sources. Analysis of the data also uncovers some of the 
generative and interpretive strategies which processors 
use in various sorts of discourse reference. These 
strategies reflect the processor-centered and non-
absolute nature of reference itself. 
we can see this and the next chapter as further 
applications of the model developed so far. The 
referential phenomena which we will consider demonstrates 
the opacity of reference no less then traditional opacity 
problems. 
SECTION ~ THE DATA .EQ.B INTENTIONALLY PERIVED 
REFERENCE 
The data under consideration were collected from two 
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populations, 16-year old Scottish secondary school 
children and Edinburgh University students (Footnote 
6.1). Subjects worked in pairs • Participant A was 
provided with a map of an area containing a number of 
dangerous natural features and a route across the map 
which avoided these dangers. Participant A was told that 
it was his job to describe the route to Participant B so 
that B could mark the route on his map. Participant B's 
map contained most of the features on A's map, but not 
all. Moreover, his map also contained features which did 
not appear on A's map. They were told that the maps were 
drawn by two different explorers and so they were aware 
that there could be differences between the two maps. The 
two pairs of maps used to elicit the data are shown 
overleaf together with the instructions used. 
There are several points to notice about the design 
of this task. Firstly, no single participant commands 
all the relevant knowledge. Although in some sense A is 
invested with authority, B has his own, sometimes 
incompatible, information. In the optimal case each 
participant ought to be sensitive not only to his own 
view of the world but also to his partner's view of how 
the world is. This of course makes it an ideal design for 
Footnote 6.1. The opportunity to elicit some of this data 
in support of my own research was provided by SED Project 
JHH/190/1, under the direction of Dr Gillian Brown. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MAP TASK 
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE ROUTE DESCRIBER 
(A) 
YOU AND YOUR PARTNER HAVE BOTH GOT A MAP 
OF THE SAME PLACE. YOU'VE GOT A ROUTE 
MARKED ON YOUR MAP. ITS THE ONLY SAFE 
ROUTE THROUGH ALL THE DANGERS. YOUR 
PARTNER HASN'T GOT A ROUTE MARKED ON THEIR 
MAP. YOUR JOB IS TO DESCRIBE THE ROUTE TO 
YOUR PARTNER SO THAT HE/SHE CAN MARK IT ON 
THEIR MAP. YOU HAVE TO DESCRIBE IT 
EXACTLY BECAUSE ITS THE ONLY SAFE ROUTE. 
THE MAPS HAVE BEEN DRAWN BY DIFFERENT 
EXPLORERS, SO THEY MIGHT NOT BE BOTH THE 
SAME. THERE COULD BE SOME DIFFERENCES. 
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE ROUTE DRAWER (B) 
YOU AND YOUR PARTNER HAVE BOTH GOT A MAP 
OF THE SAME PLACE. HE/SHE HAS GOT A ROUTE 
MARKED ON HIS/HER MAP YOUR JOB IS TO 
FINISH UP WITH THAT ROUTE MARKED ON YOUR 
MAP. LISTEN TO WHAT HE/SHE SAYS AND ASK 
HIM/HER ANY QUESTIONS YOU WANT. YOU MUST 
DRAW IT EXACTLY. ITS THE ONLY SAFE ROUTE. 
THE MAPS HAVE BEEN DRAWN BY DIFFERENT 
EXPLORERS SO THEY MIGHT NOT BE THE SAME, 
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investigating the role of embedded perspectives in 
discourse reference. 
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A second feature of this design is that for 
participant A the route is known. This constrains an 
important intentional element- his focus of attention for 
the next move on the map. For B the route is unknown. His 
intentional focus strategy may be quite different, B may 
take in and ref er to much larger areas of the map than A 
had intended him to take account of. 
Thirdly, the properties of the map are, in general, 
unpredictable. Nothing can be assumed from one feature 
about its relation to other features. Of course, there 
are domains where certain features may be n~cessary, or 
required to be in certain relations to one another. 
A fourth point concerns the considerable cognitive 
burden this task places on A and B. Participants should 
attempt not only to plan and execute, or interpret and 
follow, a set of instructions, but they should do so 
whilst attempting to accommodate each other's viewpoints. 
Lastly I should mention that the subjects who 
undertook this task showed every sign of enjoying it and 
of wanting to perform it successfully. 
Having outlined the nature of the task I will now 
discuss why this type of task should be thought to 
provide data which can cast light on the mechanisms of 
reference and of its linguistic manifestations in 
discourse. 
The justification for devising and running such 
tasks is that they provide a way of eliciting 
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'controlled data'. One can control the task so as to 
elicit comparable data from many different subjects. This 
provides a set of linguistic profiles which can be 
compared one with another, checked over for similarities, 
regularities etc. A task such as the map task allows 
control of input, so that the analyst can discern the 
specific information which it may be presumed a 
participant has access to when he produces a particular 
utterance. 
Also in this type of task one can be reasonably sure 
at the outset that the particular information relevant to 
the task is new to all the participants - that we are not 
witnessing the discourse as part of some longer term 
discourse between them. 
The map task allows us to look at language 
spontaneously produced by the participants. 
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These 'methodological' features of controlled data 
elicitation allow us to look for regularities in language 
use, to relate these regularities to a model. The model 
aims to represent aspects of a discourse participant's 
state which are crucial to understanding acts of 
reference in discourse. 
SECTION .TIY.Q CONSTITUTING REFERENCE- THE ~ OF 
EMBEDDED MODELS 
Some of the knowledge relevant to this task is what a 
processor can see on his own map (specifying some of the 
content of his activated EM) (Footnote 6.2). These will 
include directly instantiated EOs representing various 
features on the map. Recall that a directly instantiated 
object is one on which a processor has an immediate or 
'primary' perspective, ie for A his 'aep' perspective, 
for B his 'bep' perspective. One of the most striking 
first observations about the data is that 'discourse 
communication' does not draw its 'referential content' 
exclusively from primary epistemi.c perspectives. 
Of course there are cases, exemplified in extracts 
6.1-6.4, where a participant relies on the objects and 
Footnote 6.2. This knowledge will have entered through 
the visual modality. Of course this knowledge may rely on 
or be augmented by all sorts of background information 
for interpretation as well as existing notions of how to 
go about describing and solving a problem. 
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their associated properties which they have in their 
primary EM perspectives. Objects which they further 
assume satisfy the condition of being 'mutually known'. 
For any object or feature, say the start in Mapl, this is 
modelled by A's assuming a set of EO perspectives for the 
feature as shown in Figure 6.1. I should point out that 
in this and the next chapter I will assume objects on the 
map evoke token EOs in the EMs of participants. 
FIGURE 6.1 
Part of A's active EM __ ~~~~~~~~~~~-
1 
l.eoll aep [<Al,BOT RIGHT>,<A2,START>] I 
I I a/bep C ] I 
I I a/b/ aep [_ : ] I 
I 
'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
The situation represented in Figure 6.1 would seem to be 
just the sort that underlies the assumption of the 
identity of maps, features and information that informs 
the initial utterances of extract 6.1-6.4 (Footnote 6.3). 
Extract 6.1 




right you go + through + the middle + 
between the middle in between the swamp 
and the palm trees 
uhu 
then + left turn left round the swamp + 
and go under the waterfall 
Footnote 6.3. In the transcriptions a '+' symbol 
represents a pause of approximately 1 to 2 seconds dura-
tion, '++' a pause of 2 to 4 seconds duration. 
Extract 6.2 
Map 1 SS & S6 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: Go down a bit from the palm trees + and 
go along +.go up and round round the swamp+ 
and go down and round the waterfall ++ go 
between the two mountains ++ and up and over 
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the bridge ++ and then + keep going along and 
round ++ and then just keep going straight on till 
you get to the castle 
Extract 6.3 




start in the south east corner and go north 
west past palm beach and around the swamp 
go + north west and past the swamp and around 
the swamp + how far ? 
+ well north past the swamp and around the swamp 
and go under the waterfall 
Extract 6.4 







just go + start from the bottom 
whereabout ? 
go up + palm beach 
right 
then you just + go down from the waterfall 
right 
In fact in all these extracts A's assumptions of 
'congruence' are confirmed and apparently shared by B 
(Footnote 6.4). This occurs despite the fact that in 
extracts 6.1 and 6.3 discourse has involved reference to 
a feature .th§ swamp which B does not know about. It 
appears that some kind of bridging inference is being 
made that equates the crocodile~ for B with A's 
swamp. However, this assumption, as we shall see, is by 
no means always made. The over-riding strategy adopted 
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by the two processors and informing reference to 
discourse objects in these extracts seems to be an 
assumption of equivalence of the featural information 
they share, to assume that their perspectives are the 
same. This happens despite the clear initial 
instructions that they may expect differences between 
their maps. 
Of course, A may not simply assume congruence of the 
maps. In extracts 6.5-6.8 we have evidence of A 
attempting to establish the content of B's EM; what EOs 
he has, what perspectives on these EOs. This requires A 
to be able to operate with embedded models. A's questions 
in all these extracts seem to contribute to the 
construction of a detailed appreciation of B's point of 
view. In terms of the P-C descriptive system this amounts 
to the construction by A of 'a/bep' perspectives on the 
EOs contained in A's EM. 
Extract 6.5 
Map 1 Sl3 & Sl4 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: have you got wee palm trees aye ? 
2 B: uhu 
3 A: right go just + a wee bit along to them 
have you got a swamp ? 
4 B: er 
5 A: right well just go + have you got a waterfall ? 
Footnote 6.4~ Extract 6.2 is unusual in being a complete 
potted set of route instructions with no active partici-
pation by B. 
Extract 6.6 




have you got palm trees, palm beach on 
your map ? 
aye 
well start + about an inch down from the 
palm beach + and you go up + 
a couple of inches + have you got 
a swamp on your map ? 
Extract 6.7 











do you have a blue bay on your map Sandra ? 
yes I do 
bottom right hand corner of the map 
yes 
to the left of there is there a palm beach ? 
yes 
yes + right + erm + that means that there 
should should be approximately two 
inches of land + from + 
directly below palm beach to the coast again 
erm yes 
erm +there's + starting from there do you 
have a start marked ? 
yes I do 
Extract 6.8 









do you have a starting point there ? 
yeh my starting point is about half an 
an inch from the top 
yeh 
and about two inches from the right hand side 
urm + have you got a volcano ? 
yes I have 
good + have you got a graveyard ? 
yes •••• 
Consider extract 6.6, we can use our P-C descriptive 
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system to model: aspects of A's likely state prior to his 
utterance of ClA), the introduction of a new object of 
discourse after A's utterance ClA), subsequent 
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modifications which A might make to his knowledge 
structures in the light of B's reply C2B). Figures 6.2-
6.4 show such progressive representations of A's states 
through 6.6. Similar representations could be constructed 
for all the interactions presented in extracts 6.5-6.6. 
FIGURE 6.2 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF 
A's STATE PRIOR TO UTTERANCE (lA) OF 6.6 
Part of A'a Active EM.~----~--~------~--~ 
I 
l.eoll aep 
I I a/bep? 
I I a/b/aep? 
[<Al,BO RHS>,<A2,P BEACH>] I 
I 
I 






















PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (lA) OF 6.6 
Part of A'a Active EM----------------~-----
1 
I .eol I aep 
I I a/bep? 
I I a/b/aep? 









.doll adp [eol,[adcll 
I a/bdp Ceo?, l 




adc={have you got palm beach ?,a/bep} 
FIGURE 6.4 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (2B) OF 6.6 
Part of A'a Active EM.~---------------------
1 
I .eoll aep [<Al,BO RHS>,<A2,P BEACH>] I 
I I a/bep [<Al , > , <A2 , > l I 







.doll adp [eol,[adc][bdcll 
I a/bdp C l 
I a/b/adp[ : l 
'~-----------------------------------------
where 
adc={have you got palm beach ?,a/bep} 
bdc={yes,a/bep} 
A number of points are raised by these P-C 
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representations. In Figure 6.2, A's uncertainty about B's 
view of a particular EO, in this case 'eol' representing 
the map feature Palm Beach, is quite radical. This is 
uncertainty not to do with the particular value of an 
attribute but with whether A has a feature at all. A '?' 
symbol in the perspectival perspectives themselves, ie 
embedded perspectives 'a/bep?' and 'a/b/aep?', represents 
uncertainty as to whether B has a feature at all. 
Utterance (lA) is clearly designed to answer A's 
doubt. There are a number of noteworthy points in Figure 
6.3. Firstly, the description 'Palm Beach' is 
represented as originating out of 'a/bep', how can this 
be when A is in doubt as to the contents of 'a/bep'? A's 
discourse contribution is of an interrogative kind and 
also mentions explicitly B's perspective, 'Have you got 
r •••• l on your map?'. we can think of (lA) as an 
hypothesis A is advancing about a possible perspectival 
configuration which B may have on an EO Cif B has that 
object at all). A uses the description in an attempt to 
access B's view of 'eol' if such a view exists. This is 
different than the case in which A uses a simple 
declarative form containing a description D but no 
explicit intensional operator, D can then be regarded as 
arising out of 'aep' Cin this case it is assumed that 
equivalent modes of description ~ available at the 
perspectives 'a/bep', and 'a/b/aep'). 
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In Figure 6.3 the DO introduced as 'dol' has two 
perspectives, 'a/bdc' and 'a/blade', which contain an 
associate EO symbol 'eo?'. This indicates that A is 
unsure with which, if any, of the potential EOs B can 
associate the DO (Footnote 6.5). 
It might be thought that after ClA) A may assume 
that B realises that A must have the object referred to 
as 'palm beach' even if he CB) does not. Thus A is 
licenced to make an immediate modification to his 
'a/b/aep' perspective on 'eol'. However, strictly 
speaking, A should make no such modification until he has 
some indication from B that B heard and/or understood 
what he said. 
Moving on to Figure 6.4 we see that B's reply C2B) 
confirms to A that they do mutually share the object 
under discussion. Notice that A is represented as 
assuming that they share the same view about the location 
of 'eol'. In fact this property has not been explicitly 
mentioned by A, but utterance C3A) suggests that an 
assumption of common location has.been made. There is 
substantial evidence in the data that if a feature is 
discussed and some way of describing it is found to be 
mutually shared then much additional information is 
Footnote 6.5. The case where B might have answered 'no' 
to A's query about a feature will be dealt later in this 
chapter. 
310 
assumed to be common. For example, if it is discovered 
that there are features on the two participants' maps 
which are called by the same name then their location, 
relative position to other objects, may well be assumed 
to be common also. This issue will be reconsidered when 
we look at the types of interpretive strategy which 
processors bring to this sort of task. 
A final aspect of these extracts, and of this task, 
is whether or not third level perspectives such as 
'a/b/aep' or 'b/a/bep' are ever used by the processors 
themselves. As they stand they might be regarded as a 
useful convention for indicating the tacit recognition of 
subjective mutual knowledge. But are the third level 
perspectives ever employed by the processors in this kind 
of communicative exchange? There is some evidence that 
they are? consider the co-operative responses to the 
questions posed in (lA) of 6.6, CSA) of 6.7 and ClA) of 
6.6. It seems that in all cases the sensitive respondent 
realises that A is trying to construct a view of B's 
perspective. The consequence of this must be B's 
recognition that the perspective 'b/a/bep' is at stake. 
Direct evidence of the utility of these third level 
perspectives will be discussed in the next chapter when 
we consider how processors are able to cancel the 
presuppositions which their interlocutors have of their 
knowledge states. 
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I want to consider now a set of extracts where, in 
attempting to construct a model of B's viewpoint, A comes 
across differences between their maps. Extracts 6.9-6.12 
all deal, for the sake of simplicity, with 'the same 
difference on Map 1 where A has a feature the bridge 
crossing the feature .aig River. B has the .B..ig River 
feature but does not have a bridge crossing it. 
Extract 6.9 






do you have + er a bridge crossing big river ? 
no 
to the top right hand side + do you have 
a big river 
er sorry + yes I do have a big river + er 
there's no bridge 
there is no bridge ++ you now have to cross 
the bridge + the bridge is + erm + I would say 
+ two + and a half + two and a quarter inches 
up + the river + up river 
Extract 6.10 









••• do you have a bridge? 
no I don't 
well there is a bridge + erm + if you + 
if you draw a line between lions den and the + 
and the + mountains 
yeh 
if you draw a horizontal line where it 
intersects the the river · 
yeh 
that's about where the bridge is 
ok 
Extract 6.11 




and then + go up about and over the bridge 
I've not got a bridge I've got a lion's den 
and a wood 
have you got a river ? 
Extract 6.12 





you go to the + the big river + and you go 
over a bridge ++ got that ? + have you got 
it yet ? 
I've not got the bridge where's the bridge ? 
at the big river 
what part of the big river ? 
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How might we describe these interactions in terms of 
the P-C descriptive system? Configurations that prompt A 
to ask B questions such as ClA) in 6.9, or ClA) in 6.10 
are those in which A is unsure whether B has certain 
features on his map. Whilst in (lA) of 6.11, A makes an 
assumption of the commonality of a feature only to have 
it discredited. How should we represent the detection of 
such differences by the participants? 
Let's take extract 6.9 and concentrate on A's state 
after (2B) with respect to the bridge feature. What 
modification should he make to his EM? Figure 6.5 
represents what is perhaps the most appropriate 
modification. B has no information of her own about the 
feature, she does not have the object on her map, her 
only knowledge is derivative from A's. But whilst B may 
not have any information derived from her primary 
perspective, simply by its introduction into discourse 
the feature has in some sense become a mutually shared 
object. This despite the fact that the perspectives 
'a/bep', 'bep', and 'b/a/bep' are empty of content. 
(Footnote 6.6) 
FIGURE 6.5 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (2B) OF 6.9 
Part of A'a Active EM.~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
I .eo81 aep [<Al,ON B RIV>,<A2,BRIDGE>] I 
I I a/bep I 





I .do81 adp [eo8, [adc] [bdc]] 
I I a/bdp [ l 





adc={a bridge crossing big river ?,a/bep} 
bdc={no,a/bep} 
If we turn to plausible P-C repre~entations for B herself 
Footnote 6.6. Notice that a condition in which A believed 
B to have no knowledge of the bridge feature is quite 
different than the perspectival configuration which A has 
after ClA) when A must suppose that there is a new 
mutually known object of knowledge. In the first case 
the perspective on 'eo8' given below is all that could be 
present. 
eo8 I aep [<Al,ON B RIV>,<A2,BRIDGE>] I 
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we see that immediately after hearing ClA) and on 
checking her EM she discovers there is no EO for her to 
associate the DO with, see Figure 6.6 (notice that there 
is no EO associate for the DO at this stage, represented 
as •_•). We might suppose that from this state she moves 
to instantiate an EO, she has knowledge of a new object, 
if only from a derivative perspective. This instantiation 
of a new EO is shown in Figure 6.7, it is a 'minimally 
mutually known' object, B is represented as having three 
perspectives on the object only one of which, 'b/aep', is 
the repository of the information B has about the object 
(Footnote 6.7). 
Footnote 6.7. We can not always be certain about the 
assumed knowledge and beliefs which the route drawers 
have. This is because they often do not say much, and the 
language produced in this task is one of the most effec-
tive 'windows' into the intentional states of the proces-
sor. 
FIGURE 6.6 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF B's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (lA) OF 6~9 













.do5 I bdp [ 
I b/adp [ 
I b/a/bdp £ : 
























PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF B's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (2B) OF 6.9 
Part of B's Active EM 
---~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
I .eo3 I bep 
I I b/aep [<Al,ON B RIV>,<A2,BRIDGE>l I 






I .dos I bdp [eo3, [bdcl [ adcl] 
I I b/adp [ l 






adc={a bridge crossing big river ?,b/a/bep} 
bdc={no,bep} 
There is a need to say something about how the 
contents of direct primary perspectives can be formed 
when information about an object is obtained in a 
descriptive, derivative manner. In the last chapter I 
talked of the authority and sincerity assumptions which 
processors make about their fellow discourse 
participants. In all the cases I discussed not only were 
the objects of knowledge mutually known but each 
processor believed that his interlocutor had primary 
perspectives containing information about the objects. In 
the event that a processor, say A, believed that the 
authority and sincerity conditions held and made a novel 
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ascription to an object, then A believed that a fellow 
discourse participant, say B, would adopt the 
modification so that it became part of the contents of 
his view of the object. In this way information was 
inherited from one perspective, say 'b/aep', to another, 
say 'bep'. Of course, this embodies a view about how we 
come by our knowledge of the world. In fact the problem 
is reminiscent of one faced by Russell and mentioned in 
chapter 1. He was convinced that all the knowledge which 
a person has is ultimately grounded in a Principle 
Acquaintance. This acquaintance must be direct. This 
raises for knowledge acquired through the say so of 
others Cie knowledge by Description). such situations 
arise frequently in the extracts we will be examining. 
The problem is to decide when descriptively received 
information constitutes secure knowledge which the 
recipient adopts for his own. What are the grounds, 
either necessary or sufficient, for such indirect 
knowledge being promoted to the contents of a direct 
primary perspective? Russell found the problem 
intractable, I do not think I am better able to provide 
answers. However, there are a number of observations one 
can make about the kind of knowledge transfer involved in 
the task detailed here. In the map task, apart from A's 
say-so, there are certain features (such as the bridge on 
Map 1) which B is only descriptively acquainted with. 
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There are other features in which this type of situation 
is reversed for the two processors. Let us stipulate 
that in these cases whilst A or B can come to know of 
another object which they do not have, they do not and 
cannot form a direct perspective on it in the context of 
this task. This effectively side steps the whole issue of 
the grounds required to establish any content in primary 
perspectives. Since epistemologists cannot agree on the 
matter it would be inappropriate for me to lay down the 
relevant conditions. Against the charge that this is 
exactly what I did in the last chapter I can take a 
minimalist stand and argue that wherever a change in a 
primary perspective occurred for an interpreter then we . 
could reanalyse the modification using the conservative 
or cautious modification of EMs outlined on page ***· 
This avoids any commitment to the conditions for changing 
the epistemological content of primary perspectives. 
Three of the cited extracts, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.12, 
provide explicit evidence of the discourse participants 
moving beyond the initial detection of incongruence. 
Participant A in 6.9, 6.10 and B in 6.12 attempt to 
obtain more information about an object which they and 
their interlocutors now know they do not share. Aspects 
of the form of interactions involving incongruent 
features will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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In extracts 6.13-6.18 processors can be regarded as 
forming secondary perspectives on objects which they do 
not have marked on their own maps. Subsequently they use 
knowledge about these indirectly instantiated discourse 
referents in acts of referential communication. 
In extract 6.13, obtained from university students, 
we can see that the part of the map they are discussing 
is one where participant A does not have a particular 
feature, a waterhole, whereas participant B does. 
Extract 6.13 











I have a waterhole 
oh I have not got a waterhole + where ++ 
do you have a ruined village ? 
no 
no + erm 
is it ++ my waterhole is erm + 
between the graveyard and the volcano 
but a bit down 
er 
So I should just avoid it 
You want to go just above that 
OK, yes 
so your curve goes just above the waterhole 
In 6.13 we see that speaker A discovers from 
utterance ClB) the incongruency between their two maps. 
She informs B of this difference ~n utterance C2A), and 
asks a question to establish whether a further feature is 
shared. Eventually, after receiving information from B 
as to the whereabouts of the waterhole, A 'refers 
successfully' in two utterances to an object on which she 
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has information derived from only a secondary 
perspective, ie 'a/bep'. In the first instance we have 
the use, in utterance C 8A), of a demonstrative pronoun. 
On the second occasion, ClOA), reference is sustained by 
A's explicitly using the definite description 'the 
waterhole'. Participant A issues instructions as to how 
B should draw her route relative to this feature. 
Extract 6.14 revolves round a discussion of the same 
part of Map 2 by another pair of university students. The 
extract opens with A and B discussing the various 
f eatural differences. 
Extract 6.14 









so you have a dead tree there as well 
besides the ruined village 
and where is your waterhole ? 
my waterhole + it + its a + an oval waterhole + 
and the left edge of its oval bit is directly 
underneath the right hand gravestone + the last 
right hand gravestone + and about an inch down 
OK + have you got ~n old temple marked ? 
no 
well I think it must be directly + well it must 
be quite ++ just underneath the + erm + 
waterhole in fact 
near a stony desert ? 
In utterance ClA) A attempts to get a clear understanding 
of what B has at a particular point and B responds with 
information in which she uses an already pre-established 
incongruent feature Ca ruined village which A has but B 
does not) to act as a referential anchor for A's building 
a picture of the whereabouts of B's features. So 
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utterance C2B) provides us with the first example, in 
this extract, of successful reference being achieved via 
information from a secondary perspective - namely, B's 
use of the definite description 'the ruined village' 
which has its origin in 'b/aep'. In utterance (3A) A 
attempts to discover where the waterhole is located 
(previously discovered by A to be present only on B's 
map). After B's careful description of its location 
relative to a mutually shared feature, the 9raveyard, A 
seems to indicate that she has placed the waterhole and 
now asks whether B has another feature the old temple. 
On discovering in C6B) that B does not have this feature 
A goes on to provide B with information about its 
location in terms of A's understanding of the location of 
B's feature the waterhole, an understanding which for A 
is derived entirely from the 'a/bep' perspective, and 
which allows A to use the definite description 'the 
waterhole' in C7A) as a successful referential device. 
An interesting referential tactic is observed in 
extract 6.15. Again the extract exemplifies the 
dependency a participant may have on his understanding of 
other processors• information states in order to effect a 
successful referential act himself. At this point in Map 
2 participant A has a ruined village, whereas participant 
B has a dead ~ at the same place on her map. 
Extract 6.15 
Map 2 Sl & S2 subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 









else between the graveyard and 
the crashed airplane? 
there is a dead tree near the graveyard 
erm + whereabouts is the dead tree? 
it's erm +to the left and below 
the graveyard 
to the left and below + erm + 
well that's where my ruined village is 
uhu 
so + erm + you want to go + 
between the ruined village and the graveyard 
uhu 
erm + and you want to go ++ erm ++ head ++ 
down towards the bottom right hand side of 
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your page ++ erm ++ about ++ making a slight 
curve+ to the right++ so you're going between 
the dead tree and the graveyard 
The interesting thing about this extract is that 
participant A first co-locates her ruined village with 
participant B's dead~ in utterance CSA). She then 
uses information from her own primary perspective to 
refer to this position in utterance (7A) when she uses 
'the ruined village'. Notice that B's utterance C6B), 
suggests that she has been able to interpret A's 
referential act even though from B's point of view the 
definite description arises out of a 'b/aep' perspective. 
Later in 6.15 A uses her perspective of participant B's 
perspective, this occurs in (9A) when A uses the definite 
description 'the dead tree'. 
Moving on to Map 1 I have selected three extracts 
from our sixteen year old subjects which demonstrate a 
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similar facility to that displayed by our older subjects 
in extracts 6.13-6.15. 
Extract 6.16 














Have you got wee palm trees aye? 
uhu 
right go just + a wee bit along to them + 
have you got a swamp ? 
er 
right just go + have you got a waterfall? 
aye 
go + between the palm trees and the waterfall 
but I've got crocodiles 
you've- got what? 
crocodiles 
whereabout? 
In between the waterfall and the palm trees 
right + go in between the crocodiles and the palm trees 
In utterance Cl3A) participant A refers to a feature 
using a description which originates from his 
understanding of participant B's map. This understanding 
involves an appreciation of what objects with what 
properties and descriptions each participant has, and 
placing this information in appropriate perspectival 
partitions. Participant A does not have crocodiles on 
his map. He first discovers in C8B) that B has 
crocodiles and then finds out their location. He then 
uses this data, supplied by B, to construct the definite 
description 'the crocodiles' to refer to a referent he 
has no direct access to. 
Extracts 6~17 and 6.18 deal with the same part of 
Map 1. In each of the extracts 6.16-6.18 one could argue 
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that there has been a collapse, by the two participants, 
of the features crocodiles and swamp into the same 
spatial location. After all these two features on Map 1 
are certainly not semantically incompatible. 
Nevertheless, even if a reduction of two features into 
one spatial location has occurred, in all these extracts 
participant A uses a description derived from his 
perspective of B's view of the spatial location. 
Extract 6.17 




••• have you got a swamp on your map? 
crocodiles 
yeh well + you avoid the crocodiles 
+ you go round them + go round 
in a circle + round them + 
so that + have you got a waterfall? 
Extract 6.18 
Map 1 S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: go + across + towards the swamp ++ and draw a 
line round the swamp 
2 B: swamp where about is the swamp ? 
3 A: on your left 
4 B: where the crocodiles are ? 
5 A: dunno+ where's crocodiles ? 
6 B: left of palm beach 
7 A: aye + draw a + draw a line round the crocodiles 
Thus far the discourse interactions have been 
described without the explicit use of the P-C descriptive 
system, although the essential mechanism used in 
explaining these interactions, is that of perspectival 
partitions on the objects of our knowledge. A set of P-C 
representations is provided in Figures 6.8-917. They 
purport to model the instruction giver (participant A) 
for an extended version of the discourse contained in 
6.13. This larger extract is given below as 6.13' 
(Footnote 6.8). 
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The P-C representations reveal the dynamic nature of 
referential generation and construal. One can represent a 
processor's growing appreciation of another processor's 
knowledge states. The P-C representations highlight the 
incremental nature of discourse; as discourse proceeds 
new objects are introduced, settings and foci are 
changed. If discourse is pulled back to earlier foci 
then the modes of description of these earlier discourse 
objects have to be recoverable. In all these respects 


























you have a start marked do you ? 
uhu 
just below the start mark you have a volcano + 
do you ? 
uhu 
right + erm + I want you to make a semi-circular 
curve + erm + downwards + er + just passing the 
volcano + er + about half a centimetre to its 
left ++ now do you have a graveyard ? 
yes I do + so I make a semicircle towards the 
graveyard + 
yes 
would it be a wide one 
erm + your + your semicircle wants to be + well 
erm + you want to go 
do I go down and left ? 
yes~thats right+ forming a semicircle+ and 
stop it + erm just + half a centimetre to the 
right of the graveyard + OK 
I have a waterhole 
oh I have not got a waterhole + where ++ 
do you have a ruined village ? 
no 
no + erm 
is it ++ my waterhole is erm + 
between the graveyard and the volcano but 
a bit down 
er 
so I should just avoid it 
you want to go just above that 
ok, yes 
so your curve goes just above the waterhole 
Footnote 6.8. The choice of extracts was determined by 
the degree to which the language used made explicit the 
likely states of the participant and his view of his 
interlocutor. I wanted an extract which left A's presup-
positions and assumptions in little doubt. There is of 
course a methodological point at issue here, in deciding 
which P-C representations best capture A's state we are 
taking the stance of objective analysts, but we are not, 
of course, infallible in our ascription and subsequent 
description of these states. 
In order that the Figures do not become inordinately 
large I have used the simple device of having the EO and 
DO labels populate the P-C area and then only expanding 
the EOs and DOs under the P-C areas if they are newly 
introduced or modified in some way. 
FIGURE 6.8 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (lA) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM~~~~~~~ 
I 
I • eol .eo3 
I 








.eol laep [<Al,TOP LHS>,<A2,START>l 
la/bep? 
la/b/aep? 
.dol ladp [eol,[adcll 
la/bdp Ceo?, l 
la/b/adp[eo?, l 
where 
adc={have you got a start ?,a/bep} 
Notice in Figure 6.8 that a DO has been introduced by the 
act of referential instigation at (lA). This utterance 
indicates that A is checking whether or not B has the 
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feature start. Until she gets some feedback A is not 
strictly entitled to make any modification to her EOs, 
not even the third level perspective on 'eol' is modified 
at this stage. 
FIGURE 6.9 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (2B) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 
I 








.eol laep [<Al,TOP RHS>,<A2,START>] 
la/bep [ : ] 
la/b/aep [ ] 
.dol I adp [eol, [adc] [bdc]] 
Ja/bdp [eol, ] 
Ja/b/adp[eol, : ] 
where 
adc={have you got a start ?,a/bep} 
bdc={yes,a/bep} 
B's response at C2B) confirms to A that B does have a 
feature described as 'start'. This enables information to 
be propagate to the two perspectives ., a/bep' and 
'a/b/aep'. Notice that they also inherit information 
concerning the location of this feature. But no 
information about location has been mentioned, what 
329 
licences this assumption about A's belief states? As 
analysts we are able to look at future discourse and 
determine what these later utterances imply for the 
earlier states of the processors. Since at C3A) A 
doesn't locate the start but begins describing the route 
relative to it, it seems that the assumption embodied in 
6.9 is directly made by processor A. 
FIGURE 6.10 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (3A) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 
I 








.eo2 laep [<Al,UNDER START>,<A2,VOLCANO>l 
la/bep? 
la/b/aep? 
.do2 ladp [eo2,[adcll 
la/bdp [eo?, l 
la/b/adp[eo?, l 
where 
adc={have you got a volcano ?,a/bep} 
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show a similar interaction to that 
represented in 6.8 and 6.6. In this case A actually does 
explicitly define a location for the feature volcano, 
330 
although it is relative to start whose location, as we 
have seen, never was checked. so far from A's point of 
view the language in this extract is aimed at, and 
generated from,B's primary perspective. The checks, 
hypotheses and feedback, which constitute the various 
discourse contributions are associated with 'a/bep'. 
FIGURE 6.11 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (4B) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 
I 








.eo2 laep [<Al,UNDER START>,<A2,VOLCANO>l 
la/bep [ l 
la/b/aep [ l 
.do2 ladp [eo2,[adcl [bdcll 
la/bdp [eo2, l 
la/b/adp[eo2, : l 
where 
adc={have you got a volcano ?,a/bep} 
bdc={yes,a/bep} 
FIGURE 6.12 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE CSA) OF 6.13 
I 
I Part of A'a Active EM 
I I 
I I .eol .eo3 
I I 
I I .eo2 .eoS 
I I 
I 
I A's DM 
I I 
I I .dol .do3 
I I 
I I .do2 
I I 
I 
.eo3 laep [<Al,L OF VOLC>,<A2,G'YARD>] 
la/bep? 
la/b/aep? 
• do3 I adp [eo3, [ adcl] 
la/bdp [eo?, l 
la/b/adp[eo?, ] 
where 
adc={have you got a graveyard ?,a/bep} 
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Once more the interaction represented in Figures 6.12 and 
6.13 is identical in form to those in Figures 6.8-6.11: 
the introduction of a DO with the intention by A to 
discover if B has an existing object of knowledge to 
associate with the DO, and the subsequent confirmation by 
B that he has. 
FIGURE 6.13 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (6B) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 
I 









.eo3 laep [<Al,L OF VOLC>,<A2,G'YARD>l 
I a/bep [ : l 
la/b/aep [ l 
.do3 ladp [eo3,[adcl[bdcll 
la/bdp [eo3, l 
la/b/adp[eo3, : l 
where 
adc={have you got a graveyard ?,a/bep} 
bdc={yes,a/bep} 
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After (6B) there occurs in extract 6.13' discussion about 
the shape of the line which is being drawn in as the 
route. Strictly speaking the route itself constitutes a 
feature, a feature which A has and which B is trying to 
duplicate. I have not included this feature, nor the 
discussions that revolve round it as a discourse object, 
in any of the task analyses. I have chosen instead to 
look at discourse reference relative to the less 
abstract, more concrete features. 
FIGURE 6.14 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (12B) OF 6.13 
I 
I Part of A'a Active EM 
I I 
I I .eol .eo3 
I I 
I I .eo2 .eoS 
I I 
I 
I A's DM 
I I 
I I .dol .do3 
I I 




I a/bep [<Al , 
la/b/aep? 
? 
.do4 ladp [eo4,[bdcll 
la/bdp [eo4, l 






> ,<A2 ,W' HOLE>] 
bdc={I have a waterhole,a/bep} 
333 
Figure 6.14 is of interest because we see that A has now 
discovered that B has a feature, a waterhole, which he 
does not have. Figure 6.14 is a representation of A after 
he has instantiated a new object of knowledge 'eo4' in 
response to the discourse object 'do4'. This EO has 
content only by virtue of B's descriptions, the only 
perspective containing information about 'eo4' is 
therefore 'a/bep'. Notice that I have not filled in a 
value for the location attribute of 'eo4'. Clearly if B 
has not mentioned its whereabouts, and A does not have 
334 
the feature then A cannot make any detailed assumptions 
about its location. 
FIGURE 6.15 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (13A) OF 6.13 
I 
I Part of A'a Active EM 
I I I 
I I .eol .eo3 .eo41 
I I I 
I I .eo2 .eo5 I 
I I I 
I 
I A Is DM 
I I 
I I .dol .do3 .doSI 
I I I 
I I .do2 .do4 I 
I I I 
I 
.eo4 laep 
I a/bep [<Al , 
la/b/aep 
? > ,<A2 ,W' HOLE>] 
• do4 I adp [eo4, [bdcl [adcl l 
I a/bdp [eo4, l 
I a/b/adp [eo4, : l 
where 
do4 bdc={I have a waterhole,a/bep}_. 
adc={I have not got a waterhole,aep} 
.eo5 laep [<Al,R UNDER G'YRD>,<A2,R.VILL>l 
la/bep? 
la/b/aep? 
.do5 ladp [eo5,[adcll 
la/bdp Ceo?, l 
la/b/adp[eo?, l 
where 
dos adc={have you got a ruined 
village ?,a/bep} 
Notice also that in 6.14 'a/b/aep?' is unknown. A does 
not know whether B thinks A has the waterhole feature. 
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One of the functions of Cl3A) is to show B that A has not 
got the feature. Thus in· 6.15 this perspective on 'eo4' 
is modified form 'a/b/aep?' to 'a/b/aep'. Utterance Cl3A) 
also contains a query about another feature, the ruined 
village. Figure 6.16 represents A's change of 
information state in response to B's utterance Cl4B) 
where he says that he does not have a referent for this 
most recently introduced discourse object. 
FIGURE 6.16 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (14B) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 .eo41 
I I 




I .dol .do3 .do51 
I I 
I .do2 .do4 I 
I I 
.eoS laep [<Al,R UNDER G'YRD>,<A2,R.VILL>l 
la/bep 
la/b/aep [<Al, ? >,<A2,R.VILL>l 
.dos ladp [eo5,Cadcll 
la/bdp [eoS, l 
la/b/adp[eos, : l 
where 
adc={have you got a 
ruined village ?,a/bep} 
bdc={no,a/bep} 
FIGURE 6.17 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (16B) OF 6.13 
I 
I Part of A'a Active EM 
I I 
I I .eol .eo3 .eo41 
I I I 
I I .eo2 .eoS I 
I I I 
I 
I A Is DM 
I I I 
I I .dol .do3 .doSI 
I I I 
I I .do2 .do4 I 
I I I 
I 
.eo4 laep 
la/bep [<Al,TWIX G'Y & V>,<A2,W'HOLE>1 
la/b/aep 
.do4 ladp Ceo4,[bdcl[adcll 
la/bdp [eo4, l 
la/b/adp[eo4, 1 
where 
bdc={I have a waterhole,a/bep} 
adc={I have not got a waterhole,aep} 
bdc={rny waterhole is between 
the graveyard 
and the volcano,a/bep} 
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Figure 6.17 shows A's modification to his 'eo4' structure 
on learning at (16B) of the location of the waterhole 
feature. Finally 6.18 represents A's use of his knowledge 
of an indirectly instantiated object to perform a 
referential act at (19A). 
FIGURE 6.18 
PROCESSOR CENTRIC REPRESENTATION OF PART OF A's 
STATE IMMEDIATELY AFTER UTTERANCE (19A) OF 6.13 
Part of A'a Active EM 
I 
I .eol .eo3 .eo41 
I I 




I .dol .do3 .doSI 
I I 
I .do2 .do4 I 
I I 
.eo4 laep 
la/bep [<Al,TWIX G'Y & V>,<A2,W'HOLE>l 
la/b/aep 
.do4 ladp [eo4,[bdcl[adcll 
la/bdp [eo4, l 
la/b/adp[eo4, l 
where 
bdc={I have a waterhole,a/bep} 
adc={I have-not got a waterhole,aep} 
bdc={my waterhole is between 
the graveyard 
and the volcano,a/bep} 
adc={I should just avoid it,a/bep} 
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In the extracts cited so far, and the P-C representations 
of them, I have confined myself to examples where what is 
at issue are the views each participant has of his 
partner's map. One dimension of the map task is not 
directly modelled in the P-C descriptive system, 
nevertheless it is crucial to understanding the kinds of 
referential exchange that go on. The dimension consists 
of the communicative strategies that participants in this 
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task call into play. It is to this feature of discourse 
reference that I look in the next section. 
SECTION THREE INTENTIONAL STRATEGIES 1.N DISCOURSE 
What does one mean by a communicative strategy? We may 
illustrate by considering one of the most obvious and 
fundamental - the adoption of a co-operative strategy. 
Obviously a participant can choose to be fully co-
operative - to pay attention to the task at hand, to make 
a maximum effort to generate or interpret a message, to 
integrate current messages with what is already known, to 
make further contributions which will be co-operative 
etc. But of course a participant may equally choose not 
to be co-operative in the ways outlined. Obviously the 
notion of co-operativeness forms something of a cline, we 
can speak of extremes of co-operativeness and unco-
operativeness and of many possible states in between 
them. 
It is important to realise that the effect of unco-
operati veness can be produced .in spite Qf a participant 
having co-operative intentions. For example, a highly 
co-operative interpreter may be so absorbed with 
processing the first thing said by his partner that he 
may not hear or may ignore the next contribution. 
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Behaviour in the map task sometimes appears to be 
unco-operative even though the participant may have been 




















different cases of 'unco-operative' behaviour. 
6.19 
Mapl Sl9 & S20 Subjects from B'Muir School 
•••• you go up + between a swamp and the palm 
beach 
eh ? . 
between a swamp and the palm beach + and 
you go round the swamp 
what swamp. ? 
have you got a waterfall ? 
aye 
right 
do you go past the. crocodiles ? 
go round the waterfall + near the cliffs + 
go round it that way.round the waterfall+ and 
up towards the mountains 
6.20 
Ma pl Sl7 & Sl8 Subjects from B'Muir School 
up the hill ++ and over the bridge 
I've not got a bridge 
and keep going up + and you reach the top 
6.21 
Mapl Sl3 & Sl4 Subjects from B' Muir School. .. 
right+ yqu're going to have to cross the river 
how?. 
dinnae ken +any way you want •••• 
Extract 6.22 
Mapl S9 & SlO Subjects from B'Muir .school 
1 A: just dra~ what I said + right you go over the 
big river + right . · 
2 B: right over the big river right +there's not a 
bridge on it where's the bridge ? 
3 A: dinnae ken 
4 B: is it up from oxbow lake ? 
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In extract 6.19 participant B with utterance C2B) 
registers some problem, which is not specified, 
concerning his understanding of what was said. 
Participant A registers this and assumes that B did not 
hear the original message and co-operatively repeats what 
she has said before. Now B hears what A has said but is 
unable to produce an adequate drawing response so she 
asks, in utterance (4B), for more information. A ignores 
B's question, ignores it again at C7A), and ignores B's 
problem with a feature at (8B). 
Again in extract 6.20 we have A acting as if he had 
not heard the question, or request from his fellow 
participant. In both 6.19 and 6.20 participant A actually 
ignores B's announcement of incompatible information. 
Extracts 6.21 and 6.22 are slightly different, A 
responds to questions from B, demonstrating that the 
questions have been interpreted even though in both cases 
A's responses are less than helpful. In these cases A 
abdicates his responsibility as the authoritative route 
giver, A either regards himself as incapable of dealing 
with the problem or else is not prepared to undertake the 
task of solving it. 
These cases of 'unco-operative' behaviour may arise 
out of the processing load that this complex cognitive 
task requires. This may manifest itself as an 
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unwillingness by one participant to try and cope with the 
construction of a model of his interlocutor's point of 
view. Or else a participant may refuse to take on extra 
information which they are not able to accommodate at a 
particular moment. We might suppose that extract 6.23 
evinces just such a situation, A's mention of a waterfall 
at C7A) is not attended to by B whose response, CBB), 
indicates that he is busy with an earlier part of the 
task. 









Mapl S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
•••• draw a line round the swamp 
swamp + whereabouts is the swamp ? 
on your left 
where the crocodiles are ? 
dunno~ where's crocodiles ? 
left of palm beach 
aye + draw a- line round the crocodiles /+ 
is there a waterfall over the other side -?---
just + right just draw it round the + the crocodiles 
A high level intentional phenomenon such as 'co-
operativeness' can be the product of very different sorts 
of underlying processor states. And of course inferring 
the intentional states of another processor is not an 
infallible enterprise, even for the discourse analyst 
armed with transcripts and all the knowledge relevant to 
the task. 
Nevertheless evidence of the interpretive and 
generative intentional strategies in play can be seen in 
the data if we make a number of assumptions about a 
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participant's goals and his processing constraints. 
In discussing intentional strategies many cognitive 
scientists have distinguished what appears to be an 
over-riding 'Principle of Parsimony', or more 
uncharitably 'Principle of Least Effort'. This is a 
behavioural principle which instructs processors to do no 
more processing than is necessary to achieve a goal. It 
is also assumed that goal satisfaction criteria are not 
fixed or invariant. In other words a processor is 
involved in determining what he regards as an adequate 
amount of success in goal achievement against the amount 
of processing that he is prepared to do or is able to do. 
The interaction of goals with available resources is 
reminiscent of the line taken by exponents of 
naturalistic epistemology. It is also the hallmark of 
recent approaches in the psychology of decision theory 
and problem solving (cf for example Kahneman & Tversky 
1972, Tversky & Kahneman 1973, Slovic, Fischoff & 
Lichtenstein 1977). This psychological work has provided 
us with the concept of a 'heuristic' processing strategy. 
An heuristic is a procedure to determine a response to 
some input, the heuristic is not guaranteed to provide 
the right answer. Indeed heuristics imply that the notion 
of 'right response' is a product of thinking about 
behaviour in a normative and deterministic manner (of 
supposing that in any situation there is a correct way to 
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behave). When talking about the application of an 
heuristic the best way to talk of the outcome is as an 
appropriate response given an interaction between the 
demands of the problem and the limitations of the 
processor. 
What does this mean for communication in a task such 
as the one described in this chapter? Well we assume in 
looking at the data that what we are seeing is just the 
sort of interaction described in the last paragraph. The 
output is, in part, a balance between the amount of 
success a processor wants to achieve, or is able to 
achieve, with the amount of effort that he is either 
prepared or is able to put in. Obviously the sorts of 
heuristic strategy which will derive from a desire to 
achieve success will often conflict with principles such 
as Parsimony. 
In terms of the map task what would it mean to talk 
of heuristic strategies of communication? The list below 
is not exhaustive, but provides an idea of the strategies 
it would make sense to postulate: 
1. each participant assumes that their 
perspectives are equivalent, an assumption 
that information about features on the map 
is shared 
2. participants do not modify knowledge 
structures until compelled to do so 
3. if a knowledge structure is to be 
modified then modify it conservatively 
4. never multiply structures 
unnecessarily, for example do not 
introduce new perspectives unless forced 
to 
5. to secure .reference minimally. specify 
it,. assume other information is shared if 
the manner of description is shared .(ie. if 
a feature is similarly named assume it is 
in the same location) 
6 •. fill in details of objects. as much as 
possible using background general. 
information rather then requesting or 
discussing it explicitly 
Together 1-6 can be seen as constituting the general 
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Principle of Parsimony, 'do as little processing as you 
can get away with'. Balanced against this is the desire 
for success which is the requirement to do as much 
processing as necessary to achieve the goal criteria. 
In looking at the map data we assume that processors 
are making on-line judgements as they communicate with 
one another which lead them to adopt particular 
communicative strategies at different stages in 
discourse. Language generation and interpretation is 
therefore assumed to be influenced by the kinds of 
intentional, heuristic strategy outlined. Moreover these 
strategies are liable to change as linguistic and para-
linguistic information is sampled, tested and integrated 
into the growing construct which represents a processor's 
understanding of discourse. 
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Let me illustrate how appeal to these intentional 
strategies allows us to make sense of discourse in this 
task. I will look at two sets of heuristics which, as 
sets, constitute very different sorts of approach to the 
generation and interpretation of discourse in this task. 
One set of heuristics constitute what I have called a 
High Risk Communicative Posture, the second set give rise 
to what I have termed a Low Risk Communicative Posture. 
In effect, the set of heuristics comprising the High 
Risk Posture amount to the Principle of Parsimony 
maximally applied, whilst the set comprising the Low Risk 
Posture are consistent with the goal requirement of a 
high degree of accuracy in the route replication. 
These two sets of heuristics are not to be thought 
of as exclusive alternatives which processors must 
operate for the duration of a discourse. Successful 
communicators appear able to assess the current situation 
and apply both postures appropriately. 
Let me first detail the sets of heuristics which 
comprise the two postures, then I will illustrate how 
they can be seen as applying in the data available. The 
High Risk heuristics for this task are really a task 
specific realisation of the heuristics 1-6 outlined 
above. 
High Risk Posture 
1.1 Minimal Difference - assume that your 
partner has the the same information about 
the map features as yourself 
1.2 Minimal Specification - in the case 
of referential instigation, for example, 
minimally specify the new DO 
1.3 Minimal Ontology - select.as few 
objects as possible to relate the task to 
1.4 Shared focus - assume that your 
partner shares your area of focus 
1.5 Minimal Decentering .- assume your 
information is secure, do not take on 
board incompatible information 
1.6. Minimal Feedback - do not expect and 
do not provide feedback about each others 
discourse contributions 
Low Risk Posture 
2 .1 Maximal Difference .. do not assume 
that your partner has the same information 
about the map features as yourself 
2.2 Maximal Specification - in the case 
of referential instigation, for example, 
provide.as much information as possible so 
as to identify a new DO and establish its 
inter -relations with other mutually 
shared features. As a referential 
interpreter demand location of new nos, 
check the meaning of orientation terms 
etc. 
2.3 Generous Ontology - be prepared to 
intro~uce new nos into discourse, be 
prepared to separate out what was 
previously assumed to be one common 
feature 
2. 4 Conservative Focus - move minimally 
away from the cur rent focus,. constantly 
check current focus of your partner 
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2.5 Decenter ~-construct a view of your 
partner's knowledge state, be prepared for 
it be be different 
2.6 Maximal Feedback - provide constant 
information so that your partner is 
reminded of;. the task goals, the state. of 
your understanding of.his .contributions, 
the information you have on your map etc. 
2.7 Hypothesis Formation - Constantly 
test your partner's representations, and. 
hypothesise about what they might have on 
their map, what the next step in the task 
is etc. 
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We have already seen various aspects of these strategies 
at work in the extracts considered so far. Attempts to 
build models of a fellow participant would seem to 
require the operation of strategies such as 2.1, 2.3, 2.5 
and 2.7. On the other hand some of the extracts contain 
what appear to be the deployment of high risk strategies 
such as 1.1, 1.3, and 1.5. For example, subjects Sl7 & 
Sl8 in extract 6.4 produce a performance of the task 
which can be classified as 'high risk'. We can also see 
in terms of the route which B produces how inadequate his 
performance is in comparison to the route A was trying to 
transmit, see Figure 6.19 over. If we look at an extended 
version of their discourse we can isolate a number of 
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just. go + start from the bottom 
whereabout ? 
go up + palm beach 
right 




up the hill + and over the bridge 
I've not got a bridge 
and keep going till you reach the top 
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In general both A and B minimally specify objects. 
They also use minimal ontologies, in particular, objects 
which the route would indicate to be relevant are not 
mentioned at all, eg in this extract A does not mention 
the swamp, the big river, the right hand set of woods, 
and B does not mention the crocodiles, the lion's den, 
the left hand set of woods. Also A provides only minimal 
consideration to B's problem at (2B) and completely 
ignores B's protest in utterance ClOB); A's behaviour 
suggests he is minimally decentering and giving minimal 
attention to feedback from B. 
The use of High Risk strategies by both participants 
is not limited to our school children. Extract 6.25 shows 
two university students operating High Risk strategies, 
again at considerable cost to the accuracy of the 
duplicated route, see Figure 6.20. 
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Extract 6 .• 25 
Map 1 Sll & Sl2 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 A: •·• .. and round .the waterfall 
2 B: round the bottom of. the-waterfall --OK 
3 A: north east + until you get to the bridge, to the 
river 
4 B: that's the big river half way there ? 
5 A: yes 
6 B: straight north east ? 
7 A: erm yeh 
8 B: yes OK 
9 A: you cross the river 
10 B: yeh 
11 A: erm + north past the wood - er 
12 B: wood + wood + oh yes I see it 
13 A: yeh 
Again despite B providing some feedback and checking A's 
instructions, notably at (2B), C4B) and Cl2B), both 
participants provide minimal specifications of features 
and of the route relative to the features. Moreover, 
features are omitted, features which could be regarded as 
crucial to accurate route construction, (for example the 
mountains are not mentioned). This behaviour together 
with an assumption of congruence leads them into a direct 
misconstrual of their referential acts in utterance 
CllA)-(13A), where A intends one set of woods and B's 
uptake is of another. More of this particular sort of 
problem later. 
A good example of a Low Risk Posture is provided in 
the extended extract from subjects S7 and S8 below. This 
discussion concerns only a relatively small part of the 
route but its exhaustive nature secures an excellent 
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duplication of the route by B, see Figure 6.21. 
Extract 6 .. 26 






















what in effect you are doing is curving up the 
side of the waterfall 
yes 
yeh + now just let me check if you have the next 
reference point + erm do you_have mountains over +++ 
erm north east of the waterfall ? 
uhu 
and you also have mountains almost due north 
no I have got.woods due north 
ah there should be two sets of mountains 
well I have only got one 
you have only got the one set right +++ well lets 
check which set you have got 
have you got cliffs ? 
yes I have got cliffs + yes OK er + if we go from the 
waterfall 
erm + from the left hand side of the waterfall ? 
from the left hand side of the waterfall ++ I think 
we have got different sets of mountains +++ wait a 
minute hold on ++ can I take you from the right hand 
side of the waterfall ? 
well I have only just come from + round the bottom 
of the waterfall 
yes+ no sorry+ I am just directing you+ now.don't draw 
anything yet + I'm just directing you to see if you 
have got the mountains 
the mountains I have got are just to the right 
of the waterfall 
well that is fine you have got one set 
one set ? 
well I have got two sets 
you said one set was north east 
right one set is sort of north east 
Throughout this extract we see various Low Risk 
strategies in play. Throughout, A endeavours to decenter 
and build a model of B's viewpoint. This will enable him 
to engineer his route descriptions so as to be maximally 
useful for B. Examples of this sort of behaviour can be 
found in utterances C3A), CSA) and (9A). such 
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contributions by A, together with B's responses, indicate 
that there is a clear appreciation of the incongruence of 
the two maps. We can also observe both participants 
operating a conservative focus strategy which is 
supplemented by detailed hypothesis formation. In 
particular, (13A) and ~lSA) serve to secure the current 
focus as well as establishing an immediate goal (which is 
to determine the content of part of each other's maps 
prior to B's drawing in the route). Both participants 
offer and receive detailed feedback, B's contributions at 
(6B), CBB), Cl2B), C20B) are all clear examples, and in 
some cases this feedback consists of accurate and 
detailed information about the features which B herself 
has, eg (16B). 
Whilst such detailed Low Risk strategies often do 
yield good route duplications it would be wrong to think 
that an exclusively Low Risk Posture is necessarily best. 
The Low Risk Posture carries its own problems- for 
example, there are subjects who spend large amounts of 
time and effort specifying entities and their inter-
relations in great detail before setting out to draw in 
the route. Unfortunately they then forget the agreed 
information, presumably because the processing and memory 
load is too great. Or again we find subjects who apply a 
strategy of maximal specification too rigorously. Extract 
6.27 is from two subjects who seemed prepared to agree 
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the identity of shared features only after a monumental 
amount of discussion. This usually led to problems about 
what had been agreed and established in the first place. 
Extract 6.27 





•••• directly above the cactus you have a 
crashed plane. 
er .. right. +. erm + oh yes + er + I have a crashed 
plane marked here + can I .+ check this + my crashed 
plane is above it+ it's in. the base of the quadrant 
+ top right.hand imaginary quadrant of the erm picture 
+.yes er+ that sounds too high for me 
er ? .. 
because my cacti + my cacti + are about .. oh .. + 
I would say . + about two inches at the moment or 
one. and a half inches below. the. imaginary 
horizontal + er you know the half way line . or. 
the vertical dimension of this + er + sheet of paper 
In general, however, the data reveals that 
processors adopt elements of High Risk and Low Risk 
Postures. The successful subjects, in terms of the 
accuracy of the reproduced routes and degree of 
referential concord, were those who displayed a flexible 
approach - adopting a High Risk strategy as long as they 
thought it would work but having the ability to switch to 
Low Risk ones when they deemed them necessary. Extract 
6.28 demonstrates a mix of High and Low risk strategies. 
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Extract 6.28 




























2 8 B: 
go round the crocodile towards + the mountains + 
then round the+ waterfall-++ up.towards between 
the mountains ++ and across the bridge on the 
big river 
what bridge on the big river ? 
the river on the -
och aye 
and you go + round towards the wood + but you cut 
off between +_ the tip of the + river and the woods 
+~and then up towards the castle 
I .go up the top of the river + right 
you go across the bridge right + up towards the 
wood + then go between the two rivers right + 
one at off the top of the right hand corner + and 
the.river with the bridge on it+ between that and 
then up towards the-castle 
say that again Karen 
right you go across the bridge + and you go up 
towards a wood 
wait a minute where's your bridge + I've not got 
a bridge 
across the big river ++ you-go across the big river 
aye 
then- you go up 
across it ? 
uhu 
right 
then you go up towards the wood + but + then you go 
between the two rivers + one that comes in the top 
end at the corner 
aye 
and the big river 
aye 
and go up towards the- castle -
wait a minute what did you say about the woods ? 
you just. go + towards that but 
doesn't matter I'm nowhere near the woods + right 
go on 
and you go between the two rivers 
aye 
and then go straight up + just straight across to 
the castle 
right I'm at the castle 
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If we look at extract 6.28 there are a number of 
interesting aspects to the discourse. For example, C2B) 
indicates that although B has interpreted A's 
contribution correctly she does not have a referent for 
'bridge on the big river'. We can see A's response in 
terms of 'the river' as a way of indicating the most 
salient feature of what A assumes is B's ,b.ig river/bridge 
package. B, at this point, presumably locates the river, 
and assumes that that will do as an identifying location 
and provides confirmatory feedback to A in (4B). In fact 
whilst both participants are co-operating they can both 
be charged with taking too much for granted. A assumes 
congruence of features, it is not clear that A realises 
that B does not have a bridge until considerably later in 
the discourse. B accepts only the most general 
characterisation to fix her next location point. 
At (6B), B shows that she has paid attention to, and 
interpreted, the beginning of A's contribution CSA). A 
continues at C7A) with a set of well-specified 
directions, which include two references to the bridge 
(which B hasn't got) and also to the wood - CB has a wood 
but not in the area intended by A). Basks for a 
repetition of this complex set of instructions (8B) and A 
co-operates effectively and begins again with (9A), and 
once again mentions the two entities which B doesn•t· 
have. At CIOB) we see B pay serious attention to a 
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perceived incongruence, the lack of a bridge, B makes 
explicit this difference to A (notice that the problem 
with a wood is not yet mentioned). At Cl7A), A mentions 
a wood again, followed by a reference to two rivers both 
of which B has on her map. However, not until (22B) does 
B ask about the woods, apparently ignoring for as long as 
possible a feature which, as far as she can judge, can't 
relate to the task in hand, since it is not situated in 
the area she is currently focusing on. 
This focusing aspect of the task is vital. An 
intentional aspect of A, his current focus, is 
constrained by the route on the map, so that A may not, 
in this case even notice the presence of a second set of 
woods on the left hand side of the map as a possible 
alternative referent for the uptake of his referential 
act. B's intentional focus state is not constrained in 
the same deterministic way. Although it is interesting 
that B is operating a conservative focus strategy. As a 
consequence B is not simply, in 6.28, recognising 
entities which A's expressions descriptively identify. 
Her attention is focused on where she is on her map- and 
in this case B's strategy seems to be to take in 
information which relates to where she is at the time 
when A begins to speak, to seize upon the first phrase 
which relates to that focal area, and then to try and 
identify the next move (cf for example B's response to 
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A's contributions at CSA) and (9A)). 
We can see that application by B of a conservative 
focus strategy saved B from being misdirected, since she 
actually did misconstrue the intended referent of A's 
referential act at (17A). 
The conservative focus strategy adopted by B in 6.28 
is a feature of participants who are relatively 
successful in duplicating the route. They insist on 
securing the part of the representation which they are 
working on before they are prepared to move on to the 
next part of the route Ccf for example C6B)). Other Low 
Risk strategies apparent in B's performance in 6.28 
include demands for specification (cf for example (2B)), 
and requiring recapitulations (cf for example (8B)). 
However, B does resort to High Risk strategies, she 
minimally specifies (cf for example (12B) where she does 
not ask for the location of the bridge on the river) , she 
sometimes ignores incompatible and incongruent 
information (cf for example (18B) where she ignores 
mention of the~, and also C24B)). 
Indeed it is interesting that the operation of one 
sort of Low Risk strategy, ie conservative focusing, can 
lead to a High Risk behaviour in another respect. Thus 
focus on the immediate route position in (18B) onwards, 
is one reason for B's ignoring incongruity at C24B). 
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To understand the processes at work in ~uch 
referential exchanges one has to understand the 
intentional assumptions and strategies at work, one 
cannot rely on a link between expressions and features 
which is independent of the intentional states of 
processors. One of the consequences of this view is that 
different intentional assumptions should result in 
different referential uptakes. 
In extracts 6.29-6.32 I have concentrated on 
interesting variations in the referential negotiation 
that occurred in an area of Map 1 already familiar to us 
from extract 6.26. In extract 6.29 B is operating 
relatively High Risk strategies; assuming minimal 
differences between maps, not using a particularly 
constrained focus strategy. This results in B's securing 
a referent for A's referential act C3A), but it is not 
the referent which A intended to be evoked. However, the 
operation of High Risk strategies results in the 
misconstrual not being detected and the task is completed 
to the satisfaction of both participants. Again the 
important point to notice is that A's use of the 
ref erring expression at (3A) cannot be said to refer to a 
feature at all on any logical account of the mechanics of 
reference - in the first place it is not a unique 
identifier. we can only account for what is clearly an 
act of reference and an act of referential interpretation 
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in terms of the communicative strategies, assumptions and 
states of knowledge in play at the time. 
Extract 6.29 













you cross the river 
yes 
um + north .. past the wood .. 
wood + wood + oh yes I see it 
yeh 
now can you give me some more directions 
past the wood 
sorry 
where do I go from. the river + north ? 
yes but past the wood 
oh dear I don't have to cross the river 
again do I ? 
no 
OK+ so I'll head north west 
In extract 6.30 a misconstrual of exactly the same 
sort as in 6.29 occurs. Again one can argue that the 
operation of High Risk strategies by A and B contribute 
to the misconstrual, a misconstrual that is never 
detected by the participants. 
Extract 6.30 
Map 1 SlS & Sl6 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: 
2 B: 
go. over the bridge 







where it starts from + where do I go from there ? 







have you got .. woods ? 
yes + but I'm on top of_ the big river 
you should be half way down it ++ go 
between the river and the trees 
the.river and the trees 
at the top 
where did you say I was to go between + the woods 
and the river ? 
aye 
OK ••••••• 
Lastly extracts 6.31 and 6.32 provide cases where 
low risk strategies actually reveal the incongruences 
between the maps, allowing the participants to gain 
accurate representations of each others' knowledge states 
and use this information in the construction of 
referential discourse. 
In 6.31 B provides excellent feedback to A, at C4B), 
indicating that he cannot make sense of A's instructions 
which involve mention of the woods which as far as B can 
see are way removed from his current location. 
Extract 6.31 
Map 1 Sl & 82 Subjects from B'Muir School 





3 A: then do a wee half circle + beneath the woods .. 
+ after the bridge. just continue it into a half 














I'm not at the woods I'm at. the river 
aye but see where the wood is ? 
uhu 
the other.woods+ there's two woods 
I've only got. one 
there's one on the right 
no.I've only got one. 
well there's a wood on the right 
OK right 
erm go through 
no. 
the wood on the right is about an inch. 
from the end of the island ken what I mean ? 
uhu 
To A's credit he realises that there is a potential 
ambiguity in his use of the referring expression in CSA) 
and points this out in C7A) (the left hand set of woods 
has been mentioned and introduced as a DO earlier in the 
task). B immediately interprets this as indicating an 
incongruence and signals this to A in (8B). From this 
point on there is no problem in the subsequent 
referential acts involving the expression 'the wood', A 
specifies its location and B signals that he understands 
A's point of view at Cl6B). 
In 6.32 B suspects the possibility of multiple 
referents from A's initial introduction of a DO at ClA). 
B expresses this suspicion at C2B) and subsequent 
discourse seeks to establish the location of the intended 
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referent of A's referential act in ClA). 
Extract 6.32 















•••• have you got a wood just north of the river ?. 
a wood yes +but the.wood is on+ of course it could 
be a different wood.the one I have- is-on the. left 
OK well + if you draw ++ the wood is on the left ? 
yeh above the cliffs 
oh well that is a different wood +-I- -have- got--two woods 
OK well whereabouts is this wood in relation to the 
lake + can I explain where the lake is 
OK where is the lake 
In these cases of discourse reference to ask for the 
referent of terms like 'wood' one has to take into 
account the intentions of the participants. Thus on A's 
map, unless we have recourse to his perception of 
intentional factors such as constrained focus being 
operational, there is no answer to the question of how he 
could refer unambiguously with terms like 'the wood' when 
he knows there are two referents available. From B's 
point of view how could he ever detect the possibility of 
ambiguity in A's use of a term, since this use can be 
seen as unique reference because for B there is only one 
referent. 
SECTION .f..Ql!B CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has tried to establish a number of points. 
Firstly, in section three I tried to show how data 
elicited from a controlled task domain provides clear 
evidence that processors use information derived from the 
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models they construct of the knowledge states of their 
interlocutors in order to generate and interpret acts of 
reference. The P-C system of description is able to 
capture the information states relevant to these sorts of 
derivative referential acts. 
Throughout the data we see that discourse in general 
and referential communication in particular is conducted 
against a background of intentional strategies. In such 
'referential interaction' processors set limits on the 
amount of information and detail they require for the 
identification of a shared feature. 
We looked in section four at the kinds of strategy 
that might be implicated in the data from our map task. 
These strategies were, of course, intentionally derived, 
since they were cognitive in origin. 
No system of referential description comes close to 
capturing the intentional complexity of the cognitive 
system. It would require, amongst other things, the 
embodiment of processes able to implement rich theories 
of decision and action. However, a processor centred 
approach does, at least, make us sensitive to the role of 
intentional machinery in the mechanics of reference. 
Looking at things in a processor centred manner also 
suggests that opacity must be a feature of our 
interaction with the world and others in it. It is bound 
therefore to make us think about what is to count as 
success in communicative interactions. 
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success for a processor is relative to his needs, 
goals, beliefs and strategies. I will call this sense of 
the word success its 'open texture' sense. 
It would be wrong to think of this sense of success 
as being synonymous with 'the right answer'. Rather, the 
success a processor aims for will be an outcome which is 
appropriate given the structure of the problem and the 
information processing constraints of the cognitive 
system. 
Processors aim at a degree of success consonant with 
their intentions. In the map task, as analysts there is 
some notion of objective success to be appealed to, let 
us call this the 'closed sense' of success. We can 
'measure' the degree of closed success by looking, for 
example, at the route drawn by one of the participants 
and compare it with the one the other speaker has, or by 
viewing referential acts in the context of our 
'Omniscient' knowledge of both maps. It is important to 
realise that this success is not available to the 
participating processors. 
The map task is not special in this respect. 
Processors generally cannot judge communicative success 
364 
by some appeal to a closed sense of success embodied in 
absolute states of affairs external to them. Rather in 
using language the processors involved judge by the 
criteria operational at a particular time whether 
communication has been successful. The criteria for 
identity and reference are constituted out of the 
intentions processors bring to the generation or 
interpretation of language. 
In the next chapter I will be looking at some 
detailed aspects of referential behaviour in the map 
task. I will try to demonstrate that once again the 
multiple perspectives and dynamic modelling of 
informational states which the P-C descriptive system 
offers, yields real insights into the role and function 
of elements of our language. 
CHAPTER SEVEN DEPLOY..I.N..G ~ MODEL- REFERENCE 
AND DENOTING PHRASES 
In this chapter I will present an analysis of the 
use of indefinite and definite phrases (what Russell 
called 'denoting phrases') in discourse. The analysis was 
inspired by the apparatus for referential description 
which was used in the last two chapters. The account 
given in this chapter of the semantics of the indefinite 
and definite stands in contrast to the formal one 
presented in chapters 1, 2, and 3. The analysis 
concentrates on the specific and referential use of the 
the indefinite and definite respectively. Thus I will be 
restricting myself to discussion of the indefinite 
article as it appears in the subcategorisation frame 'a + 
count noun' and in its indefinite plural form. Discussion 
of the definite article will be as it appears in the 
subcategorisation frame 'the+ count noun'. I shall not 
consider the generic use of the definite or indefinite 
article, nor the predicative use of the indefinite. 
This chapter attempts to show, contrary to the 
standard logical treatment, that we have to sometimes 
view indefinites and definites as full-blooded referring 
expressions. In the certain domains of use, it appears 
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that the difference between the distribution of definite 
and indefinite forms has to do with the perception by 
processors of their interlocutor's knowlegde about the 
objects of discourse- it is nothing to do with notions of 
uniqueness in a model etc. 
The apparatus of partitioned perspectives suggests a 
powerful and general account of indefinite and definite 
use. This account provides additional support for the 
utility of the PC model. 
The first part of this chapter will consist of a 
resume of the most influential and established ideas 
concerning the semantics of definite and indefinite 
expressions. The second part of the chapter presents data 
which poses severe problems for these established views. 
The data seems amenable to analysis using the P-C 
descriptive system, indeed the result is a rather 
interesting analysis of the role of denoting phrases. 
SECTION ~ THE Y.1.EN .F.RQM FORMAL SEMANTICS -
A RESUME 
In earlier chapters we saw that formal semantics provides 
one particularly influential and univocal account of the 
semantics of def inites and indefinites. Formal semantics 
Footnote 7.1. Exceptions, to a limited extent, are 
Frege's view of definite descriptions, and Fodor -& Sag's 
(1982) claims about certain classes of indefinite expres-
sion. 
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generally (Footnote 7.1) assigns the indefinite article 
the semantics of the existential quantifier 'E', whilst 
the definite article is given a Russellian analysis. 
First Order glosses of these two views can be given as: 
(7.1) '(Ex)F(x)' is understood as 'For at least 
one object, 'x', in the domain (or world) 
D , ' F C x ) ' is true ' 
(7 .2) '(Ey) CF Cy) & (x) CF (x) -->x=y)) &G Cy) ' is 
understood as 'There is one and only one 
object, 'y', in the domain (or world) D, 
such that 'F(y)' and 'G(y)' are true' 
As we have already seen in earlier chapters, a number of 
consequences follow from a quantif icational 
interpretation of the articles. 
1 The non-referring nature of definite and 
indefinite expressions 
As a quantification over variables the 
quantified indefinite and definite 
expressions are not treated as ref erring 
expressions. Variables are not held to 
refer. 
2 The cardinality- of definite and 
indefinite expressions 
The existential quantifier requires that 
at least one object satisfy the expression 
it quantifies. The definite determiner is 
analysed in such a way that one and only 
one object is held to satisfy the 
expression quantified into. 
3 The scope principles of quantified 
def inites and indefinites 
The scope of quantifiers determines which 
variables the quantifier can bind. 
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The features outlined in 1-3 have been used to 
provide explanations for many semantic facts. For 
example, if we consider 1 and 2 jointly we can explain 
why sentence (7.3) is not false in situations where three 
students failed the exam. 
(7.3) A student failed the exam. 
(7.4) (Ex)(student(y)&fail(y,Cix) Cexam(x))) 
The existential operator analysis of 'a' is seen to 
set conditions on the cardinality of the indefinite 
expression. It establishes the minimal case for what is 
to hold with respect to the satisfaction of the 
indefinite expression in order that the sentence be true. 
Moreover, if we were to understand a student as a full 
blooded referring expression, then on the truth-
conditional view, (7.3) would have to amount to the claim 
that there was one, and only one, student who failed the 
exam. It is claimed that the existential operator 
analysis is in accord with our intuitions since we would 
want to resist the previously mentioned inference from 
(7 .3) • 
scope we have looked at extensively. It has been 
used to account for specificity in indefinite 
expressions, expressive responsibility, referential 
readings of definite expressions, and 
intensional/extensional ambiguities. 
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I have argued that, for example, both specificity 
and expressive responsibility are intentional phenomena, 
and that whatever scopal flavour there may be to some of 
these distinctions is a result of the possibility of 
descriptions/expressions originating out of embedded 
models. 
A basic problem is that in the case of genuine 
referential expressions, the formal view has reference as 
a relation between referring expressions and the objects 
which they denote. Ref erring expressions are held to 
uniquely specify the individual objects in the world or 
model which the language is being interpreted over. 
within this paradigm no status is accorded to the beliefs 
and intentions of speakers. There is no serious 
recognition of the fact that natural language consists of 
utterances produced by interlocuters with cognitive 
states and histories. 
SECTION .TIY.Q PEFINITES AND INPEFINITES -
INTENTIONAL ACCOUNTS 
Intentional views have a basic language-user orientation. 
They attempt to provide an account of what motivates a 
speaker to choose an indefinite or definite expression 
on a particular occasion of communication. 
unfortunately, such theories are no less susceptible to 
'Imperialist pretensions'; assuming that a univocal 
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account is possible for the 'use' of these various 
expressions in all contexts. 
1. FIRST AND SECOND MENTION 
One well-established intentional view is that the 
occurrence of the indefinite or definite noun-phrase is 
determined by whether its use constitutes the first 
occasion of mention of the referent. Clark & Clark (1977) 
advance such a view: 
adults use the indefinite article to 
introduce.new information [ ••• ] the first 
mention is usually marked by the. use .. of 
the indefinite article and subsequent 
mentions have the definite one. (Clark & 
Clark 1977: 36 8) 
Psychologists have added a developmental aspect to 
this. warden (1976) and Maratsos (1974,1976) found that 
children only gradually approach the adult model 
described above. This suggests that the conventions for 
using the indefinite and definite article in a story, for 
example, take some time to develop. 
This 'first-second mention' model also appears in 
Prince (1981) and Kuno (1972). In a careful discussion of 
this and related issues, Dahl (1976) points out that it 
is rarely made clear what is held to constitute 'first 
and second mention'. 
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Dahl's criticism notwithstanding, Prince's (1981) 
model is a good example of an intentional theory of 
indefinite and definite use. It attempts to give a 
comprehensive account of the distribution of referential 
forms in discourse. She provides a taxonomy of the types 
of discourse entity introduction, she then maps these 
types onto particular referential forms. The four main 
categories of discourse entity introduction are listed in 
Table 7.1, together with the forms typically used in 
these situations. Notice that her claim as to when the 
indefinite form is used is a very strong one. 
Effectively, indefinites mark the introduction into 
discourse of brand new referents which are not in any way 
known to the hearer. 
-TABLE 7 .l,, 
Mode of discourse entity 
introduction 




Brand New Entity - Speaker 
assumes it is not in any 
way previously known to 
the hearer 
Inf errable. ~ Entities the 
speaker assumes will be 
inferrable by the hearer 
from general knowledge 
Evoked-Situational - Entities 
which are salient in the 
environment in which the 
discourse is occurring 
Textual Situational - Entities 
which are salient in the 
context of. the discourse 
itself, two types: 
Current ~ pronominal reference 
back to a discourse 
antecedent 
Displaced - reference back to 
a discourse antecedent 
displaced from 'focus' 
Typically 'a + noun' 
Typically 'the + noun' 
Typically 'the + noun' 
Typically a pronominal 
form 
Typically 'the + noun' 
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In data elicited by Brown & Yule (cited in Brown & 
Yule 1983) this model was seen to provide a good 
description of the observed distribution of 'referential 
forms'. In their experiment undergraduates worked in 
pairs, one undergraduate had a geometric diagram in front 
of him which the other could not see. The undergraduate 
with the diagram had to instruct his partner so that he 
could replicate the diagram on a sheet of paper he had in 
front of him. An analysis of the instructions revealed 
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that the percentage of 'referring expressions' having a 
particular syntactic form when involved with a particular 
sort of discourse entity introduction was as shown in 
Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 
Form class B. New Inf 'ble Sit'nal Cur. Dis. 
a + noun 98% 
the + noun 2% 100% 58% 24% 100% 
pronoun 9% 65% 
ellipsis 33% 11% 
The fit of the data to the claims which Prince makes is 
rather impressive. Presumably it is because of this 
coincidence, and the fact that examples of this type of 
data come so easily to mind, that we are liable to accept 
the generalisations made in this model as true for 
English in all 'types of discourse'. 
2. REFERENTIAL EXCLUSION 
A rather different account is provided by Hawkins 
(1976,1978,1980). He argues that as a pre-requisite for 
indefinite expressions .t..Q ~ ~ to refer to an object, 
there must exist at least one more such object which the 
utterance can exclude. He cites examples such as (7.5)-
(7.9) to illustrate his 'exclusion principle'. 
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( 7. 5) Fred lost a leg during. the. war 
( 7. 6) Fred lost a.nose during the -war '·' * 
(7. 7) I didn't buy the house, because a 
window was broken 
(7. 8) I didn't buy the house, because some 
windows were broken 
(7. 9) I didn't.buy the house because a roof * 
was leaking 
In (7.5) Fred originally had two legs and so it is 
possible to refer to one (the one he lost) which excludes 
the other one from the reference. such an exclusion is 
not possible in (7.6) and to attempt to signal it with 
'a' results in a marked reading. Similarly in (7.7)-(7.9) 
we know houses normally have several windows and only one 
roof. Hawkins argues: 
Both 'a window' and 'some windows' can 
refer to some. only. of the total .number of 
windows in the .house, while excluding 
others from the reference, but 'a roof' 
would necessarily be referring to all the . 
roofs of the house, ie one only. Since the 
exclusion of at least one object from the 
reference cannot be satisfied within the 
pragmatic domain of interpretation (the 
parts of the house in question>- -'a roof' 
cannot be understood as. ref erring to the 
roof of the previously mentioned house. 
(Hawkins 1980:54-55) 
Hawkins recruits the notion of 'inclusion' to 
explain the use of the definite article. The definite 
article acts as an instruction from speaker to hearer 
that the hearer should 'locate' the referent of the 
definite expression within one of a number of sets of 
objects which are again pragmatically defined on the 
basis of shared speaker-hearer knowledge and situational 
context. The hearer, according to Hawkins: 
C ••• l locates the referent in the sense 
that he understands that the object 
ref erred to is a member of the __ __ _ .. 
appropriate, pragmatically identifiable 
set. The definite descr-iption refers 
.•inclusively' to the totality of the 
objects (or mass) satisfying the referring 
predicates within the relevant pragmatic 
set. (Ibid: 54) 
3 DEFINITES, INDEFINITES AND UNIQUENESS 
Venneman's (1975) account stands in direct contrast to 
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Hawkin's view. Venneman argues that 'discourse subjects' 
can arise, or be given, (a) by general knowledge 
(including knowledge shared by just the interlocutors) or 
Cb) the situative context of the discourse or Cc) by the 
preceding part of the text of the discourse. If the 
discourse participant is relying on (c) as a way of 
getting discourse subjects into discourse models then the 
only way to get the discourse subject into the discourse 
initially is via: 
C ••.• l an_ indefinite description. (which. 
presupposes the existence in the real or 
some possible world of the kind_ of. 
phenomenon described by the predicate(s) 
used in the indefinite description). From 
the first mentioning on, the unique 
existence of the discourse subject 
introduced textually is presupposed, and 
the discourse subject will in the 
continued discourse be referred.to by an 
individual name, a definite description, 
or a text-deictic expression, ie a 
pronoun. (Venneman 1975:316) 
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Venneman is sensitive to the part played by the 
knowledge which interlocutors bring to discourse in 
providing the source of discourse subjects. He also goes 
along with a 'first and second mention' model in order 
to determine when the indefinites and def inites will 
occur. However, he is insistent that, no matter how a 
discourse subject is introduced, whether textually or 
not, once it has been introduced, the unique existence of 
the discourse subject in a world actual or possible is 
presupposed. It is hard to imagine how a particular 
referent might exist other than uniquely! Presumably, 
what is at issue is the existence of an object which 
uniquely satisfies the predicates used to refer to it in 
the text. Venneman's formal semantic backqround is 
apparent here. Within formal semantics, 'referring 
expressions' are interpreted as assertions that there is 
one and only one object which satisfies the predicates 
contained in the 'referring expression' itself. In this 
sense venneman's claim is either trivial or misconceived. 
It is trivial because the prototypical relationship which 
underlies interpreted logical languages is the 
name/bearer relationship. It is a maxim in the logician's 
enterprise that the name/bearer relation should always be 
regimented in a logical language so that there is an 
unambiguous and unique relation of individual objects to 
names (cf for example Dummett 198la). Venneman's point 
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appears misconceived if we construe uniqueness as the 
commitment to the existence Cin a world) of objects 
uniquely satisfying the predicates ascribed to them in a 
discourse. This is far too strong for the normal use of 
'referring expressions' in language. Johnson-Laird & 
Garnham argue: 
Linguists and philosophers have- -Often 
noted that a definite description can lead 
a listener to infer the existence- of a 
unique entity if the description occurs- in 
the absence of a prior identification of 
the entity. They have seldom noted that 
such a description often-estabiishes 
uniqueness only with respect to the 
current discourse model. (Johnson-Laird & 
Garnham 1980:377) 
In a sentence like (7.10) we do not want to be 
committed to the presupposition that there is one and 
only one man living next door to the speaker. 
(7.10) The man who lives next door to me 
has bought a car 
If uniqueness is relevant at all it is uniqueness in a 
discourse model rather than in reality which controls the 
use and interpretation of descriptions. 
SECTION THREE DENOTING PHRASES AND DISCOURSE 
The claims made in the three views outlined are general 
across all types of discourse. Yet if we examine 
naturally occurring language there appear to be uses of 
definite and indefinite expressions which do not seem to 
be helpfully characterised in any of these accounts. 
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Brown (1983) cites a piece of conversation recorded 
between a young Scotswoman, A, and her elderly cousin, B, 
who she has not met for several years: 
Extract.7.1 
B where I stayed was in Mea + was off 
Morningside Road 
A oh + yes + that's not far from Granpa' s house 
B yes + just further on + in the bus + you know . 
the. Plaza + there was a Plaza + do you remember 
it + further on 
A erm 
B : it was the next stop 
To most of us it is fairly clear what is happening 
in this discourse fragment. Indeed we can appreciate how 
the various expressions relating to t4e Plaza - 'the 
Plaza'- 'a Plaza'- 'it'- are being used by the instigator 
of the intentional act, and how the discourse object 'the 
Plaza' is introduced into their respective models of the 
conversation. 
What would the views cited make of this data? The 
Formalist would have to deny that genuine reference had 
occurred at all in B's second utterance. And yet we do 
not feel happy with such a claim, surely A's subsequent 
puzzlement was more than a realisation that no 
referential act could in principle have occurred in the 
previous utterance! 
we should also note that the first mention of the 
plaza takes the form of a definite description, and the 
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instigator appears to assume that her interpreter will 
know the object she thereby refers to. Moreover, even the 
subsequent use of the indefinite expression 'there was a 
Plaza' does not obviously suggest that the object the 
instigator is speaking of is unidentified, or expected to 
be unidentified by the interpreter. 
What we as fellow linguistic processors suspect is 
that a change has occurred in the instigator's 
expectations, presuppositions, about what might be 
recovered from the background knowledge of her 
interlocutor. This change is difficult to characterise 
under any of the models available to us so far. Why does 
she use an indefinite expression after having used a 
definite expression first? An advocate of the first-
second mention model might suggest it is because the 
instigator realises she has failed to follow the rule of 
first mention. I would suggest that fe~ of us would 
think this provides an adequate account. 
Is it then because she realises that the Plaza 
cannot in any way be known to her interlocutor? This 
claim would seem incongruous in the light of her next 
remark 'do you remember it?'. 
Is the distribution of forms in this example 
occasioned by the fact that she finally applies an 
'exclusion' principle because she thinks there may be a 
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number of such objects the interpreter may know about and 
she is intent on excluding the one she has in mind from 
the rest? Again this does not look right. 
What we might say is that none of the models 
considered so far seems to give a satisfactory account of 
what is going on in this particular context. How might 
we capture this kind of distribution, this kind of 
referential exchange? 
SECTION .E.Qll.R DENOTING PHRASES AND EMBEDDED 
PERSPECTIVES 
The exchange in extract 7.1 seems to arise out of a 
change in the referential instigator's presuppositions 
about what might be available knowledge for her 
interlocutor. This is somewhat reminiscent of the 
situations which prevailed when participants were engaged 
in the map task. In fact the map task provides a 
controlled domain in which to attempt to equate the 
distribution of forms with the states of knowledge of the 
various participants. 
Let us consider processor A's EM at the start of Map 
1. Assuming that he first considers the feature start, 
there are a limited number of ways in which he can assume 
knowledge of this feature to be distributed between his 
primary perspective, 'aep', and his fellow participant's 
primary perspective, 'a/bep'. I am not at this stage 
3 81 
going to consider third level perspectives; the model I 
want to propose is best approached by first looking at 
this simple two level system. The number of possible EO 
configurations is shown in Figures 7.1-7.4. As in the 
previous chapter I will assume that throughout the EOs 
are tokens. 
FIGURE 7.1 
POSSIBLE CONFIGURATION FOR PART OF A'S 
EM AT BEGINNING OF MAP 1 
Part of A's active EM.~~~~~~ 
I 
l.eoll aep [<Al,BOT RIGHT>,<A2,START>l I 





POSSIBLE CONFIGURATION FOR PART OF A'S 
EM AT BEGINNING OF MAP 1 
Part of A's active EM~---
1 
I .eol I aep 
I I a/bep 
I 
I 




POSSIBLE CONFIGURATION FOR PART OF A'S 
EM AT BEGINNING OF MAP 1 
Part of A's active EM 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
I 
I .eol I aep 
I I a/bep? 
I 
I 




POSSIBLE CONFIGURATION FOR PART OF A'S 
EM AT BEGINNING OF MAP 1 
Part of A's active EM.~~~~~~ 
I 
I .eol I aep 





Figure 7.1 represents the case where A believes that 
he and his fellow participant both have a feature start 
in a common location. Figure 7.2 represents the situation 
in which A has this feature, and he believes that B does 
not. Figure 7.3 is the case where A has a feature and he 
wonders whether B shares it. He is uncertain as to 
whether B has it. Finally, Figure 7.4 represents the case 
where A has discovered that B has a feature which he does 
not have (in fact this configuration does not hold for 
the feature start and the route giver in Map 1, but it 
can for other features). 
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These various P-C representations may, for the sake 
of space, be collapsed into basic configurations 
representing the absence or presence of information about 
a particular feature. This simplified notation is shown 
in Table 7.3. 
TABLE 7.3 
Perspect Content Perspect Content 
Figure 7.1 ~> aep + a/bep + 
Figure 7.2 -> aep + a/bep 
Figure 7.3 -> aep + a/bep ? 
Figure 7.4 -> aep a/bep + 
One may ask why all the possible configurations, which 
result from three values in two perspectives, are not 
shown. Each of the configurations shown in Table 7.4 is, 
for one reason or another, not possible in the context of 
this task. 
TABLE 7.4 
Perspect Content Perspect Content 
aep ? a/bep + 
aep a/bep 
aep ? a/bep ? 
aep ? a/bep 
aep a/bep ? 
The first of these additional configurations would 
correspond to the situation where A knows that B knows of 
a feature, but A himself is not sure of his own 
perspective on it. In the toy world of the map task we 
assume that A is able to decide whether or not he knows 
of an object. In actual practice it is possible to think 
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someone else has definite knowledge about an object which 
you think you know about but cannot bring to mind. 
we also accord no sense to the second configuration, 
which suggests that both A and B know that they have no 
information about an object and no derivative knowledge 
from any other source. 
There is a problem in knowledge representation in 
distinguishing cases of knowledge of the absence of 
objects or features, and total ignorance of objects or 
features. If we take A's P-C point of view, A may come to 
realise that he has no perspective on a feature through 
derivative information he receives on the feature from B. 
This case is covered by the configuration (aeb a/aep 
+) • 
The third and fourth configurations are ruled out in 
the map task for the same reasons as the first 
configuration in 7.4. we assume that A cannot be unsure 
as to whether a feature is present on his own map or not. 
The fifth configuration of Table 7.4 is ruled out on 
the grounds that A cannot be ignorant of a feature and 
then be in doubt as to that feature's presence in 
'a/bep' • 
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Let us consider the role of the referential 
instigator and interpreter modulo these configurations. 
A referential instigator who makes first discourse 
reference to an object can be in any of the 
configurations shown in Table 7.5. 
TABLE 7.5 
Perspect Content Perspect Content 
i Ins ep + Ins/Int ep + 
ii Ins ep + Ins/Int ep 
iii Ins ep + Ins/Int ep ? 
The referential instigator {Ins) must have the object at 
a primary perspective. If he has derivative knowledge of 
an object from his partner, he cannot be the referential 
instigator. The first configuration, Ci), is that in 
which the instigator assumes his interpreter has the 
object as well. Else he may, in advance of his act of 
reference, assume that the interpreter does not have the 
object, configuration Cii). Finally the instigator may 
be unsure about whether the interpreter has a contentful 
primary perspective on the object, configuration Ciii). 
As a referential interpreter a participant may be 
represented as in any of the configuration detailed in 
Table 7 .6. 














The interpreter can either think he shares the object 
introduced into discourse,. as in Ci'), or else he can 
believe he does not have it, as in Cii'). 
Let us now look at some of the data obtained from 
our subjects. As we saw in the last chapter, we can 
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characterise the state of knowledge of a current speaker 
before his utterance by appeal to what he has on his map 
and the history of the discourse up to this point. What I 
shall do now is note the form of the expressions used in 
various 'knowledge configurations' where reference is 
made to new discourse objects or back to pre-established 
ones. 
The extracts below are taken from our two 
populations of 16 year old Scottish Secondary school 
children and Edinburqh University students. The first set 
of extracts are typical of interchanges at two points on 
Map 1. The parts of Map 1 at issue will be familiar from 
chapter 8. At the bottom right hand corner of Map 1 
there is a .P.9lID beach, and a ~rfall at the bottom left 
hand corner. Both participants have these features 
marked. One of the participants (the instruction giver) 
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has a swamp lying between these two features, the other 
participant has crocodiles marked. Also on Map 1 both 
participants have the feature lUg River but, only the 
instruction giver has a bridge marked across the river. 
Extract 7.2 














Have you got wee palm trees aye? 
uhu 
right. go just +. a. wee bit along to them + 
have you got a swamp ? 
er 
right just go + have you got a waterfall? 
aye 
go + between the palmtrees and the waterfall 




in between the waterfall and the. palm trees .. 
right + go in between the crocodiles and the 
palm trees 
Extract 7.3 









ok you are. going to come about one inch below 
that palm beach 
uhu 
and ++ you are not quite horizontal you are 
taking.a slight curve up towards the swamp+ 
not obviously going into it 
well sorry + I've not got a swamp 
you have not got a swamp 
no 
ok 
start again from the palm beach 
Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: draw a curved line towards the bridge 
2 B: bridge? 
3 A: at the Big River . 
4 B: there's not a bridge 
5 A: eh? ... 
6 B: there's not a bridge .. 
7 A: just draw a line + going across the 
river +the Big River 
8 B: anywhere on the river? 
9 A: aye 
Extract 7.5 







ok so you're walking towards +have you got a 
bridge on your map that goes across the 
Big River? 
no .. 
well there is a bridge 









well I don't have a lake + all I have is the Big 
River that nearly describes the tail of a rat 
ok. + look I am on top of the waterfall now I am 
aiming between these two peaks sort of + pretty 







yeh + you are going straight between the two 
peaks + ok 
yeh ok 
and you are describing a sort of a curvy line + 
you are not walking straight through 
ok is it a wiggly line ? 
yeh.it is a wiggly line 
ok ++ and I am through the peaks and do I go 
straight on and I hit the bridge? 
Looking at fragments of the cited extracts we can 
characterise the state of knowledge of a speaker the 
moment immediately before (or after) he produces an 
utterance and note the form of the expression he 
provides. Let's first consider participant A, the 
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authoritative participant, as speaker in extract 7.2. The 
configurations and forms are distinguished as to whether 
this is an initial act of referential instigation (1), or 
of subsequent mention (2), the conditions for instigation 
and subsequent mention being well defined in this task. 
Analysis of Extract 7.2 
Map 1 Sl3 & Sl4 B'Muir 
1 A: •• you got wee 
palm trees aye? 
2 B: uhu 
3 A: •• you got a swamp ? 
4 B: er 
5 A: •• you got a waterfall? 
6 B: aye 
7 A: •• between the palmtrees 
and the waterfall 
8 B: but I've got crocodiles 
9 A: you've.got what? 
10 B: crocodiles 
11 A: whereabout? 
12 B: •• the waterfall and 
the palm trees 
13 A: •• the crocodiles and 
















1 ind pl 
1 a + N 
1 a + N 
2 the + N 
2 the + N 
2 the + N 
2 the + N 
Consider now the fragments of extract 7.2 where B refers 
to discourse objects. 
Analysis of Extract 7.2 
Map 1 Sl3 & Sl4 B'Muir 
8 B: but I've got crocodiles 
10 B: crocodiles 
12 B: •• the waterfall and 











1 ind pl 
2 ind pl 
2 the + N 
2 the + N 
Moving on, let us consider participant A in extract 7.3. 
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Analysis of Extract 7 .• 3 
Map 1 S7 & SB Ed. Univ. 
aep a/bep form 
1 A: •• that palm beach + + 2 def 
2 B: uhu 
3 A: •• up. towards the swamp + + 1 the + N 
4 B: •• I've not got.a swamp 
5 A: not got a swamp + 2 a + N 
6 B: no 
7 A: ok 
B B: •• from the palm beach 
And now consider the fragments of extract 7.3 where Bis 
making reference to discourse objects. 
Analysis of Extract 7.3 
Map 1 S7 & SB Ed. Univ. 
bep b/aep form . 
4 B: •• I've not got a swamp + 2 a + N 
B B: •• from the palm beach + + 2 a + N 
What might these two extracts suggest? Certainly the 
participants seem to be referring, despite the fact that 
Formalist doctrine does not allow reference to be the 
relation underpinning their use of the various indefinite 
and definite expressions in these extracts. The extracts 
also demonstrate that first and second mention is not 
equated with indefinite and definite forms respectively, 
cf for example extract 7.2 ClOB), or extract 7.3 (3A) and 
C4B). Many of the indefinite expressions are not 
exclusive in the way Hawkins predicts; most of the 
features are unique in the map domain which constitutes 
the 'pragmatic domain of interpretation'. 
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If we look at the forms and the perspectival 
partitions, two patterns do emerge from these small 
fragments. One pattern applies to the referential 
instiqator - where a configuration is implicated in the 





then an indefinite form is used, cf for example extract 
7. 2 ClA) , C3A) and CSA) (Footnote 7. 2) • The other 
pattern is that where initial or subsequent reference 





then a definite form is used, cf for example extract 7.2 
C7A), Cl3A), and extract 7 .3 C3A), C BB). 
Let us look at analyses of extracts 7.4 and 7.S to 
see if they help consolidate and clarify our 
understanding of the possible relation between epistemic 
perspectives and referential forms. Consider extract 7.4 
from A and then B's point of view. 
Footnote 7.2. The assumption of a configuration 
Ins ep + Ins/Int ep ? 
in utterances such as extract 7.2-.(lA), .(3A), .CSA) .. is 
based on the very fact that interrogative forms are used. 
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Analysis of Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 B'Muir 
aep a/bep form 
1 A: •• towards the bridge + + 1 the + N 
2 B: bridge? 
3 A: at the Big River + + 1 the + N 
4 B: there's not a bridge 
5 A: eh? .. 
6 B: there's not. a .bridge 
7 A: •• across the river + + 2 the + N 
+ the Big River + + 2 the + N 
8 B: anywhere on the river? 
9 A: aye 
Analysis of Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 B'Muir 
bep b/aep form 
2 B: bridge? + 2 bare 
4 B: there's not a bridge + 2 a + N 
6 B: there.• s not a bridge + 2 a + N 
8 B: anywhere on the river? + + 2 the + N 
And now extract 7.5 from the two participants' points of 
view. 
Analysis of Extract 7.5 
Map 1 SS & S6 Ed Univ 
aep a/bep form 
1 A: •• you got a bridge + ? 1 a + N 
•• across the Big River? + + 2 the + N 
2 B: no 
3 A: well there is a bridge + 2 a + N 
4 B: •• the .lake before 
the Biq River? 
5 A: a .. lake? + 2 a + N 
6 B: oxbow lake 
7 A: •• a lake + + 2 a + N 
•• the Big River + + 2 the + N 
8 B: •• the waterfall 
•• these two peaks 
9 A: .•• the two peaks + ok + + 2 the + N 
10 B: yeh ok 
11 A: •• straight through 
12 B: ok •• 
13 A: yeh •• 
14 B: •• the peaks 
•• the bridge? 
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Analysis of Extract 7.5 
Map 1 SS & S6 Ed Univ 
bep b/aep form, 
4 B: •• the lake before + + 1 a ± N 
the Big River? + + 2 the + N 
6 B: oxbow lake . 
8 B: •• the waterfall + + 2 the + N 
•• these two peaks + + 2 the + N 
14 B: •• the peaks + + 2 the + N 
•• the bridge? + 2 the + N 
Our first two patterns of configuration and form seem to 
be substantiated by these additional extracts. Recall 
that the remaining two level configurations for 
instigators and interpreters are Cii) and Cii') from 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6. These two configurations are given 
again in Table 7.7. 
Perspect 
ii Ins ep 
ii' Int ep 





Int/Ins ep + 
Let us consider Cii') first. Such a configuration can 
only operate as one which is relevant to a referential 
act which is an act of subsequent mention (some would use 
the term discourse anaphora). So far six out of the eight 
cases in which such a configuration is implicated involve 
the use of indefinite and bare nominals. This raises 
problems, as previously stated, for first and second 
mention accounts. These six cases, shown below, fall 
into two categories; situations where the interpreter is 
checking his understanding of the instigator's utterance, 
or else situations where we have explicit denial of 
presuppositions made by the instigator. 
Part of Extract 7.5 
Map 1 SS & S6 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
4 B: 
S A: 
so I am + do I go near the lake before the Big 
River? 
a lake? 
Part of Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: 
2 B: 
draw a curved line towards the bridge 
bridge? 
Part of Extract 7.3 
Map 1 S7 & SB Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
3 A: 
4 B: 
and ++you are not quite horizontal.you are 
taking a slight curve up towards the swamp + 
not obviously going into it 
well sorry + I've not got a swamp 
Part of Extract 7.5 









well I don't have a lake + ••• 
Part of Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
1 A: draw. a curved line towards the bridge 
2 B: bridge? 
3 A: at the Big River 
4 B: there's not a bridge 
s A: eh? 
6 B: there's not a bridge 
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The denial of presupposition is particularly interesting 
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because it requires the introduction of third level 
perspectives. Now there are only three possible 
configurations for three levels of perspective in the 
case of Cii'). These are shown in Table 7.8. 
TABLE 7.8 
Perspect Perspect Perspect 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
iia' + + 
iib' + ? 
iic' + 
From the interpreter's viewpoint Ciic') represents the 
case in which the instigator has an accurate view of the 
interpreter's view of the absence of a feature from the 
interpreter's map. Configuration Ciib') represents the 
situation in which the interpreter realises that the 
instiqator is unsure about the interpreter's perspective 
Cie the interpreter's view of configuration Cii)). 
Lastly, Ciia') represents the interpreter's belief that 
the instigator harbours an incorrect view as to the 
presence of an object on his map. To correct what the 
interpreter believes is a false presupposition which the 
instigator is making about him, the interpreter can be 
represented as attempting to change the perspectival 
configuration from Ciia') to Ciic'). 
There are another set of three level possibilities 
for the other two level interpreter configuration Ci'). 
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Again the interpreter's suspicion that the instigator 
harbours a misapprehension about his knowledge state can 
only be revealed in a three level analysis. These three 
possibilities are shown in Table 7.7. 
TABLE 7.9 
Perspect Perspect Perspect 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
ia' + + 
ib' + + ? 
ic' + + + 
The fragments just cited from extracts 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 
show the interpreter attempting to rectify the 
instiqator's presuppositions in cases where the 
interpreter believes the instigator thinks the 
interpreter has features which he hasn't Cin terms of our 
configurations moving from Ciia') to Ciic')). The 
analyses of the relevant extract fragments shows that in 
all cases indefinites are used. 
Analysis of part of 7.3 
Map 1 S7 & S8 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
3A: •• towards the swamp + 
not obviously going into it 
4B: •• I've not got a swamp 
A's config immed after 3A 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep Form. 
+ + + the + N 
+ + + def pro 
B's config before 4B 
Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep Form 
+ + a + N 
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Analysis of part of Extract 7.5 
Map 1 SS & S6 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
B.' s conf ig immed after 4B 
Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep Form 
4B: •• I go near the lake + + + the + N 
A's config before 7A 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep Form 
7A: •• I don't have a lake + +a + N 
Analysis of part of Extract 7.4 
Map 1 S21 & S22 Subjects from B'Muir School 
A-' s conf ig immed after IA 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep Form 
lA: •• line towards the bridge + + +the+ N 
B's config before 4B 
Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep Form 
4B: there's not a bridge + +a+ N 
Extracts 7.6 and 7.7, cited below, show the type of 
presupposition correction involved when an interpreter 
attempts to indicate to the instigator that he has a 
feature which the instigator may think he has not got, in 
terms of our configurations moving from (ia') to (ic'). 
Again indefinites are used. 
Extract 7.6 




right well you're going + from north to -
south and there is a start marked in the 
top right hand corner + about two inches 
in from ++ 
yes + well + I've + I've got a start 
you've got the start in the north +.well 
we're heading in the south +now have you 
got marked a volcano? 
398 
Analysis of part of Extract .7-.6 
Map 2 Sl5 & Sl6 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
A's config immed after lA 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep Form 
lA: •• is a start marked •• + +a + N 
B~s config before 2B 
Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep Form 
2B: •• I've got a start.. + + a+ N 
Extract 7.7 








ok do you see right in the bottom right 
hand corner of the- map a blue bay with 
a .palm beach just ++ 
yeh 
ok well below that palm beach about sort + 
one inch in is a start cross 
I already have.a start marked 
ok .then left to the palm beach do 
you have a swamp? . . . . 
where do I go from the start? 
so what you want to do is from the 
starting point you bear ••• 
Analysis of part of Extract 7.7 
Map 1 Sl3 & Sl4 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
3A: •• is a start cross ••• 
4B: •• I already have a start 
A's config immed after 3A 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep Form 
+ +a + N 
B's config before 4B 
Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep Form 
+ + a + N 
we have seen from these extracts that in correcting 
an instigator's incorrect presupposition, an interpreter 
uses indefinites. When the instigator's view of the 
interpreter has been corrected, how does the interpreter 
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subsequently refer to the object? What is the form of the 
referential expressions when configurations Cic') and 
Ciic') are at stake? An extract which contains 
presupposition correction and subsequent mention by the 
interpreter is an extension of 7.3. 
Part of Extract 7~3 with extensions 

















and++ you are not quite horizontal-you are 
taking a slight curve-up towards the swamp+ 
not obviously going-into it 
well sorry + I've not-got a swamp 
you have not got a swamp 
no 
so I go to the palm beach 
no don't .draw the route just now 
I'm going to show you where the swamp is 
ok 
two inches across from the top of the tree 
at the palm beach 
ok is the swamp 
is the swamp and that swamp is about an 
inch square 
come up about one and a half inches to the 
left and curve right round ++ round about 
half an inch to the right of the swamp 
so kind of above the palm beach then 
yeh 
how far up should I go? 
now take ++a circle round the swamp staying 
about one inch from the edge 
so I go round to the north of the swamp 
In extracts 7.5 and 7.4 the presupposed features are 
not mentioned after the interpreter's presuppositional 
denial. However, extract 7.8 shows another example of 
presuppositional denial where subsequent mention does 
occur. 
Extract 7.8 









because you are going to cross the bridge 
there 
ok +well I don't have a bridge on mine 
uhu 
ok tell me where the bridge is 
. . 
you are going north east at the moment + 
we have to cross the river 
is the bridge I cross just there? 
yes that is. what I am. trying to tell you + 
where. the .bridge is you see 
ok well tell me again 
In both these extracts after presuppositional 
correction, which in both cases is of the form Ciia')-
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>Ciic'), the feature which the interpreter has learnt he 
doesn't have is referred to using definite forms, cf for 
example 7.3 (eB), CviB), 7.8 (4B), (bB). 
Consider extracts 7.6 and 7.7 which, from the 
interpreter's point of view, move from configurations on 
the start feature of Cia') to Cic'). In both cases the 
interpreters correct what they perceive to be an 
erroneous presupposition: in 7.7, which is the only case 
of the interpreter making subsequent reference to the 
feature, a definite is used, CbB). It should be noted 
that the instigators in all the 'presuppositional 
correction' extracts also continue to use definite forms 
once they have taken 'on board' the interpreter's 
correction of their initial presupposition, cf for 
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example 7.3 (bA), CfA), CiA), CvA), 7.6 C3A), and 7.7 
(bA). 
A three level analysis of the interpreter allows us 
to examine the form of referential expressions used if he 
replies to queries from the instigator with full 
referring expressions. In other words, we can look at 
the type of nominal which is used when associated with 
the perception by the interpreter of configurations Cib') 
or Ciib'). Extracts 7.8-7.11 characterise such 
responses, responses which are quite rare since most 
commonly the response is just a 'yes'/'no' reply. we can 
see from the analyses that configuration Cib') is 
associated with extracts 7.8-7.12, whilst Ciib') is 
associated with extracts 7.13-7.14. 
Extract 7.9 
Map 2 Sl5 & Sl6 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 A: 
2 B: 
·~· have you got a waterhole 
quite near there 
by any chance? 
yes I've got a waterhole ••• 
Analysis-
B's Cthe interpreter's) perspect before 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ + ? 
B's Cthe interpreter's) perspect after 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ + + 
2B Of 7.9 
Form 
a + N 
2B of 7.9 
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Extract 7.10 
Map 1 Sl & S2 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 A: to the top right hand side + do you have 
a big river. 
2 B: er sorry + yes I do have a big river + er there's 
no bridge 
Analysis-
B's Cthe interpreter' s) perspec before 2B of 7 .•. 10 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep Form 
+ + ? a + N 
B's Cthe interpreter's) perspect after 2B Of 7.10 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ + + 
Extract 7.11 
Map 2 Sl3 & Sl4 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 B: got what? 
2 A: giraffes 
3 B: but I .have got some elephants 
4 A: how about a cave? 
s B: yes there is a cave 
Analysis-
B's Cthe interpreter's) perspect before SB of 7..11 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep Form 
+ + ? a + N 
B's (the interpreter' s) perspect after SB of 7.11 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ + + 
Extract 7.12 




••• have you got. a .. big .river? ..... 
aye + .got .a big river up the way 
you go across the bridge 
Analysis-
B's (the interpreter's) perspect before 2B of 7.12 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep Form 
+ + ? a+N 
B's (the interpreter's) perspect after 2B of 7.12 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ + + 
Extract 7.13 
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Map 2 Sl3 & Sl4 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 A: ••• up round the graveyard 
2 B: I. go up above the graveyard 
3 A: up above and round 
4 B: ok + do you have a waterhole? 
s A: no I've not got a waterhole 
Analysis-
A's (the interpreter's) perspect before SA of 7-.13 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep Form 
+ ? a + N 
A's (the interpreter' s) perspect after SA of 7.13 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ 
Extract 7.14 
Map 2 SS & S6 Subjects from Edinburgh Univ. 
1 A: •• ~can-you.see.a.desert? + it will be + its 
below the the airplane.on the map 
2 B: no I don't have a desert 
3 A: ah + ok 
Analysis-
B's (the interpreter's) perspect before 2B of 7.14 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep Form 
+ ? a + N 
B's (the interpreter's) perspect after 2B Of 7.14 
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 
+ 
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All of these responses are indefinite in form. Given the 
suggestion that both the (ib') and (ia') configurations 
evoke indefinites, this adds a couple of qualifications 
to the general pattern first observed in the two level 
analyses (which were chosen so as not to contain a third 
level perspective differing from the primary interpreter 
perspective). The rule for an interpreter's use of the 
indefinite is preserved in (ic'). Let me reiterate that 
what would be intractable exceptions to our analysis 
become suggestive new generalisations when third level 
perspectives are considered. 
The extracts selected suggest a set of relations 
between configurations and forms that may be summarised 
in Table 7.7. If an interpreter perceives the 
configuration on the left as the perspectives he has on 
an object then the tendency will be to use the 
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TABLE 7 .10 
Interpreter's .use .. of .. referential .. forms 
--------------------------------------
Int ep Int/Ins ep Int/Ins/Int ep 













Whilst all the evidence has come from isolated extracts, 
a complete analysis of the interpreter configurations in 
the map task data revealed that the percentage of 
occurrences of forms in each conf igurational class was as 
listed in Table 7.11. 
TABLE 7.11 
Percentage use of forms by interpreters 
---------------------------------------
Configuration Indefinites Def inites 
a:-t-N bare ind pro the+N def pro 
+ + + 3% 2% 83% 12% 
+ 12% 6% 74% 8% 
+ + 70% 4% 26% 
+ + 68% 10% 4% 10% 8% 
+ + ? 90% 10% 
+ ? 56% 15% 15% 4% 10% 
~ The figures given in Table 7.11 are prima facie 
evidence in support of the model of the relation between 
epistemological configurations and the production of 
referential forms given in Table 7.7. Whilst all the 
forms produced do not conform to the model's predictions 
the exceptions are a small proportion of the cases which 
do conform. Indeed in looking at regularities in 
discourse phenomena analysts often adopt the stance 
defended by Givon 1977. 
What is the communicative difference 
between. a.rule of 90% fidelity and one of 
100% fidelity? In psychological terms, 
next to nothing. . In communication, a 
system with 90% .categorial fidelity is a 
highly efficient system. CGivon 1979) 
Let us now look at the referential instigator in 
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terms of a three level analysis. Given the possibilities 
of Table 7.5, there are a total of nine three level 
configurations for a referential instigator shown in 
Table 7 .12. 
TABLE 7 .12 
Perspect Perspect Perspect 
Ins ep Ins/Int ep Ins/Int/Ins ep 
ia + + + 
ib + + ? 
ic + + 
iia + + 
iib + ? 
iic + 
iiia + ? + 
iiib + ? ? 
iiic + ? 
we must distinguish in the case of the referential 
instigator, between initial introduction and subsequent 
mention. After referential instigation, presuming that 
the interpreter has heard aright, the instigator can 
assume that the third level perspective 'Ins/Int/Ins ep' 
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must have content. The interpreter must realise the 
instigator has the object or he could not have introduced 
it into discourse in the context of this task. 
After initial mention the instigator is restricted 
to the three possibilities represented in 7.12 as Cia), 
Ciia) and Ciiia), shown below together as Table 7.13. 
TABLE 7.13 
Perspect Perspect Perspect 
Ins ep Ins/Int ep Ins/Int/Ins ep 
ia + + + 
iia + + 
iiia + ? + 
Configuration Cia) represents the case where the 
instigator believes an object is mutually recognised to 
be shared. The extracts below are typical of how this 
subsequent mention configuration can arise. Notice it can 
arise out of various different initial mention 
conditions. 
Extract 7 .• 15 
Instiqator moves from '+ 
Map 1 S23 & S24 
? ?. I tO I + + +I 








•• have you got a waterfall? 
uhu 
you for round the waterfall 
left or right or what? 
eh + left round the waterfall + and 
up + up about an inch + have you got 
some mountains? 
uhu .. 
well you go in a straight line through 
the mountains 
Extract 7.16 
Instigator moves from '+ + +' to '+ + +' 




right you go + through + the middle + 
between the middle in between the swamp 
and the palm trees + right 
uhu 
then + left turn left round the swamp + 
and go under the waterfall++ 
right and then right right round the waterfall 
++ left turning left 
Extract 7 .• 6 
I tO I+ + +' 
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Instiqator moves from '+ 




right well you're- going + from north to 
south and there is a start marked in the 
top right hand corner + about two inches 
in from ++ 
yes + well + I've + I've got a. start. 
you've got the start in the north + well 
we're heading in the south +now have you 
got marked a volcano? 
Thus in maintaining reference to what are supposed to be 
mutually recognised shared objects the instigator makes 
use of definite forms. 
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An instigator may learn that the interpreter has not 
got a feature which he, the instigator, has got. Once 
configuration Ciia) has been established through the 
interpreter's response to referential instigation, we 
find that once again the definite form predominates, cf 
for example the extended version of extract 7.3 CbA), 
(fA), CiA), CvA), and extract 7.8 CcA). 
Lastly an instigator may, even after initial 
reference, remain unsure as to the presence or absence of 
the feature from his interpreter's map, ie configuration 
(iiia). The few occasions in this data where one can 
confidently assume such a configuration seem to involve 
the repetition of the form of the initial referential 
act, cf for example extracts 7.17 and 7.18 below. 
Extract 7.17 




do you have a swamp there? 
you said a swamp?. 
yes have you got a swamp by + 
left of the palm beach 
Extract 7.18 





•• and go on +across the bridge on the 
big river 
actually I don't have a bridge + 
where would it be in relation to the lake? 
you don't have the lake + well 
no + but where would it be in relation 
to the lake? 
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Table 7.14 below shows the percentage of different 
varieties of forms produced in the map data by the 
referential instigator at subsequent mention, in relation 
to the two main configurations observed, Cia) and Ciia). 
TABLE 7 .14 
Percentage use.of. forms. by.instigators on 
subsequent mention .... -- ... 
-----------------------------------------. . . . 
Conf iquration Indefinites 
bare ind pro 
8% 
Def inites 









12% 66% 12% 
Turning to the configurations an instigator may have 
immediately prior to referential instigation, we see that 
only five out of the nine possible configurations of 
Table 7.12 are possible in the map task. Configuration 
Ciiia) and Ciiic) are ruled out, they do not make much 
sense at a third level perspective. If the instigator is 
uncertain about his interpreter's primary perspective why 
should he, before instigation, know about the 
interpreter's view of himself the instigator. Although 
possibly Ciiia) could make sense for certain obligatory 
features, ie the instigator does not know what his 
interpreter has but he does expect him to realise that 
he, the instigator, will have features such as start and 
finish. However, I will not follow up these 
configurations in this task. Configurations Ciia) and 
Ciib) seem odd for a similar reason to that given above. 
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Why should the instigator expect the interpreter not to 
have specific features but to realise that the instigator 
has (again the only exception might be the .case of 
'obliqatory features'). This leaves us with the 









Possible configurations for the referential 
instigator. prior to the act. of .instigation .. 
Perspect Perspect 
Ins/Int ep Ins/Int/Ins ep 
+ + + 
+ + ? 
+ + 
+ 
+ ? ? 
These configurations represent the following cases. In 
Cia) the instigator assumes that the object is mutually 
recognised as shared. This configuration is heavily 
implicated in strategies where the instigator plunges 
into route description without checking the congruence of 
the two maps. In such cases exemplified by extracts such 
as 7.16 the definite form is most in evidence. 
A problem is that configurations Cib) and Cic) are 
difficult to detect. They correspond to situations where 
an instigator thinks he and his interpreter share an 
object, but in Cib) the instigator is unsure about 
whether the interpreter knows that the instigator has it, 
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and in Cic) the instigator assumes that the interpreter 
does not believe that the instigator has it. Thus the 
problem with an extract such as 7.19, is that although 
the instigator at ClB) is directing his initial 
referential speech act to 'ins/int/ins ep', it is not 
immediately clear what assumptions the instigator is 
making about the level two perspective 'ins/int ep'. 
Extract 7.19 






let me tell you what I have + 
I have a wood above + well above the 
waterfall 
uhu + and. 
and I+ er+ have you got a lion's.den? 
yes+ yes+ you should still be a good way down 
from the wood + turn towards + towards the 
mountains + you take the route over between 
the two mountains 
two mountains? 
Analysis- Bep B/Aep B/A/Bep 
1 B: •• I have a wood 1 + * ? 
•• the waterfall 2 + + + . . 
3 B •• got a lion's den 1 + ? ? 
Aep A/Bep A/B/Aep 
4 A •• the mountains 1 + + + 
Utterances such as C4A) in the imperative form seem to 
presuppose the existence of the object on the 
interpreter's map. So that a referential instigator who 
assumes the first two perspectives have content can 
effectively disregard the third level since an utterance 
like C4A) will have the effect of establishing content at 
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the third level 'A/B/Aep'. Problems only really arise 
when the instiqator explicitly directs his referential 
act to the third level perspective. Thus configuration 
Ciic) and Ciiib) are also tractable because there exists 
only one possible third level configuration with each of 
them. Examining the form of the speech act at 
instiqation, as in (3B), allows us to determine that 
configuration (iiib) is implicated, or extract 7.6 ClA) 
which indicates that Ciic) is present. In both these 
cases the indefinite form is used. 
What about the configurations Cib) and Cic)? 
Perhaps the most useful generalisation is to look at the 
perspective to which an utterance is directed, if this 
looks to be explicitly a third level one, as in extract 
7.19 (lB), then note the form of the expression. 
Table 7.16 below notes the percentage of forms of 
expressions in various configurations. 
TABLE 7.16 




















Def inites .. 




Taking Tables 7.14 and 7.16 together, preferences for the 
adoption of referential forms in response to epistemic 
configuration seem to be as detailed in Table 7.17. 
TABLE 7.17 




Ins ep Ins/Int ep 
ia + + 
ib + + 
ic + + 
iic + 


























The set of generalisations proposed for the map task data 
gives us a new way of thinking about the factors 
governing the distribution of referential forms. The data 
examined suggests a model in which the factor constant 
over all uses of the indefinite expression is a 
participant's initial disposition not to assume 
symmetrical knowledge between himself and his 
interlocutor. 
It is not assumed that the epistemological 
conditions of this task are carried over into all our 
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discourse situations. The difference in the 
epistemological conditions between discourse tasks is one 
reason why the Prince model, discussed on page I 
accounts for the Brown and Yule data so well. In the 
geometric diagram drawing task the authoritative 
participant, the instructions giver, is able to assume 
pretty much an omniscient view. In the map task no 
participant commands all the relevant knowledge. Although 
the participant with the route is invested with authority 
- just as in the diagram drawing - the other participant 
has his own. sometimes incompatible information. Each 
participant has to be sensitive not only to his own view 
of the world but also to his interlocutor's. Also the 
properties of the objects in the diagram drawing task of 
Brown and Yule were well known; triangles have angles, 
circles have diameters, and so on. The properties of the 
objects in the maps are less well known and the relations 
between them cannot be predicted. The content of the map 
task has more inbuilt indeterminacy, and may therefore 
lead to greater doubt and caution, to different 
estimations as to the distribution of knowledge between 
discourse participants. What I am suggesting is that the 
different generalisations will emerge out of different 
tasks. 
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The data cited here do not constitute a rigorous 
experimental test of an effect of 'epistemological 
configurations' on the production of particular 
referential forms. The model used has suggested a set of 
possible generalisations for the referential forms found 
in particular sort of discourse data. Moreover the data 
would certainly prove embarrassing for other models of 
definite and indefinite distribution. There is a central 
reliance of the model on the estimation by referential 
processors of their interlocutors' belief states. Once 
more an intentional analysis seems required in a set of 
referential phenomena. 
CONCLUPING .REMARKS 
This thesis has been concerned with the question of how 
reference works in natural language. The phenomenon of 
referential opacity was taken as the starting point in 
this enquiry. 
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The most precise formulations of the problems 
surrounding referential opacity are to be found in Formal 
Semantics. It was therefore natural to first consider 
some Formal Semantic analyses of reference. 
In all standard theories of Formal Semantics 
reference is a tightly defined, invariant relation. It is 
a relation established by fiat. Reference formally 
construed, is an objective and immutable relation between 
the basic expressions of a logical calculus and elements 
in the model over which the language is being 
interpreted. This view of reference is necessary in 
logical languages which require determinate theories of 
truth on which to build the recursive semantic structure 
of the calculus. 
The facts of referential opacity, as we saw, 
threaten to deal a fatal blow to the enterprise of using 
logical languages to examine the semantic structure of 
natural languages. 
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Considerable effort and ingenuity went into the 
business of providing solutions for the class of 
problems generated by the so-called 'opacity operators' 
of natural languaqes. 
we considered a number of formal responses to the 
problem of opacity. The first, the Fregean account, 
introduced the concept of a two-tier semantics. In 
Frege's semantics, expressions in a language could have 
as their semantic values not just objects, sets of 
individuals and the like, but also a second type of value 
- 'sense'. The sense of an expression could be construed 
as the 'meaning' of that expression inasmuch as a sense 
does what a meaning does. Given a spatio-temporal 
context a sense determines the extensions of expressions. 
But meanings themselves can sometimes be the object of 
reference, a meaning can be what we are talking about. 
Freqe was insistent that this type of semantic value has 
to be objective and immutable. Senses were part of the 
objective furniture of the world. Only by placing 
meanings outside the head did Frege think we could secure 
a transparent semantics for language. such transparency 
would enable the proper transmission of information about 
the objective content of human knowledge, for example 
mathematics logic, physics etc. Moreover, whilst 
substitutions of 'direct' co-referring expressions within 
opaque contexts might lead to unwanted inferences, the 
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substitution of terms which had the same sense could not. 
As a programme this approach seemed promising enough. The 
next question was how to go about formally characterising 
the notion of sense? 
Russell's answer was to suggest that we need not 
try, since he claimed that we only need a semantics based 
on the single concept of denotation. In addition 
Russell's Theory of Descriptions sought to explain many 
referential puzzles by demonstrating that true denotation 
was not a feature of the 'denoting phrases' and 'names' 
of natural language. It was Russell's belief that the 
puzzles of reference could be made to disappear from 
language through the application of logical analysis. 
Nevertheless the wit of many Twentieth Century 
logicians was directed toward trying to produce a 
rigorous account of Fregean semantics. The formulation 
of sense as presented in Montague's work, is an 
interesting amalgam of Fregean and Russellian concepts. 
It provides a semantics which, on the one hand is 
fundamentally denotational and is grounded in basic 
extensions, whilst, on the other, it is capable of 
generating 'senses'. Certainly formal sense, or 
intension, filled the role of Fregean sense precisely 
because it provided a way of establishing, for any 
spatio-temporal context, the extension of an expression. 
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With the apparatus of Intensional Logic we 
considered the various analyses Montague proposed for 
opacity problems involving; proper names, definite 
descriptions and indefinite expressions. In addition, we 
reviewed scopal analyses of the referential phenomena of 
'specificity', 'expressive responsibility' and 
'referentiality'. I suggested that the mechanism of 
logical scope was being over-taxed. It is used to 
account for so many semantic distinctions that certain 
combinations of referential phenomena generate paradoxes 
of interpretation. 
Two features of Formal treatments of reference 
mitigate against its use as a model of reference in 
natural language. The first is the exclusion from the 
account of any mention of the cognitive states of 
languaqe users. The second feature, is the 
characterisation of the reference relation, it is 
characterised as absolute, objective and invariant. Both 
of these elements in the Formalists' view of reference 
may be appropriate in the 'closed system·• domains of 
mathematics and logic. However they do no justice to the 
'open texture' of natural language. Indeed properties 
like 'open texture' suggest that meaning in language just 
is dependent on cognitive criteria of identification and 
verification. 
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Attempting to take a different path than the 
Formalists I made use of cognitive states in the 
reanalysis of semantic distinctions such as 
'specificity', 'expressive responsibility' and 
'referentiality'. 
A cognitive approach to semantics brings with it the 
assumption that the representations which constitute our 
understanding of terms, referential or otherwise, are 
both subjective and fallible. This introduces the 
prospect of the collapse of language as a means of 
transferring, eliciting or debating information. we can 
never guarantee that our representations ref er to the 
same states of affairs in the world. Nor, as a corollary 
can we be sure that the same linguistic terms used by 
different processors are co-intensional. 
However the slide into hopeless subjectivism is not 
an inevitable one. Insights recruited from Evolutionary 
Epistemology can offer a means of securing the 'success' 
of communication between intentional systems. The 
effective success of our communicative acts is the result 
of an accommodation between the demands of the 
communicative situation and the limitations of ourselves 
the language user. The Evolutionary Epistemologist also 
introduces the concept of a 'Wel tbildapparat'; the 
ability of an organism to build models of their 
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environment modulo their cognitive endowment. The use of 
Mental Models in Cognitive Science is discussed in an 
attempt to discern what is said about the interpretation 
and generation of language. It turns out that most 
Discourse Models do assume a form of intensional 
equivalence of terms between language users. 
The constructive side of my thesis alleges a complex 
interaction of language user, language system and 
environment. None of these elements can be autonomous in 
our appreciation of the phenomenon of reference; 
environments contain language users, language users 
instantiate language systems. 
The processor centered system of referential 
description developed in chapter five is an attempt to 
embody some of the features which, I have claimed, must 
figure in any account of referential behaviour. In 
particular, the system contains machinery to represent 
processors' beliefs about their own and other peoples' 
views of the potential objects of discourse reference. 
Features of the system have been used to describe 
the semantic properties of 'specificity', 'expressive 
responsibility', 'referentiality' • The features used do 
not rely on the linear ordering of logical operators. 
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The descriptive system has also been applied to 
discourse data obtained from a controlled task. The 
nature of the task ensures that, initially, knowledge is 
distributed unevenly between the discourse participants. 
The referential behaviour of subjects performing the task 
was of particular interest. The data makes it clear, for 
example, apparent that processor's can and do use their 
beliefs about their fellow participant's perspectives so 
as construct effective referential expressions. we 
observe reference constituted out of the model a 
processor has of his interlocutor even when these beliefs 
are at odds with their own, or else are derived solely 
from the content of their partner's perspective on 
particular objects. On occasion referential acts are 
even directed toward, and maintained at, deeper levels of 
object perspective, for example A may use his belief of 
B's belief of A's belief about the discourse object. 
We could discern in the referential behaviour 
produced by the task the influence of linguistic 
strategies of generation and interpretation. Once again 
these strategies are not invariant throughout discourse. 
One could also discern their modification through the 
influence of higher level cognitive goals and strategies, 
for example on-line estimations of how much 'success' for 
how much effort. In the last chapter the apparatus of 
'partitioned perspectives' provided a way of accounting 
for the observed distribution of different referential 
forms in the data from our controlled task. Moreover, 
the data seems intractable for any other account of 
definite and indefinite use. 
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If we are not to spend time absorbed in the pursuit 
of which Waismann warns in the first quote of this 
thesis, we must not lose sight of what language is used 
for. Ordinary languaqe was not designed for the 
transmission of the theorems of logic, nor the 
establishment of a Millennial theory of Natural Science; 
its purpose is to allow human beings to communicate with 
each other so that work can be done, transactions carried 
out, wishes expressed and satisfied, and so on. Formal 
views of language tend to impose unity and generality on 
the semantic heory underpinning a language. This finds 
ultimate expression in the Formalist's construal of the 
reference relation. It is no surprise then that 
referential opacity is a property of language which a 
Formalist must be rid of. Nevertheless it is a property 
of languaqe which I believe cannot be avoided. Indeed it 
must not, for it is a fundamental consequence of the fact 
that we as cognitive systems instantiate language. 
Referential opacity should serve to reminds us of the 
processes by which reference is constituted in language. 
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APPENDIX l 
The language presented here is essentially the 
Intensional Logic presented in Dowty et al (1983:155ff), 
which is a modified version of the Intensional Logic 
presented in Montague (1973) • 
1. The syntax of Li 
The set of types of Li is determined by the rules 1-4 
below 
(1) e is a type 
( 2) t is a type 
(3) If a and b are types, then 
<a ,b> is a type 
( 4) If a is a type, then <s,a> is a type 
A. The basic expressions of Li consist of non-logicar 
constants and variables of all types, except s which is 
itself not a type. 
Cl) For each type a, the set of non-logical constants of 
type a, denoted Con:.a.:, contains constants c:.n,a.:, 
for each natural number n 
(2) For each type a, the set of variables of type a, 
denoted var:.a.:, contains variables v:.n,a.:, for each 
) 
natural number n 
B. Syntactic rules of formation of Li 
The set of meaningful expressions of type a, denoted 
'ME:.a.:', for any type a is defined recursively via 1-16 
below: 
1. For each type a, every variable and every non-logical 
constant of type a is a member of ME:.a.:. 
2. For any types a and b, if alpha-in-set-ME:.<a,b>.: 
and beta-in-set-ME:.a.:, then alpha(beta)-in-set-ME:.b.: 
3. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then NOT(PHI)-in-set-ME:.t.: 
4. If PHI and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then (PHI&PSI)-in-set-
ME:. t.: 
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5. If PHI and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then (PHivPSI}-in-set-
ME:.t.: 
6. If PHI and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then (PHI-->PSI}-in-
set-ME:.t.: 
7. If PHI and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then (PHI<-->PSI}-in-
set-ME:.t.: 
8. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and u is a variable, of any 
type, then VuPHI-in-set-ME:.t.: 
9. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and u is a variable, of any 
type, then EuPHI-in-set-ME:.t.: 
10.If alpha-in-set-ME:.a.: and u-in-set-var:.b.:, then 
?Calpha)-in-set-ME:.<b,a>.: 
11.If alpha and beta are both in ME:.a.:, then 
alpha=beta-in-set-ME:.t.: 
12.If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then NECC(PHI}-in-set-ME:.t.: 
13.If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then Fut(PHI}-in-set-ME:.t.: 
14.If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then Past(PHI}-in-set-ME:.t.: 
15.If alpha-in-set-ME:.a.:, then A(alpha}-in-set-
ME:.<s,a>.: 
16.If alpha-in-set-ME:.<s,a>.:, then @Calpha}-in-set-
ME:.a.: 
2. The semantics of Li 
For a non-empty set A (the domain of entities} a set of 
possible denotations of expressions of each type a is 
given by 1-4 below where a and b are any types (using the 
convention that 'D:.x.:' is the set of possible 
denotations for expressions of syntactic category x). 
1. D:.e.: is A 
2. D:.t.: is {0,1} 
3. For any syntactic categories a and b 
D:.<a,b>.:=D:.b.:.:Da:. 
4. D:.<s,a>.:=D:.a.:.:WxT:. 
A model for Li is an ordered quintuple <A,W,T,<,F> where: 
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A is the set of objects/individuals in the model 
W is the number of possible worlds available to the model 
T is the set of time intervals at which the model is sampled 
< is a linear ordering of the set T 
The function F will assign to each non-logical constant 
of Li of type a a member of S:.a.:, where S:.a.: is the 
set of senses of type a defined as D:.<s,a>.: 
An assignment of values to variables g assigns to each 
variable v:.n,a.: a denotation from the set D:.a.: for 
each type a and natural number n. 
A. The semantic values of non-logical constants and 
variables 
1. If alpha is a non-logical constant of Li, then 
I [alpha] I. :M,w,t,g:. = [F (alpha)] C<w,t>l Ci.e the 
semantic value of alpha at <w,t> is the result of 
applying the intension of alpha, supplied by F, to the 
argument <w,t» 
2. If alpha is a variable of Li, then 
I [alpha] l.:M,w,t,g:. = g(alpha) 
B. Recursive semantic rules of formation determine of any 
expression alpha, the semantic value of alpha with 
respect to M, w-in-set-w, t-in-set-T and g as follows 
la. If alpha is a non-logical constant of Li, then 
I [alpha] I. :M,w,t,g:. = [F (alpha)] C<w,t>l Ci.e the 
semantic value of alpha at <w,t> is the result of 
applying the intension of alpha, supplied by F, to the 
argument <w,t» 
lb. If alpha is a variable of Li, then 
I [alpha] I • :M, w, t, g:. = g (alpha) 
2. If alpha-in-set-ME:.<a,b>.: and beta-in-set-ME:.a.:, 
then I [alphaCbeta)] I. :M,w,t,g:. = 
I [alpha] IM,w,t,g:. CI [beta] I. :M,w,t,g: .) • Cthe results of 
applying the function I [alpha] l.:M,w,t,g:. to the 
argument I [beta] I. :M,w,t,g:.) : 
3. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: then I [NOT(PHI)] I .:M,w,t,g:. = 1 
if and only if I [PHI] l.:M,w,t,g:. = O; otherwise 
I [NOT (PH I ) l I • : M , w , t , g : • = 0 
4. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.: then 
I [PHI&PSill.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only if both 
I [PHI] I. :M,w,t,g:. = 1 and I [PSI] I. :M,w,t,g:. =l 
otherwise I [PHI&PSI] I. :M,w,t,g:. = 0 
5. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.: then 
I [PHivPSil l.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only if either 
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I [PHI] I. :M,w,t,g:. = 1 or I [PSI] I. :M,w,t,g:. =l, or both; 
otherwise I [PHivPSil I. :M,w,t,g:. = O 
6. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.: then 
I [PHI-->PSil l.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only if either 
I [PHI] I. :M,w,t,g:. = 0 or I [PSI] I. :M,w,t,g:. =l; 
otherwise l[PHI-->PSil l.:M,w,t,g:. = 0 
7. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and PSI-in-set-ME:.t.: then 
I [PHI<-->PSil l.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only if either, 
I r PH I 1 I • : M , w, t , g : • = 1 and I [ P s I l I • : M , w, t , g : • = 1 , or 
I [PH I l I • : M, w, t, g : • = 0 and I [PS I l I • : M, w, t, g : • = 0 • 
8. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and u is Var:.a.: then 
I [VuPHil l.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only if 
I [PHI] l.:M,w,t,g':. = 1 for all g' exactly like alpha 
except possibly for the value assigned to u 
9. If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: and u is var:.a.: then 
I [EuPHil I. :M,w,t,g:. = 1 if and only I [PHI] I. :M,w,t,g':. 
= 1 for some exactly like g except possibly for the value 
assigned to u 
10.If alpha-in-set-ME:.a.: and u-in-set-var:.b.:, then 
I [?u(alpha)] l.:Mg:. is that function h with domain D:.b.: 
such that for any object k in that domain, 
h(k)=I [alpha] l.:M,g':. where g' is that value assignment 
exactly like g with the possible difference that g'Cu) is 
the object k. 
II.If, alpha and beta are in ME:.a.:, then 
I [alpha=betal l.:M,w,t,g:. is I if and only if 
I [alpha] I. :M,w,t,g:. is the same as I [beta] I. :M,w,t,g:. 
I2.If PHI-in-set-ME:.t.:, then I [NECC(PHI)] I .:M,w,t,g:. 
is I if and only if I [PHI] l.:M,w' ,t' ,g:. is I for all 
<w' ,t'> in WxT 
13.If PHI-in-set-ME:.t. :, then I [Fut(PHI)] I .:M,w,t,g:. is 
1 if and only if I [PHI] l.:M,w,t' ,g:. is 1 for some t' in 
T such t<t' 
I 4. If PHI-in-set-ME:. t.:, then I [Past (PHI)] I • :M,w, t,g:. 
is I if and only if I [PHI] l.:M,w,t' ,g:. is 1 for some t' 
in T such t'<t 
42 9 
15.If alpha-in-set-ME: .a.:, then I ["alpha] I. :M,w,t,g:. is 
that function h with domain WxT such that for all <w',t'> 
in WxT. hC<w' ,t' >> is I [alpha] I. :M,w' ,t' ,g:. 
16.If alpha-in-set-ME:.<s,a>.: then I [@alpha] I .:M,w,t,g:. 
is I [alpha] I • : M, w, t , g : • (< w, t >) 
c. The following truth definitions are established for 
formulas of Li relative to M 
1. For any expression PHI-in-set-ME:.t.: of Li, then PHI 
is true with respect to M and to <w,t> if and only if 
I [PHI] l.:M,w,t,g:. = 1 for all g assignments. 
2. If alpha is any expression, then the intension of 
alpha with respect to Mand g, denoted "I [alpha] I .:M,g:. 
is that function h with domain WxT such that for all 
<w,t> in WxT, hC<w,t» is I [alpha] I. :M,w,t,g:. 
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